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A Logical Model for Security of Web Services
Hristo Koshutanski and Fabio Massacci
Dip. di Informatica e Telecomunicazioni - Univ. di Trento
via Sommarive 14 - 38050 Povo di Trento (ITALY)
{hristo,massacci}@dit.unitn.it
Abstract. Business Processes for Web Services are the new paradigm
for the lightweight integration of business from different enterprises.
Yet, there is not a comprehensive proposal for a logical framework for ac-
cess control for business processes though logics for access control policies
for basic web services are well studied.
In this paper we propose a logical framework for reasoning (deduction,
abduction, consistency checking) about access control for business pro-
cesses for web services.
1 Introduction
In the past millennium the development of middleware connected the IT efforts
to integrate distributed resources of a single enterprise. The new century has seen
the rise of a new IT concept: virtual enterprise. Virtual enterprise is born when a
business process is no longer closed within the boundary of a single corporation.
The business process is thus composed by partners that offer their services on
the web and integrate each other efforts into one (hopefully) coherent process.
The scenario offered by business processes for web services is particularly
challenging for the definition of its security features. Indeed it has some aspects of
trust management systems and some aspects of workflow security management.
From the trust management systems (see e.g. [13, 7]) it takes the credential-
based view: a (web) service is offered on its own and the decision to grant or
deny access can only be made on the basis of the credentials sent by the client.
From workflow authorization systems (see e.g. [2, 9]) we borrow all classical
problems such as dynamic assignment of roles to users, dynamic separation of
duties, and assignment of permission to users according to the least privilege
principles. In contrast with workflow security management schemes a business
process for web services crosses organizational boundaries and is provided by
entities that sees each other as just partners and nothing else. We have something
even more loosely coupled than federated databases.
So, it is not a surprise that there is not a comprehensive proposal for a logical
framework that tackles these aspects, though logics for access control policies for
basic web services, workflows, and distributed systems are well studied.
We identify a number of differences w.r.t. traditional access control:
– credential vs user based access control,
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– interactive vs one-off evaluation of credentials (i.e., controlled disclosure of
information vs all-or-nothing decision),
– on-line vs off-line analysis of consistency of roles and users assignments (e.g.,
for separation of duties),
In this paper we propose a logical framework for reasoning about access
control for business processes for web services. We identify the different reasoning
tasks (deduction, abduction, consistency checking) that characterize the problem
and clarify the problems of temporal evolution of the logical model (addition and
revocation of credentials).
2 The Formal Framework
Our formal model for reasoning on access control is based variants of Datalog
with the stable model semantics and combines in a novel way a number of
features:
– logics for trust management by Li et al. [11];
– logic for workflow access control by Bertino et al. [2];
– logic for release and access control by Bonatti and Samarati [3].
We consider the view of the single partner, as we cannot assume sharing of
policies between partners. In [10] it is explained how the entire process can be
orchestrated by using “mobile” business processes, while keeping each partner
policy decision process as a black-box.
In our framework each partner has a security policy for access control PA
and a security policy for interaction control PI , whose syntax will be defined
later in §3.
The policy for access control is used for making decision about usage of all
web services offered by the partner. The policy for interaction control is used to
decide which credentials must be additionally provided or must be revoked by
the user if those available are not adequate to obtain the service.
In many workflow authorization schemes, the policy is not sufficient to make
an access control decisions and thus we need to identify the history of the exe-
cution H of the business process as perceived by the current partner, and a set
of active (unrevoked) credentials CA that have been presented by the agent in
past requests to other services comprised in the same business process.
To execute a service of the fragment of business process under the control the
partner the user will submit a set of presented credentials CP , a set of revoked
credential CR and a service request R (.) We assume that CR and CP are disjoint.
To specify how the access control decision is made we now assume the usual
inference capabilities, that is, for any set of formulae (Datalog rules and facts)
F and any formula f :
deduction determines whether f is a logical consequence of F , F |= f ;
consistency determines whether F is consistent, F 6|= ⊥;
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abduction given an additional set of atoms A called the abducible atoms, and a
partial order relation ≺ between subsets of A determine a set of atoms E ⊂ A
such that (i) f is a logical consequence of F and E , namely F ∪ E |= f , (ii)
adding E to F does not generate an inconsistency, namely F ∪ E 6|= ⊥, and
finally (iii) E is a ≺-minimal subset of A having this property (See further
Def. 1).
For an introduction to abduction see Shanahan [12], for a survey of complexity
results - Eiter et al. [6]. We shall see later on in section 5 how abduction is used.
3 Logical Syntax
For the syntax we build upon [2, 3, 11]. We have a four disjoint sets of constants,
one for users identifiers denoted by User :U , one for roles Role :R, one for services
WebServ :S, and finally one for keys that are used to certify credentials Key :K.
We assume that we have the following security predicates:
Role :Ri Â Role :Rj when role Role : Ri dominates in the global role hierarchy
role Role :Rj .
Role :Ri ÂWebServ:S Role :Rj when role Role :Ri dominates in the local role hier-
archy for service WebServ :S role Role :Rj .
assign (P,WebServ :S) when an access to the service WebServ :S is granted (as-
signed) to P . Where P can be either a Role :R or User :U .
forced (P,WebServ :S) if the predicate is true then an access right to access the
service WebServ : S must be given (forced) to P . Where P can be either a
Role :R or User :U .
We have three type of predicates for credentials:
declaration (User :U) it is a statement declared by the User :U for its identity.
credentialID (Key :K,User :U,Role :R) it is a statement declared and signed by
Key :K corresponding to some trusted authority that User :U has activated
Role :R.
credentialTask (Key :K,User :U,WebServ :S) it is a statement declared and signed
by Key :K corresponding to some trusted authority that User :U has the right
to access WebServ :S.
Three type of predicates describing the current status of each service:
running (P,WebServ :S, number :N) if it is true then the number :Nth activation
of WebServ :S is executed by P .
abort (P,WebServ :S, number :N) if it is true then the number :Nth activation of
WebServ :S within a workflow aborts.
success (P,WebServ :S, number :N) if it is true then the number :Nth activation
of WebServ :S within a workflow successfully executes.
Furthermore, for some additional workflow constraints we need to have some
meta-level predicates that specify how many statements are true. We use here a
notation borrowed from Niemela¨ smodels system, but we are substantially using
the count predicates defined by Das [4]:
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n ≤ {X.Pr} where n is a positive integer, X is a set of variables, and Pr is a
predicate, so that intuitively n ≤ {X.Pr} is true in a model if at least n
instances of the grounding of X variables in Pr are satisfied by the model.
The {X.Pr} ≤ n is the dual predicate.
4 Formal Rules and Semantics
Normal logic programs [1] are sets of rules of the form:
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (1)
where A, Bi and Ci are (possibly ground) predicates among those listed in Sec.3
A is called the head of the rule, each Bi is called a positive literal and each
not Cj is a negative literal, whereas the conjunction of the Bi and not Cj is
called the body of the rule. A normal logic program is a set of rules.
In our framework, we also need constraints that are rules with an empty head.
← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (2)
One of the most prominent semantics for normal logic programs is the stable
model semantics proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [8] (see also [1] for an intro-
duction). The intuition is to interpret the rules of a program P as constraints on
a solution set S (a set of ground atoms) for the program itself. So, if S is a set
of atoms, a rule 1 is a constraint on S stating that if all Bi are in S and none
of Cj are in it, then A must be in S. A constraint 2 is used to rule out from the
set of acceptable models the situation in which Bi are true and all Cj are false
is not acceptable.
Definition 1 (Abduction). Let P be a logic program, H be a set of predicates
(called hypothesis, or abducibles), L be a (positive or negative) ground literal
(sometimes called the manifestation), and ≺ a p.o. over subsets of H, the cau-
tious solution of the abduction problem is a set of ground atoms E such that
1. E is a set ground instances of predicates in H,
2. P ∪ E |= L
3. P ∪ E 6|= ⊥
4. any set E′ ≺ E does not satisfy all three conditions above
Remark 1. The choice of the partial order has a major impact in presence of
complex role hierarchies. The “intuitive” behavior of the abduction algorithm
for what regards the extraction of the minimal set of security credentials is not
guaranteed by the straightforward interpretation of H as the set of credentials
and by the set cardinality or set containment as minimality orderings.
To understand the problem consider the following logic program:
assign (User :U,WebServ :ws) ←credentialID (Key :k,User :U,Role :R),
Role :R Â Role :r1
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Role :r2 Â Role :r1 ←
The request assign (User :fm,WebServ :ws) has two ⊆-minimal solutions:
{credentialID (Key :k,User :fm,Role :r1)}, {credentialID (Key :k,User :fm,Role :r2)}
Yet, our intuition is that the first should be the minimal one.
So, we need a more sophisticated partial order. For example, if E ¹ E′ is such
that for all credentials c ∈ E there is a credential c′ ∈ E′ where c = c′. We can
revise it so that E ≺ E′ if c ∈ E there is a credential c′ ∈ E′ where c′ is identical
to c except that it contains a role R′ that dominates the corresponding role R
in c. This p.o. generates the “intuitive” behavior of the abduction algorithm.
Definition 2. An access control policy PA is a logic program over the predicates
defined in Sec. 3 in which (i) no credential, no role hierarchy atom, and no exe-
cution atom can occur in the head of a rule and (ii) for every rule containing and
head A which is the (possibly ground instance of) predicate forced (P,WebServ :S)
there is the (possibly ground instance of) rule assign (P,WebServ :S)←
forced (P,WebServ :S).
An access control request is a ground instance of an assign (i,WebServ :k)
predicate.
The request r is a security consequence of a policy PA if (i) the policy is
logically consistent and (ii) the request is a logical consequence of the policy.
Definition 3. An interaction policy PI is a logic program in which no credential
and no role hierarchy atom can occur in the head of a rule.
Definition 4 (Fair Access). Let PA be an access control policy, let CD be
the set of ground instances of credentials occurring in PA, and let ≺ be a p.o.
over subsets of CD. The access control policy guarantees ≺-fair access if for any
ground request r that is an instance of a head of a rule in PA there exists a set
CM ⊆ CD that is a solution of the abduction problem.
Definition 5 (Fair Interaction). Let PA, and PI be, respectively, an access
control policy and an interactive policy, and let CD be the set of ground instances
of credentials occurring in PA, and let ≺ be a p.o. over subsets of CD. The policies
guarantee ≺-fair interaction w.r.t. a set of credentials CI if (i) PA guarantees
≺-fair access and (ii) for any solution of the abduction problem CM ⊆ CD and
any credential c ∈ CM if it PI ∪ CI |= c. If the set of initial credentials CI only
contains declarations then the access control is unlimited.
5 The Formal Framework: Reasoning
To allow for an easier grasp of the problem we start with a basic framework.
Traditional Access Control. This approach is the cornerstone of most logical
formalization [5].
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the credentials, namely
PA ∪ CP |= r
2. if the check succeeds then grant access else deny access
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A number of works has deemed such blunt denial unsatisfactory and therefore
it has been proposed by Bonatti and Samarati [3] and Yu et al. [14] to send back
to the client some of the rules that are necessary to gain additional access.
Disclosable Access Control. It is revised to allow for the flow of rules and
information to users:
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the credentials, namely
PA ∪ CP |= r
2. if the check succeeds then access is granted, otherwise select some rule r ←
p ∈ PA and send the rule back to the client
In many cases, this solution is neither sufficient nor desirable. For instance if
the policy is not flat, it has constraints on the credentials that can be presented
at the same time (e.g., separation of duties) or a more complex role structure
is used, these systems would not be complete. Also repeated queries allow for
the disclosure of the entire policy, which might well be undesirable. In this case
we need the interactive access control solution for Web Services proposed by
Koshutanski and Massacci [10] that is described below.
Interactive Access Control for Stateless WS.
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the credentials, namely
PA ∪ CP |= r
2. if the check succeeds then access is granted, otherwise
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials as
CD = {c|c credential and PI ∪ CP |= c}
(b) use abduction to find a minimal set of missing credentials CM such that
both PA ∪ CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪ CP ∪ CM 6|= ⊥
(c) if no such set exists then ⊥ is sent back to the user,
(d) otherwise the set of missing credentials CM is send back to the client
and the process re-iterates.
This type of decision is characteristic of most logical approaches to access control
[11, 2, 3]: we only look at the policy, the request and the set of credentials.
If the authorization decisions of business processes are stateful, and the the
corresponding workflow of the partners has constraints on the execution of future
services on the basis of past services, then even this solution is not adequate
enough. As we already noted, the problems are the following:
– the request may be inconsistent with some role that the user has taken up
in the past;
– the new set of credential may be inconsistent with requirements such as
separation of duties;
So, this means that we must have some roll-back procedure by which, if the user
has by chance sent the “wrong” credentials, he has some revocation mechanism
to drop them.
Access Control for Stateful Business Processes. At this stage, we need
all the policy and set of credentials that we have envisaged and indeed the partner
expects from the client the set of current credentials CP plus the set of revoked
CR. The (logical) access control decision takes the following steps:
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1. remove the revoked credentials from the set of active credentials, namely
CA ← CP ∪ CA \ CR,
2. verify the consistency of the request with the active set of credentials and
the history of execution, namely PA ∪H ∪ CA ∪ {r} 6|= ⊥
3. If this check succeeds goes to the next step, otherwise
(a) derive a subset of excessing credentials that must be revoked by the user
CE ⊆ CA such that the set CE is minimal w.r.t. the ≺ partial order and
that by removing it from CA the consistency check would succeed
(b) if no such set exists then ⊥ is sent back to the user
(c) if it exists, this set is send back to the user and the process is re-iterated.
4. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the credentials, namely
PA ∪H ∪ CA |= r,
5. if this check succeeds then access is granted
6. if the step fails
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials as
CD = {c|c credential and PI ∪H ∪ CA |= c}
(b) use abduction to find a minimal set of missing credentials CM such that
both PA ∪H ∪ CA ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CA ∪ CM 6|= ⊥
(c) if this set exists then CM is send back to the client and the process
re-iterates.
(d) if it does not exists then
i. generalize the set of disclosable credentials to all credentials occur-
ring in PA
ii. use adbuction to find a minimal set of missing credentials CM such
that both PA ∪H ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CM 6|= ⊥
iii. if no such set does exist then ⊥ is sent back to the user,
iv. if such set do exists then compute the set of revocable credentials CE
as the set CA \ CM, return this set to the client and re-iterate the
process
When the request is granted the appropriate grounding of suitable history pred-
icates are added to H.
Remark 2. The step 3a looks the opposite of abduction: rather than adding new
information to derive more things (the request), we drop information to derive
less things (the inconsistency). It is possible to show that by adding a number of
rules linear in the number of potentially revocable credentials the two task are
equivalent.
Theorem 1. If an access control policy guarantees ≺-fair access and H = ∅ the
access control algorithm for stateful business processes never returns ⊥.
Theorem 2. If access and interaction control policies guarantee ≺-fair inter-
action w.r.t. a set of credentials CI and H = ∅ the access control algorithm
for stateful business processes, there exists a sequence of revocable and missing
credentials starting with CI such that the access control algorithm for stateful
business processes eventually grant r.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a logical framework for reasoning about access con-
trol for business processes for web services. Our formal model for reasoning on
access control is based variants of Datalog with the stable model semantics and
combines in a novel way a number of features: the logic for trust management
by Li et al. [11]; the logic for workflow access control by Bertino et al. [2]; and
the logic for controlling the release of information by Bonatti and Samarati [3].
We identified the different reasoning tasks (deduction, abduction, consistency
checking) that characterize the problem and clarify the problems of temporal
evolution of the logical model (updates and downdates of credentials).
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Abstract. Transacting and interacting through computer networks makes it dif-
ficult to use traditional methods for establishing trust between parties. Creat-
ing substitutes by which people, organisations and software agents can derive
trust in others through computer networks requires computerised analysis of trust
topologies. This paper describes diverse dimensions of trust that are needed for
analysing trust topologies, and provides a notation with which to express trust re-
lationships in terms of these dimensions. The result is a simple way of specifying
topologies of trust from which derived trust relationships can be automatically
and securely computed.
1 Introduction
Modern communication media are increasingly removing us from familiar styles of
interacting and doing business which both rely on some degree of trust between the in-
teraction or business partners. Moreover most traditional cues for assessing trust in the
physical world are not available through those media. We may now be conducting busi-
ness with people and organisations of which we know nothing, and we are faced with
the difficult task of making decisions involving risk in such situations. As a result the
topic of trust in open computer networks is receiving considerable attention in the net-
work security community and e-commerce industry [1–4]. State of the art technology
for stimulating trust in e-commerce includes cryptographic security mechanisms for
providing confidentiality of communication and authentication of identities. However,
merely having a cryptographically certified identity or knowing that the communication
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channel is encrypted is not enough for making informed decisions if no other knowl-
edge about a remote transaction partner is available. Trust therefore also applies to for
example the reliability, honesty and reputation of transaction partners.
Being able to formally express and reason with these types of trust is needed in
order to create substitutes for the methods we use in the physical world, and also for
creating new methods for determining trust in electronic environments. The aim of this
will be to create communication infrastructures where trust can thrive in order to ensure
meaningful and mutually beneficial interactions between players.
In this regard, we intend to describe a notation for specifying topologies of transi-
tive trust, and to discuss ways to reason about trust in such topologies. We first consider
properties of trust: diversity, transitivity, and combination. We then propose a notation
for describing and reasoning about trust, and illustrate how this notation may success-
fully and securely be used to correctly analyse different trust scenarios. Finally, we
identify several requirements that trust measures and operators should satisfy.
2 Trust Diversity
Humans use trust to facilitate interaction and accept risk in situations where complete
information is unavailable. However, trust is a complex concept that is difficult to strin-
gently define. A wide variety of definitions of trust have been put forward [5], many of
which are dependent on the context in which interaction occurs, or on the observer’s
subjective point of view. Deutsch’s definition of trust is commonly used as a starting
point for understanding:
If an individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an
event perceived to be beneficial
 
or to an event perceived to be harmful
 	

; he perceives that the occurrence of
 	

or
 	
is contingent on
the behaviour of another person; and he perceives that the strength of
 	  
to be greater than the strength of
 
. If he chooses to take an ambiguous
path with such properties, I shall say he makes a trusting choice; if he chooses
not to take the path, he makes a distrustful choice. [6]
While Deutsch breaks trust down further into several different circumstances in
which a trusting choice might be made, he concentrates on the fact that trust “is strongly
liked to confidence in, and overall optimism about, desirable events taking place.” [7]
A similar description of trust has been expressed by McKnight and Chervany and
can be summarised as follows:
Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on something or
somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though
negative consequences are possible. [5]
This definition illustrates that non-living material or abstract things can also be trusted
although they do not have a free will to behave honestly or dishonestly in the way
living persons do. McKnight and Chervany also separate between different trust con-
structs, including trusting behaviour which expresses the act of entry into a situation
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of dependence, trusting intention which is only the intention to do so, and system trust
which denotes trust in “impersonal structures”, either material or abstract.
Thus, we may say that trust is related to belief in the honesty, reliability, compe-
tence, willingness, etc. of the trusted entity, it being a person, organisation, system.
Trust can also be related to a particular property of material or abstract objects such as
a computer system or our legal institutions. Despite this variation in meanings, many
researchers simply use and assume a definition of trust in a very specific way, such as a
trusted public key which refers to the authenticity of that key.
The repeated uses of the word “perceives” in Deutsch’s definition implies that trust
is a subjective quality individuals place in one another. Additionally, the fact that dif-
ferent entities can have different kinds of trust in the same target entity indicates that
trust is subjective. It is also important to notice that trust is related to the purpose and
nature of the relationship, e.g. an organisation trusts an employee to deal with financial
transactions up to a specific amount, but not above, and that same employee might not
be trusted to make public statements about the organisation.
In order for trust to form topologies it needs to be expressed with three basic di-
versity dimensions [8] where the first dimension represents the trustor or trust origin,
the second represents the trust purpose, and the third represents the trustee or the trust
target. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 below.
TT n
TO n
 P n
TO 2
TT 2
 P 2
Trust TargetTrust Purpose
 P
Trust Origin
3) Target diversity TO
TT 1
 P
2) Purpose diversity TO
TT
 P 1
1) Origin diversity TO 1
TT
Fig. 1. Basic trust diversity
In addition to the three basic topology dimensions a measure can be associated
with each trust relationship. The trust measure could for example be binary (trusted,
not trusted), discrete (e.g. strong trust, weak trust, strong distrust, weak distrust, etc.)
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or continuous in some form (e.g. probability, percentage or belief functions of trust-
worthiness). The topic of expressing and computing trust measures will be discussed in
Sec. 7.
In addition, a fifth important element to a trust relationship is its time component.
Quite obviously trust of the trustor in the trustee regarding a certain purpose at one
point in time might be quite different from this trust after several transactions between
these two entities have taken place. This means, that we can model time as a set of dis-
crete events taking place, where both entities trustor and trustee are involved. However,
even if no transactions take place, a trust relationship will gradually change with time
passing. Therefore, in addition to the discrete changes that are made when events have
occurred, we must also take into account continuous changes to trust relationships.
3 Trust Transitivity
It has been shown [9] that trust is not implicitly transitive. However, a recommendation
system can be used to allow trust transitivity according to explicit conditions.
Trust transitivity means, for example, that if Alice trusts Bob who trusts Clark then
Alice will also trust Clark. This assumes that Bob actually tells Alice that he trusts
Clark, and this will typically happen in a recommendation. In this simple example the
trust origins and trust targets are easily identifiable, but it does not say anything specific
about the trust purposes.
Let us assume that Alice needs to have her car serviced, so she asks Bob for his
advice about where to find a good car mechanic in town. Bob is thus trusted by Alice
to know about a good car mechanic and to tell his honest opinion about that, whereas
Clark is trusted by Bob to be a good car mechanic.
Let us make the example slightly more complicated, wherein Bob does not actually
know any car mechanics himself, but he knows Claire whom he believes knows a good
car mechanic. As it happens, Claire is happy to recommend the car mechanic named
David. The trust origins and targets are again explicit, but it is more tricky to define
exactly for what purpose Alice now trusts Bob. The most obvious is to say that Alice
trusts Bob to recommend somebody who can recommend a good car mechanic. The
problem with this type of formulation is that the length of the trust purpose becomes
proportional with the length of the transitive chain, so that the trust purpose rapidly
becomes an impenetrable expression. It can be observed that this type of trust purpose
has a recursive structure that can be exploited to define a more compact expression
for the trust purpose. Trust in the ability to recommend represents indirect trust and
is precisely what allows trust to become transitive. At the same time this trust always
assumes the existence of a direct trust purpose at the end of the transitive path which in
the example above is about being a good car mechanic.
This observation indicates that the trust purpose of the final leg must somehow be
part of every leg in the trust path. We will express this by defining the two trust variants
indirect and direct and let the trust variant be a parameter in every trust purpose.
Alice would then have indirect trust in Bob to be a good car mechanic, and sim-
ilarly for Bob and Claire. This must be interpreted as saying that Alice trusts Bob to
recommend somebody (to recommend somebody etc.) to be a good car mechanic. On
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the other hand Claire would have direct trust in David to be a good car mechanic. The
indirect variant of a trust purpose is recursive so that any transitive trust chain, with
arbitrary length, can be expressed using only one trust purpose with two variants.
The examples above assume some sort of absolute trust between the agents in the
transitive chain. In reality trust is never absolute, and many researchers have proposed
to express trust as discrete verbal statements, as probabilities or other continuous mea-
sures. One observation which can be made from a human perspective is that trust is
weakened or diluted through transitivity. By taking the example above, it means that
Alice’s trust in the car mechanic David through the recommenders Bob and Claire can
be at most as strong as Claire’s trust in David. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 below.
Fig. 2. Trust transitivity
By assuming Alice’s trust in Bob and Bob’s trust in Claire to be positive but not
absolute, Alice’s derived trust in David is intuitively weaker that Claire’s trust in David.
It could be argued that negative trust in a transitive chain can have the paradoxical
effect of strengthening the derived trust. Take for example the case where Bob distrusts
Claire and Claire distrusts David whereas Alice trusts Bob. In this situation Alice might
actually derive positive trust in David, since she relies on Bob’s advice and Bob says:
Claire is a cheater, do not rely on her. So the fact that Claire distrusts David might count
as a pro-David argument from Alice’s perspective. The question boils down to “is the
enemy of my enemy my friend”. However this question relates to how trust is computed
and derived, and we will not go into further detail on this issue here.
We will use the symbol “   ” to denote initial trust relationships and “


 
” to denote
derived trust relationships, so that the trust relationships of Fig. 2 can be expressed as:
Alice


  David  Alice   Bob   Claire   David (1)
where the trust purpose is implicit. Let the trust purpose be defined as    “ trusts 
to be a good car mechanic ”. Let the direct variant be denoted by 

  and the indirect
variant by 	

 
. The trust topology of Fig.2 can then be explicitly expressed as:
Alice 
 

 


  David  Alice 
 	

 
  Bob 
 	

 
  Claire 
 

 
  David (2)
The idea of contstructing transitive trust chains based on a single trust purpose with
direct and indirect variants is captured by the following definition.
Definition 1. A valid transitive trust chain requires that every leg in the chain contains
the same trust purpose and that every leg except the last is indirect.
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The transitive path stops when a leg is not indirect. It is of course possible for a
principal to have both direct and indirect trust in another principal but that should be
expressed as two separate trust legs. The existence of both a direct and an indirect trust
leg e.g. from Claire to David should be interpreted as Claire having trust in David not
only to be a good car mechanic but also to recommend somebody else for the job.
Let trust measures be denoted by   where 	 refers to a specific trust measure, and let
Alice, Bob and Claire’s trust measures be     ,    and    respectively. Let time stamps
be denoted by  where  refers to a specific time, and let the trust measures be time
stamped    ,   and   respectively. Alice’s derived trust measure and time stamp are
denoted by   and   . The trust expression of Fig. 2 can then be expressed as:
Alice 
 

 
	
  
	





  David  Alice 
 	

 	
 
 	

 
  Bob 
 	

 	
 
	


 
Claire 
 

 	
 
	

 
  David (3)
Claire obviously recommends to Bob her opinion about David as a car mechanic,
but Bob’s recommendation to Alice is ambiguous. It can either be that Bob passes
Claire’s recommendation unaltered on to Alice, or that Bob derives his own direct trust
in David which he recommends to Alice. The latter way of passing recommendations
can create problems and it is better when Alice receives Claire’s recommendation unal-
tered. This will be discussed in more detail in Sec. 5.
4 Parallel Trust Combination
It is common to collect recommendations from several sources in order to be better
informed when making decisions. This can be modelled as parallel trust combination.
Let us assume again that Alice needs to get her car serviced, and that she asks Bob
to recommend a good car mechanic. When Bob recommends David, Alice would like
to get a second opinion, so she asks Claire for her opinion about David. Intuitively, if
both Bob and Claire recommend David as a good car mechanic, Alice’s trust in David
will be stronger than if she had only asked Bob. Parallel combination of positive trust
thus has the effect of strengthening the derived trust. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 below.
Fig. 3. Parallel trust combination
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In the case where Alice receives conflicting recommended trust, e.g. both trust and
distrust, then she needs some method for combining these conflicting recommendations
in order to derive her trust in David.
We will use the symbol “,” to denote combination of trust, so that Alice’s combina-
tion of the two parallel trust chains from her to David can be expressed as:
Alice


  David 
 
Alice   Bob   David

	
 
Alice   Claire   David
 (4)
In the above expression the trust purpose is implicit, and the following expression
makes it explicit with regard to the trust purpose:
Alice 
 

 


  David 
 
Alice  
 	

 
  Bob 
 

 
  David

	
 
Alice 
 	

 
  Claire 
 

 
  David
 (5)
5 Topology Analysis
Trust topologies can involve many principals, and capital letters
 
	 	 will be used
to denote principals instead of names such as Alice and Bob.
We will first explain why a recommendation should always be passed in its original
form from the recommender to the relying party, and not as secondary derived trust.
Fig. 4 shows an example of how not to provide recommendations.
Fig. 4. Incorrect recommendation
In Fig. 4 the trust and recommendation arrows are indexed according to the order
in which they are formed whereas the initial trust relationships have no index. In the
scenario of Fig.4  passes his recommendation about  to  and 	 (index 1) so that
 and 	 are able to derive direct trust in  (index 2). Now  and 	 pass their derived
trust in  to
  (index 3) so that she can derive direct trust in  (index 4). As a result  
perceives the topology to be
 
 
 

 


	
 
 
 
	
 


. The problem with this scenario
is that
 
is ignorant about  so that
 
in fact derives a hidden topology that is different
from the perceived topology:
Perceived topology: Hidden topology:
 
 
 

 


	
 
 
 
	
 

 


 
 
 

 

 


	
 
 
 
	
 

 


(6)
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The reason for this is that  ’s trust 


 
 was derived from        and 	 ’s trust
	


 
 was derived from 	       , so when  and 	 recommend  they implicitly
recommend        and 	       [10] but this is hidden from   . It can easily
be seen that neither the perceived nor the hidden topology is equal to the real topology,
which shows that this way of passing recommendations produces incorrect results.
We argue that  and 	 should pass the recommendations explicitly as       
and 	       respectively, and this is certainly possible, but then
 
needs to be
convinced that  and 	 have not altered the recommendations from  . If  and 	
are unreliable they might for example try to change the recommended trust measures.
Not only that, any party that is able to intercept the recommendations from  , 	 , or
 to
 
might want to alter the trust values, and
 
needs to receive evidence of the
authenticity and integrity of the recommendations. Cryptographic security mechanisms
can typically be used to solve this problem, and this will be discussed in more detail in
Sec.6.
It is thus necessary that
 
receives all the trust recommendations unaltered and as
expressed by the original recommending party. An example of a correct way of passing
recommendations is indicated in Fig. 5
Fig. 5. Correct recommendation
In the scenario of Fig. 5 the perceived topology is equal to the real topology which
can be expressed as:
  

 
 
   
 
 

 


	
 
 
 
	
 

 
 
 (7)
The lesson to be learned from the scenarios in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is that there is a
crucial difference between recommending trust in a principal resulting from your own
experience with that principal and recommending trust in a principal which has been
derived as a result of recommendations from others. We will use the term primary trust
to denote the former, and secondary trust for the latter. Fig. 4 illustrated how problems
can occur when secondary trust is recommended, so the rule is to only recommend
primary trust [10]. Derived trust is per definition always secondary trust so that for
example,
 
’s derived trust in  in Fig. 5 should not be recommended to others.
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Expressing transitive chains in the form of Eq. (3) is not always practical, for ex-
ample when the topology is large, or when only parts of it are known. Instead, each
isolated trust relationship can be expressed individually, and an automated parser can
establish valid topologies depending on the need.
The initial trust relationships of Fig. 5 can for example be listed as in Table 1 below:
Table 1. Initial trust relationships of Fig.5
Origin Target Purpose Variant Measure Time
   
 indirect    
	  

   
 indirect     
	  

  
 indirect     
  

  
 indirect   
  

  
 direct   
  

  
 direct    fffi  

A parser going through Table 1 will be able to determine the topology of Fig. 5. The
principal
 
can be called a relying party because she relies on the recommendations
from  , 	 and  to derive her trust in  . We will assume that relying parties will
always try to base derived trust on the most recent recommendations. In Table 1 it
can be observed that there are two entries for the trust leg     and based on the
principle of the most recent trust, the parser would select the last entry expressed by
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 
derives her trust in  at time   , then that
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(8)
The piece of pseudo-code below represents a parsing algorithm that finds a trust
path for a specific origin, target and trust purpose, if it exists, in a set of recommenda-
tions. It evaluates all possible trust paths as true or false, and uses binary logic OR to
combine parallel trust paths. This simplification assumes that trust measures are binary.
As already mentioned, trust can be measured as discrete or continuous values, in which
case a more complex algorithm would be needed.
This simple algorithm can be useful to determine if at least one potential trust path
exists between two principals, and further analysis can then be done to derive the mea-
sure of trust resulting from the topology. The latter must be based on algebraic operators
for computing transitive and parallel trust. This issue will be briefly discussed in Sec 7.
Pseudo-Constructor for a Recommendation:
========================================
Recommendation(Principal origin, Principal target, Purpose purpose,
Variant variant) {
this.origin = origin;
this.target = target;
this.purpose = purpose;
this.variant = variant;
}
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Pseudo-code for a simple evaluation algorithm:
==============================================
Output is binary:
true --> there is a trust path
false --> there is none
Definition of functions:
transitivity : --> logical AND
trust combination , --> logical OR
boolean ParseTrust(Principal origin, Principal target, Purpose purpose,
RecommendationSet recs) {
IF ((origin, target, purpose, ‘direct’) IN recs) {
RETURN true;
}
ELSE {
SELECT rec FROM recs WHERE ((rec.origin == origin) AND
(rec.purpose == purpose) AND
(rec.variant == ‘indirect’));
IF (RESULTS_FROM_SELECT == empty) {
RETURN false;
}
ELSE {
Boolean b = false;
FOREACH rec IN RESULTS_FROM_SELECT DO {
b = b OR ParseTrust(rec.target, target, purpose, recs\rec);
}
RETURN b;
}
}
}
6 Integrity and Authenticity of Recommendations
Cryptography can be used to provide authenticity and integrity of recommendations.
This in turn requires that every participant holds a trusted (i.e. authentic) key. The pro-
cess of generating, distributing and using cryptographic keys is called key management,
and this still is a major and largely unsolved problem on the Internet today.
Public-key infrastructures (PKI) simplify key management and distribution but cre-
ate trust management problems. A PKI refers to an infrastructure for distributing public
keys where the authenticity of public keys is certified by Certification Authorities (CA).
A certificate basically consists of the CA’s digital signature on the public key together
with the owner identity, thereby linking the key and the owner identity together in an
unambiguous way. In order to verify a certificate, the CA’s public key is needed, thereby
creating an identical authentication problem. The CA’s public key can be certified by
another CA etc., but in the end you need to receive the public key of some CA out-of-
band in a secure way. Although out-of-band channels can be expensive to set up and
operate they are absolutely essential in order to obtain a complete chain of trust from
the relying party to the target public key.
However, there are potential trust problems in this design. What happens if a CA
issues a certificate but does not properly check the identity of the owner, or worse, what
happens if a CA deliberately issues a certificate to someone with a false owner identity?
Furthermore, what happens if a private key with a corresponding public-key certificate
is leaked to the public domain by accident, or worse, by intent? Such events could lead
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to systems and users making totally wrong assumptions about identities in computer
networks. Clearly CAs must be trusted to be honest and to do their job properly and
users must be trusted to protect their private keys.
The concept of trusted platforms introduces additional security features to reputa-
tion systems in general, and uses cryptographic means to secure recommendations and
trust assessments in particular [11]. When including security in the description of our
scheme, it must be assumed that every principal has a public/private key pair that can
be used for authentication and encryption. We can either assume that the public keys
are absolutely trusted (i.e. that the relying party is absolutely certain about their au-
thenticity) or that they too can have various levels of trustworthiness. The easiest is of
course to assume absolute trust, because then the authenticity and integrity of the rec-
ommendations communicated can be assumed, and trust topologies can be analysed as
described in the previous sections.
If on the other hand trust in cryptographic keys can have varying measures, then the
trust in every cryptographic key must be determined before the topology in question can
be analysed. Trust in public keys can be derived from trust in the various components
of a PKI. A method for analysing trust in the authenticity of public keys in a PKI is
described in detail in [10] and it broadly follows the same principles as described in the
previous sections.
The consequence of having to derive trust in public keys is that the relying party
might have to analyse a separate topology for every principal in the topology of interest.
The analysis of the topology of Fig.5 which includes 3 recommendations would for
example require the derivation of the trust in the public keys of  ,  and 	 before the
topology itself can be analysed and the trust in the target entity  can be derived. The
analysis of the topology would then have to take the authenticity of the public keys into
account in addition to the trust in the principals. With reference to the scenario of Fig.5
the trust relationships that have to be taken into account are illustrated in Fig.6 below.
Fig. 6. Trust relationships in a topology with authenticated public keys
The existence of two separate trust legs with different purposes, where the first is
targeted at the principal himself and the second at the binding between the public key
and its owner requires some method for combining the two together. Various methods
can be imagined for this purpose and one possibility is to use conjunction (i.e. logical
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AND in the binary case) of the two trust purposes[10]. The purpose of the trust tar-
geted at the public key-to-owner binding can typically be described as    “ trusts the
public key to be authentic ”, and it can be associated with a measure and timestamp
as in the normal case. We will use the symbol “   ” to denote conjunction of two trust
relationships.
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(9)
For a parser to be able to derive this topology, it is of course required that the relying
party
 
has received and stored all these trust recommendations for example in the
form of a table similar to Table 1. Only the first trust purpose in a conjunctive trust
relationship is used by the parser to determine the aactual topology. The second trust
purpose is only used when computing the derived trust measure.
To illustrate the role of key authenticity, take for example the case when a principal
is recommended to be reliable but that the binding between the principal and his key
is broken, e.g. because it is known that the private key has been stolen by an intruder.
The result of the conjunction between trust in the principal and the distrust in his key
would produce distrust, indicating that a principal identified by this particular public
key can not be trusted. This is what intuition would dictate because it is now possible
that recommendations that appear to come from the principal in fact originate from the
intruder who stole the private key and who is not trusted.
7 Measuring and Computing Trust
In previous sections we have used the term “trust measure” without specifying how it
should be expressed or computed, and that is not the topic of this paper. Instead, we have
indicated several intuitive principles that trust measures and computational rules should
follow. Without going into great detail this section describes additional requirements
that trust measures and operators should satisfy.
While trust has no specific measurable units, its value can be measured in a similar
manner to other abstract commodities, like information or knowledge [12]. Many trust
measures have been proposed in the literature varying from discrete measures [13–17]
to continuous measures [10, 18–23].
Typical discrete trust measures are for example “strong trust”, “weak trust”, strong
distrust” and “weak distrust”. PGP[13] is a well known software tool for cryptographic
key management and email security that for example uses the discrete trust measures
“ultimate”, “always trusted”, “usually trusted”, “usually not trusted” and “undefined”
for key owner trust. In order to obtain compatibility between discrete and continuous
methods it should be possible to interpret such discrete verbal statements by mapping
them to continuous measures.
When measuring trust, it is critical that the trust value is meaningful to and usable
by both the origin and the target transacting partners. Otherwise, if trust is subjectively
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measured by each party using different methods, the value becomes meaningless and
unusable. By explicitly defining    and   in the scenarios above, we ensure that the
interacting parties have a common understanding of the trust purpose so that they are
deriving meaningful trust values for one another.
The context, or purpose, of the interaction must also be satisfied by the trust mea-
sure. Again, by explicitly defining    , and   , the context becomes clear to all parties
participating in the interaction.
As mentioned in Sec. 2, time is another element that should be captured together
with trust measures. This element is necessary not only to demonstrate how trust is
evolving, but also in order to enable transaction partners to assess trust based on, for
example, the most recent trust value available.
Determining the confidence of the trust measure is also a requirement. For example,
the weakening of trust through long transitive chains should result in a reduced con-
fidence level. On the other hand, a large number of parallel recommendations should
result in an increased confidence level.
Finally, in order to derive trust measures from a topology there must be explicit
methods for combining trust measures in a transitive chain as in Fig.2, for combining
trust measures in parallel chains as in Fig.3 as well as for combining trust measures
in a conjunction of trust relationships as in Fig.6. Various methods and principles for
deriving trust from such combinations have been proposed in the literature [10, 13, 14,
16, 18–20]. The validation and suitability assessment of any computational approach
should be based on simulations and usability studies in environments equal or similar
to those where it is intended for deployment.
8 Conclusion
We have captured the diversity that exists in trust by specifying three basic topology
dimensions, that of trust origin, trust target and trust purpose. Additionally, we have
incorporated the dimensions of measure and time into the specification which are im-
portant for deriving trust measures through computational methods.
We have described principles for recommendation such that transitive trust chains
might be formed which capture the basic trust diversity dimensions. In this regard, we
found that a trust topology is valid when every leg in the chain contains the same trust
purpose with the last leg having direct trust and all previous legs having indirect trust.
We provided a notation with which to express these trust principles and to analyse
topologies of transitive trust. In doing so, we proved the rule that only primary trust
should be recommended, as recommending secondary trust results in incorrect trust
derivation.
We showed also that the parsing of transitive trust chains may be automated such
that trust measures might be derived practically and easily in scenarios where the topol-
ogy is large or where only parts of the topology are known. We presented the pseudo-
code for such a parser.
Finally, we presented a method with which to ensure the integrity and authentic-
ity of recommendations in transitive trust chains, as well as several requirements for
expressing and computing trust measures.
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Abstract. Reasoning about trust management and credential-based systems such
as SDSI/SPKI, is one of today’s security challenges. The representation and rea-
soning problem for this (simple) public key infrastructure is challenging: we need
to represent permissions, complex naming constructions (“Martinelli’s office-
mate is FAST’s PC-Chair’s Colleague”), intervals of time and metric time for
expiration dates and validity intervals.
Such problem is only partly solved by current approaches. At first because they
focus on Lamport and Rivest’s SDSI and SPKI, the major goal being to show that
the proposed logics and semantics captured exactly SPKI behavior or were better
in this or that respect. Second, reasoning about time is missing. Complicated
logics and algorithms are put in place for name resolution but it is always assumed
that just the valid credentials are evaluated.
What we find missing is what Syverson termed an “independently motivated se-
mantics”. Here, we propose such a semantics with annexed logical calculi. The
semantics has a natural intuitive interpretation and in particular can represent tim-
ing constraints, intersection of validity intervals and naming at the same time.
We also provide a logical calculus based on semantic tableaux with the appeal-
ing feature that the verification of credentials allows for the direct construction
of a counter-model in the semantics when invalid requests are made. This com-
bines semantic tableau method for modal and description logics with systems for
reasoning about interval algebra with both qualitative and metric constraints.
1 Introduction
The security of credential-based systems is one of today’s security challenges. This is
mostly due to the disappearance of the traditional model of client/server interaction
and its replacement by Service Oriented computing [11]: the important data is on some
server which knows the clients and let them just have what they deserve. First of all,
clients are no longer known by servers: the entire idea behind web services is that re-
quests may come from everybody, provided they have the right credentials . Second,
servers themselves are often distributed and their security policies may come from dif-
ferent sources and different administrative domains.
The traditional authentication and authorization questions have been transformed
into another one about trust management: “Does the set of credentials about identifiers
and about permissions proves that the request complies with the set of local policies?”
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To perform these tasks without a centralized security infrastructure, a number of
proposals have been put forward by security researchers (see the recent survey by Weeks
[23]). One of the most cited work is Lampson and Rivest’s SDSI (Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure), later refined into an Internet RFC as SPKI (Simple Public Key
Infrastructure) [10]. Many later proposals such as Binder [9] build upon the intuition of
those works.
Loosely speaking, the appeal of SDSI/SPKI is to have distilled the concept of lo-
cal name and to have reduced the traditional access and authorization decision into a
problem of verifying the combination of credentials linking local names and global
names and credentials linking names and permissions. For example, in FAST’s Chair,
the Chair is a local name, which maps to an individual who is likely to be different from
CSFW’s Chair. The individual standing for Chair may be linked by some certificate
to an individual named Dimitrakos. Dimitrakos’ Colleague may also be mapped into
more than one individual. Suppose now that any Dimitrakos’ Colleague was granted
access to Martinelli’s Computer, should a claim from an FAST’s Chair’s Colleague
be granted by the server? The reasoning is further complicated by time: one can be PC-
chair or colleague for an interval of time and then something may change. Should the
claim be granted in 2004?
The SDSI/SPKI proposal has been the subject of an intense debate and a number
of researchers have formalized this proposal or its alternatives using logics to analyze
and emphasize differences or subtle features. Abadi [1] has used a modal logic, which
later Howell and Kotz [14] have modified, Halpern and Van der Meyden [12, 13] have
proposed another modal logic to reason about it, Jha, Reps and Stubblebine have used
model checking for the verification for the time-free fragment of the logic [21]. Li et al.
[16, 19] have used Datalog.
So far, the approaches in Computer Security fora have focussed on using logics for
giving “the” semantics to the operational description of SDSI/SPKI [10]. This has a
number of drawbacks. For sake of example, to match the certificate treatment of SPKI,
Halper and van der Meyden semantics [12, Sec. 3.2] is self-referential: a certificate is
valid in a model because it is in the list of valid certificates. The English wording looks
almost unacceptable though this is the exact description of the logical definition in the
paper. This mixes syntax (the presence of a string in a set) and semantics (validity of
the attribution of a key to a principal). The list of “valid” certificates describes what is
in a set. In the world, the certificate may no longer describe the situation (for instance
the key has been cracked and CRLs may not have been issued yet): syntactic would-be-
valid certificates could well not be semantically valid.
A second limitation is the (missing) ability of reasoning about time. Obviously, for
reasoning about validity interval one could simply apply the SPKI algorithm. But the
same reasoning applies to any 40 pages paper describing a logic for the 4 pages name
resolution algorithm. Time is the most intriguing aspect of certificates, in particular
if we have name attribution certificates with validity periods that differs from validity
periods of privileges attribution certificates. So, if Fabio’s co-author is Nathalie since
19/Jan/02, and Fabio’s co-author can write chet-mass-03.tex up to 12/Jul/03 this
is equivalent to say that the model could (semantically) satisfy also a certificate stating
that Nathalie can write the paper from 19/Jan/02 to 12/Jul/03. The certificate may
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well not be in the list of valid certificates, as nobody might have actually issued it, but
is nevertheless “semantically valid” as it would describe the status of the world. Even
more sophisticated models such as Jha, Reps, and Stubblebine general authorization
problems [21] cannot reason about such phenomena as their certificates are timeless.
1.1 Our Contribution
Building upon previous formalizations by Abadi, Halpern and van der Meyden, Jha
and Reps we provide a general model for reasoning about naming and identifiers, au-
thorization, credentials, and time. We hope that this would provide the equivalent of
what Syverson termed an “independently motivated semantics” [22]. Last but not least,
we provide a method to reason about them. Nobody is interested in formalizing the
SDSI/SPKI FAST’s PC-Chair’s ConfMan policies if we cannot then decide whether
the remote user making a request signed with the key 0xF34567 is allowed to see the
reviews of paper ES0345.pdf. For the naming and modal part we need to combine
features for advanced work in modal and dynamic logics [17, 7]. For the temporal part,
as we shall see, this is a challenge where a CSP-based qualitative reasoning proper of
Allen’s Interval algebra [4] is not sufficient. TCPs (Temporal CSPs) and STPs (Simple
Temporal Problem) are necessary to handle metric temporal relations [8].
In the rest of the paper we sketch the intuitions about SDSI/SPKI, we show the
semantical model for credential based systems, and the intuitions behind it. We give a
sound and complete calculus and conclude the paper with a brief discussion.
2 A Primer on SDSI/SPKI
The idea behind SDSI/SPKI [10] is that servers make access control decision by looking
at public key credentials which either link identifiers to known roles or other identifiers
or link identifiers with privileges.
Each principal has its set of local names1, denoted by n, possibly with subscript.
Name can be composed so that for Lamport, the local name Ron may map into Rivest
and the name Ron ′ Buddy map into what Rivest consider a buddy. In SPKI, Compound
names are denoted by the tuple construct (name n1 n2 ...nk) or by the equiva-
lent expression n ′ n1 ′ . . . nk where each n − i is a local name, and n is either a local
name or a public key. When n is a key we have a fully qualified name. The interpre-
tation of a compound name depends on the agent except for fully-qualified names. So
that the interpretation of Ron ′ poker-buddies by one agent depends on its interpre-
tation of Ron, and may be different from another agent’s interpretation of Ron and
Ron ′ poker-buddies.
Strictly speaking, we have no agents interpeting names in SPKI but just keys. We
may say that Ron’s interpretation by the agent Lamport is mapped into the agent Rivest,
but what we can only say in practice is that Ron is mapped into the public key kr. So
that the public key kl (which corresponds to what we call the agent Lamport) takes any
credential verifiable with the public key kr as a statement coming from his fellow Ron.
1 In absence of a centralized naming authority there are no global names in SPKI whereas SDSI
had global names such as DNS.
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SPKI has other kinds of principals such as hashes of keys and threshold subject
(”any m out of N of the following subjects”) for joint signatures, or the reserved word
”Self”, representing the entity doing the verification. Here, along the same line of Jha,
Reps and Stubblebine [21], we only consider compound names.
Credentials are represented by certificates. There are various types of certificates
in SPKI: naming certificates, authorization certificates, and certificate revocation lists
(CRLs). Here, we only treat the first two but the framework is designed to give a rea-
sonable account of revocation list.
A naming certificate has the form of a cryptographically signed message with con-
tents (cert (issuer (name k n)) (subject p) valid), where k is a
key (representing the issuer, whose signature is on the certificate), n is a local name, p
is a fully-qualified name, and valid is an optional section describing temporal validity
constraints on the certificate. The valid section describes an interval during which the
certificate is valid, expressed by means of a (not-before date) and/or a (not-
after date). It may also include additional tests for the validation of certificates.
If k is a key, p is a fully-qualified name, A is an authorization (loosely speaking a
set of actions), and valid is a temporal validity section then an authorization certifi-
cate is (cert (issuer k) (subject p) (propagate) A valid). Intu-
itively, the issuer uses such a certificate to grant p the authority to perform the actions
in A. Moreover, if the optional propagation field is present, then the subject is further
authorized to delegate this authority to others2.
The logical syntax is based on the proposals by Abadi [1], Halpern and van der
Meyden [12, 13], Jha, Reps et al. [20, 21]. We have a set of actions A, a set of keys K,
and a set of names N . A principal can be a key k ∈ K, a local name n where n ∈ N ,
or p ′ q where p and q are principals.
The atomic formulae of our logic are p 7→ q and p perm a, where p and q are
principals and a is an action. More complex formulae are built by the usual operators
of negation, conjunction and disjunction. The intuition behind p 7→ q, which is read
”p speaks for q”, is that for the current principal any authorization for p can be mapped
into an authorization for q.
We have two forms of certificates, certk (p 7→ q [tb, te]) to associate names to
other names and certk (p perm a [tb, te]) to associates permissions to names. Here, we
allow one to use compound names as subjects and not just local names. The interpre-
tation of certk (n 7→ p [tb, te]) is that for the principal k the local name n is bound
to the fully qualified name p for the validity period between the instant tb and te. The
interpretation of certk (p perm a [tb, te]) is that k permits action a to p for the validity
period of the certificate. It is possible to have also open ended certificates. Delegation
can be treated by generalizing permission certificates replacing action a with recursive
permissions.
With respect to the calculus in [1, 2] we have eliminated the says operator because
it is subsumed by the certificate operator. See [17] for an automated reasoning method
for some fragments of Abadi’s et al. calculus.
2 This unbounded delegation of powers has been mitigated by other authors. For instance, Li et
al. [16, 19] introduce the notion of delegation up to n steps.
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3 Semantics
The motto of any credential-based security religion could be “Extra public-keys nulla
salus” and we build upon this intuition by making a model where the basic domain is a
set of keys, and where names connect keys with each other and with permissions.
Let’s first give a model without time. So a model is a generalized Kripke structure
that is a triple 〈K,LN,A〉 where K is a set of real keys (such that for all k ∈ K there is
a k ∈ K plus possibly additional keys). The naming relation LN is an indexed family of
partial mappings from keys to subset of keys N −→ K→ 2K. The grant relation A is
a function mapping actions into mappings of keys into subset of keys A −→ K→ 2K.
In the sequel we always use X as the syntactic value and X as the semantic counterpart.
The intuition behind the set K should be obvious. The naming relation associates
to each local name a mapping: who uses this name for whom. So k′ ∈ LNnk means
that the principal associated to key k associates to the name n at least the key k′. We
have a set because the same name n may refer to many individuals as in Ron ′ poker−
buddies. Furthermore note that the mapping may be partial because a principal may not
associate anybody to a name. In the sequel, for simplicity we use the relation-oriented
notation to describe the mapping: 〈k,k′〉 ∈ LNn.
The grant relation associates to each key the set of actions that the agent holding the
key is willing to permit to other principals. So 〈k,k′〉 ∈ A(a) means that the principal
associated to the key k is willing to permit action a to k′.
Names can be lifted to compound names by giving a semantics for the ′ operator:
– N(n) = LN(n) where n ∈ N
– N(k) =
⋃
k′∈K {〈k
′,k〉} where k ∈ K
– N(p ′ q) =
⋃
kp∈K
{〈k,kpq〉 | 〈k,kp〉 ∈ Np and 〈kp,kpq〉 ∈ Nq}
The second rule says that syntactic keys are mapped into the corresponding semantics
keys. The last rule is just composition: if k associate kp to the name p and kp associates
kpq to the name q then k should associate kpq to the name p ′ q.
Proposition 1. A principal p0 ′ . . . ′ pl is equivalent to some principal q0 ′ . . . ′ qm
where q0 is either a key or a name and q1, . . . , qm are names.
So from now on we shall consider only principals in the latter form.
Figure 1 shows an example of a Kripke structure for credential systems without
time. It describes the relation between two co-authors and a PC chair. Keys are repre-
sented as nodes of the graph and the permissions to read or write the paper labels each
node. The key k1 corresponds to Fabio Massacci, whereas the key k3 is Fabio Martinelli
which is k3 ′ FAST-03 ′ co-chair. Note how the name Fabio is mapped into different
keys.
To lift our structure to time we introduce the concept of a traceM that is a mapping
from time to models. A trace associates to each instant of time a given modelM@t =
〈K@t,LN@t,A@t〉 where t ∈ R. Then K@t : R −→ K is the set of real keys which
are associated to the named keys at time t, LN@t is the local naming relation with the
additional time parameter R×N −→ K→ 2K at time t and A@t is the grant relation:
R×A −→ K→ 2K.
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co− chair
k1
k3
k5
k4
k2
Fabio
Fabio
Martinelli
Fabio
Fabio
co− chair
FAST − 03
co− author
Nathalie
Fabio
Dimitrakos
Fig. 1. Timeless Model
The extension of the semantics to compound names principals is identical, except
for the t subscript. In the sequel, we merge the principal and the time in the same
subscript. So we write Np@t instead of N@t(p), and similarly for other operators.
Intuitively, we can view the same formal structure from two different perspectives.
At first glance, we have a timeline and at each time the entire world may change. This
is hardly appealing: we are used that the world stays the same and something in it
changes. The second perspective is more appealing: the model is composed by parts
(keys, naming relations, and permission relations) that change over time.
In Figure 3 we show a timed version of the model shown in Figure 1 in which we
have added the validity interval of each naming relation.
The timed model allows for fine grained distinctions that are not possible in the
untimed model. If we consider key security properties like dynamic separation of duties,
the timed models allows for a natural description of such constraints and situations.
For instance in the untimed model k3 is always k1 ′ FAST ′ Co-chair, and it is at
the same time k2 ′ Fabio and k2 ′ Martinelli. In the timed modelthe concatenation of
the validity periods is such that k1 ′ FAST ′ Co-chair only maps into k3 for the period
[7/03, 9/03] which is by far shorter then each validity period of the component naming
relations. Equally, k3 has never been at the same time k2 ′ Martinelli and k2 ′ Fabio
(as in the untimed model), but either only one or the other. Thus k3 has never got the
permissions associated with both identifiers.
It is possible to add more security constraints on the model. For instance, should we
have persistence of global keys, i.e. should K@t = K@t′ hold? Basically this says that
all keys have been already invented, just not used. Another possibility is that the only
possible keys are those listed in a given set of syntactic certificates, and thus K@t = K
for all t.
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co− chair[7/03, 7/04]
k1
k3
k5
k4
Fabio : [00, 03]
Fabio : [0,∞]
k2
Fabio : [67,∞]
FAST − 03 : [4/02, 9/03]
co− chair : [7/03, 7/04]
Martinelli : [97, 98]
Fabio : [02, 03]
co− author : [01, 03]
Nathalie : [00, 03]
Fabio[00, 03]
Dimitrakos : [02, 03]
Fig. 2. Timed Model
Another question is whether the validity period of keys should always be a con-
nected interval. Suppose that we have 〈k,k′〉 ∈ NFAST ′ Co-chair@12/07/03, that is the real
key k associates the key k′ to the FAST ′ Co-chair. After an year the certificate ex-
pires and we have 〈k,k′〉 6∈ NFAST ′ Co-chair@12/07/04. Do we want to impose that for all
t ≥ 11/07/2004 we have 〈k,k′〉 6∈ N@tFAST ′ Co-chair? If the answer is yes, this means
that after a certificate is expired we would not accept another re-validation certificate
for the same key. This is one possible scenario and there might be cases when this is
desirable and cases when it is not.
All such possibilities can be captured with suitable axiom schemata. Different cer-
tificate theories (for instance persistence-of-syntactic-keys, no-revalidation) can be char-
acterized by different axiom schemata.
We have now all the necessary material to give a semantics to formulae.
– M@t,k |= p 7→ q iff for all k′ ∈ K@t, if 〈k,k′〉 ∈ Nq@t then 〈k,k′〉 ∈ Np@t
– M@t,k |= p perm a iff 〈k,k′〉 ∈ Np@t implies a ∈ A@t(k′)
As for certificates, we evaluate them as follows:
– M@t |= certk (p 7→ q [tb, te]) if t ∈ [tb, te] impliesM@t,k |= p 7→ q
– M@t |= certk (p perm a [tb, te]) if t ∈ [tb, te] impliesM@t,k |= p perm a
Remark 1. Comparing with Halpern and van der Meyden proposals we have no syn-
tactic list of valid certificates. A model is an independent entity from certificates. It has
its properties and satisfies some formulae. If it satisfies the appropriate formulae, then
it also satisfies some certificates. In this way, as we said, a particular certificate theory
characterizes a particular set of models.
Another characteristics of our model is that we worry about validity of certificates
in model only if they refer to the current time. If a certificate is not at all applicable
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there is little interested in knowing whether it describes the current state of the world or
not.
Then we can define the notion of satisfaction by a traceM, that is the notion of
satisfaction for all time instant.
– M |= certk (c [tb, te]) iff ∀t,M@t |= certk (c [tb, te])
As Jha and Reps [20, 21] we have a notion of consequence for chains of certificates:
Definition 1. A boolean combinations of certificates χ is a logical consequence of a set
of certificates C if any trace which satisfies all certificates C also satisfies χ.
If χ is a single certificates then we have exactly Jha and Reps notion of consequence.
This generalized notions is more useful for deriving interesting consequences. For in-
stance we can ask whether an invalid certificate implies that another certificate is also
implicitly invalidated.
4 Semantic Tableaux
Once the model is in place, how do we know that a certificate is a logical consequence
of a a set of physical certificates? Furthermore, if this is not the case, how can we get a
counter-example?
We propose a calculus based on semantic tableaux. Intuitively, to prove that a cer-
tificate χ is a logical consequence of a set of other certificates C (see Def. 1) we instead
try to construct a model that falsifies χ and satisfies C. If we succeed, then we have the
counter example. If we fail and we used a fair and systematic procedure, we are sure
that no such countermodel exists and the formula is valid.
If we drop the timed information, our calculus could be a tableaux sibling of the
model checking procedure of Jha and Reps. The additional dificulty is that for each pair
of constraints on the attempted counter-model we must check that
– either there is no temporal interaction and then we simply impose that the temporal
constraints are not overlapping,
– or we update the untimed information with the required constraints during the over-
lapping validity intervals.
The construction starts from the formulae and then try to build the entire model and the
trace by incrementally constructing the naming associations, by attributing permission
and by determining temporal informations.
For tableaux we shall use the usual terminology. For instance, see De Giacomo and
Massacci [7] for the naming and permission part and Kautz and Ladkin [15] for the
temporal part. So a tableau is a collection of branches, each intuitively correspond-
ing to some potential counter-model. A branch has three components for qualitative
information (such as naming relations), for qualitative temporal information and for
quantitative temporal information.
For the naming and permission information we have a triple 〈(K), N, (F, A)〉 where
– K are the syntactic keys plus possibly some new keys
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– a function N : N −→ 2K×K are the naming relation constructed so far,
– a function A : A −→ 2K×K are the permissions assigned so far
– F : K −→ 2Fml are the formulae (labelled with validity intervals) which we try to
satisfy
If no contradiction is found at the end of the construction then the countermodel would
be simply K := K, LN := N and A := A.
For the qualitative temporal information about validity of certificates we have an
interval network 〈TI, E〉 where
– TI is a set of variables representing temporal intervals
– a function E : TI × TI −→ 2Allen′s relations corresponds to the qualitative tem-
poral relations that we have forced so far
If v is an interval variable by we represent its beginning and end point as v− and v+
Allen’s interval relations are the following: before, after, meets, met− by, overlaps,
overlapped− by, starts, started− by, during, contains, finishes, finished− by, equals.
Their interpretation is intuitive and we refer to Allen’s work for additional explana-
tions [3, 4], and to Dechter and Meiri [8, 18] for reasoning procedures. For instance
v1 meets v2 means that when v1 ends, v2 starts.
For the metric temporal information we have a point network 〈TP, ET 〉 where
– TP is a set of variables representing time points
– ETP : TP ×TP −→ 2
Intervals represents the metric constraints between the time
points that we contructed so far.
For example ETP (t, t′) = {[1, 5], [100, 201]} means that t is distant by t′ either for a
value on the range 1 − 5 or the range 100 − 201. Using linear inequalities we would
have t + 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t + 5 or t + 100 ≤ t′ ≤ t + 201
Initialization At the very start, K is the set of keys appearing in {χ}∪ C. The sets F, N,
A, TI , and TP are empty.
For each certificate certk (c [tb, te]) in C∪{χ} a new interval variable vc is added to
TI and v−c and v+c are added to TP . Then E, resp. ETP , is enriched with the constraints
existing between vc, resp. v−c and v+c , and the remaining interval, resp. point, variables.
The intuition is that the interval variable vc is used to define the validity period of the
certificate.
Finally if χ, the certificate we are trying to disprove, has the form certki (c [tib, tie]),
we let F(ki)← {¬c : vi} where vi is the interval corresponding to [tib, tie]. Intuitively,
we want a model where the certificate is not valid in the given interval.
Remark 2. At this stage one may ask why do we need at all such validity intervals and
such cumbersome notation of end points: we already know that a certificate spans an
interval of time by simply looking at it. This is actually correct except for one small
but essential point: revocation certificates! The validity period is the maximal potential
period in which a certificate can be valid. If certificates can be revoked, even if tem-
porarily, we no longer knows what validity interval a certificate has just by looking at
the certificate.
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There is no space here to introduce revocation certificates but the machinery is nec-
essary to scale up to a reasonable semantic account of revocation3. In particular the
tricky bit is the validity period of revocation certificates. In a general model, there is
no obligation4 for revocation certificates to have validity period outlasting the validity
period of the revoked certificate.
Suppose that certk3 (Dimitrakos ′ Fabio 7→ Fabio [1/1/02, 31/12/03]) is revoked
by a certificate whose validity interval is only [1/1/03, 1/7/03]. It is clear what happens
in the interval [1/1/02, 31/12/02]: the speaks-for naming relation between Fabio and
Dimitrakos ′ Fabio is valid. It is also clear that in the period [1/1/03, 1/7/03] this cer-
tificate is n longer valid5. What happens during the period [2/7/03, 31/12/03] in which
the revocation certificate is no longer valid? The natural semantical interpretation is that
the original certificate is still valid.
4.1 Rules for Tableau Construction
After the initialization step the construction proceeds step-wise by the application of
a rule and the checking of the consistency of the temporal information. It stops either
when all the expressions were processed, or when an inconsistency is found.
We now consider the processing of atomic formulae only. The boolean operators
are handled in the usual way: if a key must satisfy the conjunction of two formulae this
means that the key must satisfy both formulae and thus both formulae are added to the
branch at the appropriate key.
The only tricky bit for the read not familiar with tableau methods is the treatment of
disjunction. Since disjunction means that either one or another formula must be satisfied
we split the current branch in two. Formally this means that we duplicate every sets that
we have constructed so far K, F, N, A, TI , and TP , and add one disjunct to one instance
of F and the second disjunct to the second instance of F. Then the search continues by
pushing one branch on the stack and by exploring the remaining branch. If the search
for counter models is unsuccessful in the first branch, the search resumes the other
alternative. Of course in any tableau implementation the structure is not duplicated and
pointers are used.
To simplify the rules for formulae we need some abbreviations that describe possi-
ble relations between validity intervals of certificates.
Definition 2. Let v, v′ and v∗ be interval variables.
no overlapping validity: v ∩ v′ = ∅ when the following constraint is satisfied:
v{before, meets, met− by, after}v′
3 Again in Halpern and Van der Meyden [13] we have a syntactic account of revocation, mostly
because they have not considered time. In Jha et al, revocation is not treated.
4 A particular certificate theory may instead impose such obligation. There might be axiom
schemata forcing properties of revocation certificates. Such schemata would be mapped into
conditions for inconsistency in our tableaux setting.
5 The relation may still be valid is there is some other valid certificate.
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k1 k2 k2k1
N : p : v1
=⇒
p 7→ k2 : v1
Fig. 3. Illustration of first rule for 7→ (the temporal graphs remain unchanged)
overlapping validity: v ∩ v′ 6= ∅ when the following constraint is satisfied:
v
{
starts, started− by, finishes, finished− by,
overlaps, overlapped− by, during, contains, equals
}
v′
containment: v′ ⊆ v when the following constraint is satisfied:
v′{starts, during, finishes, equals}v
The intuition of the first rule is that two intervals have no intersection if either one
interval is before the other, or one interval just finishes when the other just starts.
Proposition 2. To compute the overlap of validity periods we let v∗ = v ∩ v′. Then
the following conditions hold (1) if v{starts, during, finishes, equals}v ′ then v∗ = v,
(2) if v{started− by, contains, finished− by}v′ then v∗ = v′, (3) if v overlaps v′ then
v∗ finishes v and v∗ starts v′, (4) if v overlapped− by v′ then v∗ starts v and v∗ finishes v′.
Certificate. The rule for certificates is the simplest: if certk (c [tb, te]) ∈ C then for the
corresponding vc ∈ TI , add {c : vc} to F(k). In words:if the certificate certk (c [tb, te])
is valid then the corresponding formula must be true for the corresponding key during
the validity interval of the certificate.
Speaking for. The rules consider both positive and negative cases.
– if p 7→ k′ : v ∈ F(k) then add {p : v} to N(k, k′)
– if p 7→ k′ ′ q : v ∈ F(k) then ∀k∗ ∈ K such that q : v′ ∈ N(k′, k∗) either one has
v ∩ v′ = ∅ or let v∗ = v ∩ v′ and add {p : v∗} to N(k, k∗)
– if p 7→ n ′ q : v ∈ F(k) (where q can be null) then ∀k′ ∈ K such that n ′ q : v′ ∈
N(k, k′) either one has v ∩ v′ = ∅ or let v∗ = v ∩ v′ and add {p : v∗} to N(k, k′)
– if ¬(p 7→ q) : v ∈ F(k) then for a new action a∗ we add {p perm a∗) :
v,¬(q perm a∗) : v} to F(k)
The intuition behind the first rule is that if p is associated to k′ for the key k then we
add the labelling to the relation, tagged with the appropriate validity interval v. The
graphical representation is shown in Figure 3
The intuition behind the second rule is the following: suppose that you have a claim
that for the key k the name p has been associated to the name n ′ q for a certain validity
interval v. We can have a look at all naming relations between keys that have q as
their name. These naming relations will also have their validity period, say v ′. Now
we have two possibilities. The first one is that the validity periods do not overlap (that
is v ∩ v′ = ∅) and therefore there is nothing that we need to do. The second one is
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untimed information
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v
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quantitative temporal information
⇓
Fig. 4. Illustration of one of the rules for 7→ (where v overlaps v′)
that the validity periods do overlap and then we must chain the two certificates for the
overlapping periods, namely v∗ = v ∩ v′.
We illustrate the second rule in the special case where v overlaps v′ in Figure 4.
As we can see from the figure we have added the link between k and k∗ but only for
the overlapping interval v∗. The temporal information says that when v finishes then v∗
also finish and when v′ starts then v∗ also starts.
Permission. These rules have the same flavour of the speaks for rules, excpet that they
add permitted actions to each key rather then connecting keys with a naming relation.
– if k′ perm a : v ∈ F(k) then add {a : v} to A(k, k′)
– if k′ ′ q perm a : v ∈ F(k) then ∀k∗ ∈ K such that q : v′ ∈ N(k′, k∗) then either
v ∩ v′ = ∅ or let v∗ = v ∩ v′ and add {a : v∗} to A(k, k∗)
– if n ′ q perm a : v ∈ F(k) (where q can be null) then ∀k′ ∈ K such that n ′ q : v′ ∈
N(k, k′) then either v ∩ v′ = ∅ or let v∗ = v ∩ v′ and add {a : v∗} to A(k, k′)
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We also have a rule for negated permissions.
– if ¬k′ perm a : v ∈ F(k) then for a new interval v∗ ⊆ v, add {¬a : v∗} to A(k, k′)
– if ¬k′ ′ q perm a : v ∈ F(k) then for a new k∗ ∈ K and a new interval v∗ ⊆ v, set
N(k′, k∗) to {q : v∗} and A(k, k∗) to {¬a : v∗}
– if ¬n ′ q perm a : v ∈ F(k) (where q can be null) then for a new k∗ ∈ K and a new
interval v∗ ⊆ v, set N(k, k∗) to {n ′ q : v∗} and A(k, k∗) to {¬a : v∗}
Rules for principals. These rules refine the naming relations eliminating compound
names when validity intervals allow to do that.
– if k∗ ′ q : v ∈ N(k, k′) then add {q : v} to N(k∗, k′)
– if n ′ q : v ∈ N(k, k′) then ∀k∗ ∈ K such that n : v′ ∈ N(k, k∗) either v ∩ v′ = ∅
or let v∗ = v ∩ v′ and add {q : v∗} to N(k∗, k′)
– if q : v ∈ N(k, k′) and q′ : v′ ∈ N(k′, k∗) then either v ∩ v′ = ∅ or let v∗ = v ∩ v′
and add {n ′ q : v∗} to N(k, k∗).
Rule for consistency. A principal associated to a key cannot be permitted and forbidden
the same action during overlapping periods.
– if a : v ∈ A(k, k′) and ¬a : v′ ∈ A(k, k′) then
E(v, v′) = E(v, v′) ∩ {before, after, meets, met− by}
Finally, we must guarantee the consistency of the qualitative and the metric temporal
information. To this extent we need to solve the corresponding constraint network and
if the empty interval is present then the original information is inconsistent [15]. This
algorithm is sound but not complete unless the interval network is at least preconvex
[6]. To get completeness of the processing of the temporal information, we modify
slightly some rules: whenever we need to add v ∩ v′ = ∅ we actually split it into
v{before, meets}v′ or v{met− by, after}v′.
Definition 3. A branch is saturated when no new information can appear through the
application of a rule. A branch is closed if an inconsistency is found ; it is open if it is
saturated and not closed. A tableau is closed when all its branches are closed, it is open
if one of its branches is such.
Theorem 1. If a boolean combinations of certificates χ has a closed tableau given a
set of certificates C iff χ is a logical consequence of C.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In the security literature there has been a number of proposals for the right logical ac-
count for SDSI/SPKI features. Abadi [1] has used the DEC-SRC calculus for access
control [2]. However a number of problems have been found in the DEC-SRC calculus
by other authors [17, 12]. Howell and Kotz [14] have proposed an alternative seman-
tics, but their solution is logically rather awkward (for instance it is not closed under
the usual boolean operators) and does not give a reasoning procedure. Halpern and Van
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der Meyden [12, 13] have refined the semantics of Abadi and their proposal is the basic
reference for all subsequent works (including this one). They have proposed two modal
logics to reason about it but their proposal is fairly tailored on the SDSI/SPKI frame-
work. Jha, Reps and others [20, 21] have given a pushdown automata procedure for
SPKI certificates but have only focused on the normal trust relationship assuming time
interval fixed. this is the most comprehensive treatment, and it is a decision procedure
for time-free fragment of Halpern and van der Meyden logic. Dropping time from our
framework it is a sibling of our model. However, in all papers the treatment of time is
either absent (Abadi, Howell and Kotz, Jha and Reps) or refers essentially to the SPKI
algorithms (Halpern and Van der Meyden).
With respect to the trust management systems of Li et al. [16, 19] we only have
propositional rules. In contrast, Li et al. constructions based on logic programming and
Datalog allows for quantification. Since term creating functions are absent, quantifica-
tion is a just a more efficient and compact representation of the propositional version but
does not introduce new possibilities. However, the semantics is just the term algebra of
the Datalog programs representing a policy. It could be intriguing to have a independent
semantics for the bounded delegation framework.
Conceptually, it is possible to lift our framework to first order reasoning over objects
and it would be interesting to derive syntactic restrictions on quantification in certifi-
cates that would allow for the the same decidability results based on Datalog in Li el
al [19]. The lifting of permissions can be done without difficulties: one could simply
import techniques from first order modal logics. Basically, we could have certificates
like certk (p perm a(o) [tb, te]) when permission to perform action a is only granted on
object o and certk (p perm λx.a(x) [tb, te]) when permission is granted on all objects.
The lifting of naming association is the tricky bit, as there is no simple security
intuition on the meaning of ”key k is associated to name n for the object o” (though it is
possible to write formulae linking them). A convincing semantics could then be given
only for a convincing security intuition of the above concept. Even looking at neighbor
field, such as grammar logics or description logics we don’t have anything remotely
resembling such ternary relation.
Once this framework were lifted to first logic would then be interesting to analyze
the relations between the two frameworks. In particular one could then try to derive
syntactic restriction on the general model that would make possible to use the Datalog
representation and inference engine. Building on this result one could then show the
relation with other works on credential based systems that are based on logic and that
cope with the proper aspect of trust negotiation (which is neglected in the original SPKI
proposal) such as the work of Yu et al. [24] and Bonatti and Samarati [5]
An intriguing subject of future research is the usage of symbolic validity intervals.
For instance, if we had certk (FAST ′ co-chair 7→ Martinelli [12/07/04, NextFAST])
and then have symbolic constraints on intervals such as NextFAST is non-overlapping
with 2004 and overlaps with part of 2002 and starts after [appointment-day,end-of-
conference]. The calculus we have present can indeed cope with such constraints. The
lifting of the SPKI framework to symbolic validity intervals looks promising for some
distributed applications.
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Building upon previous attempt of formalizations we provided a general model for
reasoning about naming and identifiers, authorization, credentials, and time. We show
how to construct a general reasoning method for the logic that combines advanced
tableaux methods for modal and description logics [7] with systems for reasoning about
the interval algebra by Allen [4] and advanced proposals that exploit both qualitative
and metric constraints [18, 15].
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Abstract. We have previously presented a framework for updating priv-
ileges and creating management structures by means of authority certifi-
cates. These are used both to create access-level permissions and to dele-
gate authority to other agents. In this paper we extend the framework to
support a richer set of revocation schemes. As in the original, we present
an associated calculus of privileges, encoded as a logic program, for rea-
soning about certificates, revocations, and the privileges they create and
destroy. The discussion of revocation schemes follows an existing classi-
fication in the literature based on three separate dimensions: resilience,
propagation, and dominance. The first does not apply to this framework.
The second is specified straightforwardly. The third can be encoded but
raises a number of further questions for future investigation.
1 Introduction
A public key certificate (PKC) is a data record digitally signed by the private key
of its issuer, a certificate authority (CA). A PKC can be seen as a statement by
its issuer to certify that there is a binding between an identity (a distinguished
name) and a certain public key. Revocation of a PKC can be seen as another
statement saying that from a certain time point—the time-stamp of the revo-
cation or the time-stamp of the revocation list containing the revocation—the
binding given in the PKC no longer holds. The usual reason for revoking a PKC
is that the private key matching the public key given in the certificate is lost or
stolen.
Sometimes, in addition to the identity of the key holder, a PKC contains
other information, e.g., the key holder’s affiliation. As a consequence, a PKC
sometimes has to be revoked not because the private key is lost, but because
the affiliation of the key holder has changed. However, with the introduction
of new types of digital certificates, i.e., attribute certificates (AC), there will
often be cases in which one has to revoke a certificate because the attribute
(privilege) given in the certificate needs to be deleted. For example, a certificate
containing an access permission may get revoked because the permission given
? This research was supported in part by Policy Based Management Project funded
by the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems, and by AMANDA project funded
by Microsoft Research in Cambridge, UK.
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in that certificate does not hold any longer and not because the private key used
to sign the certificate has been exposed.
In an earlier paper [FSB01] we presented a framework for updating privi-
leges in a dynamic environment by means of authority certificates in a Privilege
Management Infrastructure. These certificates can be used to create access-level
permissions but also to delegate authority to other agents, thereby providing a
mechanism for creating management structures and for changing these structures
over time. We presented a semantic framework for privileges and certificates, and
an associated calculus, encoded as a logic program, for reasoning about them.
The framework distinguishes between the time a certificate is issued or revoked
and the time for which the associated privilege is created. This enables certifi-
cates to have prospective and retrospective effects, and allows us to reason about
privileges and their consequences in the past, present, and future. The calculus
provides a verification procedure for determining, given a set of declaration and
revocation certificates, whether a certain privilege holds.
In our earlier presentation we restricted attention to the simplest form of
revocation only. The present paper expands the framework for managing au-
thorities to support a richer set of revocation schemes. The ideas in this paper
has earlier been presented in the position paper [FS02]. The current paper ex-
tends the ideas and incorporate them in the privilege calculus.
1.1 Revocation (deletion) Classification
In [HJPW01], the authors classify revocation schemes based on three dimensions—
resilience, propagation, and dominance—which can be combined in various ways
to provide several distinct categories. Although these authors do not consider
revocation of certificates, but rather deletion of privileges that have been granted
in a delegation chain, and although their way of representing privileges and del-
egations is not the same as ours, we nevertheless find it instructive to consider
how that classification might apply to the classification of revocation schemes in
our framework. The three dimensions are:
1. Resilience: This concerns how a privilege may be revoked in such a way
that its effects are persistent, that is to say, in such a way that no other
agent may subsequently re-create it. For example, this is the effect that
is obtained by creating a ‘negative privilege’ that will always override its
positive counterpart. In this way, the subsequent granting of the positive
privilege will never have an effect, since it will always be overriden by the
negative one.
2. Propagation: This concerns how revocation of a privilege may have indirect
effects on other privileges stemming from it in a delegation chain.
3. Dominance: This concerns how an agent may be allowed to revoke privi-
leges that are not directly delegated by him. For example, the case considered
by [HJPW01] is one in which an agent retains the ability to revoke not only
his own delegations, but those of any other agents whose privileges were
obtained in a delegation chain stemming from him.
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Of these three, the first, resilience, is not applicable to our framework. We
do not support the granting of negative privileges. Put another way, our frame-
work deliberately separates privileges from the means by which they are created
(here, the issuing of certificates). It is meaningful in our framework to revoke
certificates, and thereby indirectly delete privileges, but it is not meaningful to
revoke privileges directly.
The other two dimensions, however, do apply, and are examined in the body
of the paper.
2 Managing Authorities
In ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000) [X.500], the standard is extended to
include Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) as well as Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI). PMI is similar to PKI, but its purpose is to give an infrastructure
for issuing and managing attribute certificates for assigning and conveying priv-
ileges.
The main components of a PMI are: Attribute Certificates (AC), Sources of
Authority (SoA), Attribute Authorities (AA), and Attribute Certificate Revo-
cation Lists (ACRL). An attribute certificate is, like a public key certificate, a
digitally signed statement (in the form of a data structure) certifying the bind-
ing between the holder of the certificate and some of his privileges. A privilege
in an attribute certificate can be, for example, an access permission, a group
membership, or a role assignment. A SoA is an agent who is recognised by the
users as initially empowered to create and delegate certain privileges. An AA is
an agent who has been delegated, by the SoA, the authority to create a privi-
lege. A number of AAs can create an authority management structure in which
authorities have been delegated from the top AA, e.g. the SoA, to subordinates.
An ACRL is a list of references of attribute certificates that are no longer to be
considered valid.
The framework introduced in our earlier paper [FSB01] provides a means for
creating and updating authority management structures such as an AA structure
in the PMI model of X.509 (2000). In that paper we distinguish between an access
level permission and a management level authority. perm(s, a, o) represents an
access level permission which says agent s is permitted to perform action a on
object o. auth(s, p) represents an management level authority which says agent s
has the authority to bring about privilege p. Here, p can either be an access-level
permission or another management-level authority. We use the term privilege to
refer both to an access level permission and a management level authority. Note
that having the authority to create a privilege does not necessarily mean that
one has or can enjoy that privilege oneself; nor that one has the authority to
create that privilege for oneself.
A certificate stating that its holder has the authority to create a privilege
by means of issuing another certificate is called here an authority certificate.
Neither in PMI [X.500] nor in other digital certificate frameworks there is a
direct support for encoding management authorities in certificates, however one
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can see an authority to create a privilege as an permission to delegate that
privilege which can be encoded in attribute certificates.
In [FSB01], we considered only the simplest type of revocation, one that
makes it possible to invalidate a certificate from the time the revocation occurs
for all times in the future. In the current paper, we generalise this revocation
type, allowing the revoker to disable a certificate in the past, present, or future,
permanently or just for some specified period of time. This means that the time
at which the revocation occurs and the time for which the revoked certificate
becomes invalidated are independent. Furthermore, in the previous framework
we allowed only the issuer of a certificate to revoke it (though it was possible to
get other effects indirectly). In this paper we consider a number of alternatives,
under the heading of ‘dominance’.
2.1 The Framework of Authority Management
The framework contains only two type of actions: the issuing of certificates and
the revoking of certificates.
– Certificates are represented as:
certifies(issuer , p[I], time-stamp, id).
The intended reading is as follows: the issuer makes an attempt, at time
time-stamp to bring about that privilege p holds for the time interval [I]. We
say that the certificate certifies (or sometimes ‘contains’) the privilege p, and
we call [I] the validity interval of the certificate. If p is a permission then the
action in p is an access level action, e.g. read or write a file. If p is a management
level authority, of the form auth(s, q), then the action in p is the creation of a
privilege q for s. The id is the unique identifier of the certificate.
For simplicity we leave out all the parts of a certificate management system
that do not have any impact on the reasoning required to determine whether a
given privilege holds at a given time. In particular, validation of signatures is of
course an essential component of verifying a certificate, but signatures are not
part of the reasoning process for verifying that a privilege holds, and for this
reason signatures do not appear in our representation of certificates.
– Revocations are represented as:
revokes(issuer , id, [I], time-stamp).
Revocations, like certificates, are seen as time-stamped statements. In con-
trast to certificates, a revocation does not have an id, but it contains the id of
the certificate which is the subject of the revocation. The interval [I], called the
disabling interval, represents the period of time for which the revocation disables
the certificate with the id id. By specifying the disabling interval, revocation can
be used to disable the particular instance of the privilege in that certificate either
temporarily or permanently. Note that revocation works on certificates: if the
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same privilege is created by several different certificates, revoking only one of
them will not necessarily disable the privilege itself. All of the certificates would
have to be revoked for that to happen.
Given a historical database of certificates and revocations, it is possible to
determine whether a privilege p holds at a given time. Informally: a privilege p
holds at a time-point t when there is a certificate c declaring that p holds for
some interval I containing t; the certificate c moreover must be ‘effective’ at t, in
the sense that it was issued by s at a time when s had the authority to declare p
to hold for interval I. The authority of s, in turn, requires a certificate that was
effective at the time c was issued — and so on, in a chain of effective certificates
back to some source whose authority can be accepted without certification (as
determined by the organisational structure).
Now, we give a number of definitions to make these ideas more precise. We
assume that there is a historical database recording the issued certificates and
their revocations. This database may be stored in a distributed form: the only
requirement is that the reasoning engine for determining whether a certain priv-
ilege holds has access to the information.
Definition 1. A certificate c1 directly supports another certificate c2 if
1. the privilege given in c1 is the authority for the issuer of c2 to bring about
the privilege given in c2 at the time of issuance of c2, and
2. c1 is not disabled at the issuance time of c2.
If condition 1 holds we say that the privilege given in c1 validates the certificate
c2.
Note that this definition refers only to the time point at which c2 is issued. If
c1 becomes disabled at any other time, that is to say, for some time period not
containing the issuance time of c2, the support of c1 for c2 will not be affected.
Definition 2. A set of certificates c1 . . . cn is a chain if each ci directly supports
ci+1, for 1 ≤ i < n.
A chain represents an authority management structure created by a number
of authority certificates. A chain usually, but not always, ends in an end-entity
attribute certificate containing an access level permission.
Definition 3. A certificate ci in a chain c1 . . . cn indirectly supports a cer-
tificate cj, if i+ 1 < j and 1 ≤ i < n.
In any application there should be a way of defining who is a source of
authority and in what circumstances. For example, in many applications the
owner of an object is considered to be the source of authority for any privilege
concerning that object. We assume that there is a specified way of recognising
sources of authorities, either because the SoA relation between an agent and
a privilege is given explicitly, or by means of a set of rules which defines this
relation.
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Definition 4. A certificate is called rooted if it is issued by the source of au-
thority of the particular privilege given in the certificate.
A chain of certificates is rooted if the first certificate in the chain is rooted.
In this framework, anyone can issue a certificate at any time with or with-
out having the necessary authority to make it effective. Without the necessary
authority, the certificate has no effect. However, it is possible for a certificate c1
to become supported, retrospectively, by another certificate c2 issued at a time
later than c1. This happens when the validity interval of c2 contains the issuance
time of c1. Examples of the use of such retrospective mechanisms are provided
in [FSB01].
Definition 5. A chain that is not rooted is called a dormant chain.
A certificate is called dormant at time t if it is part of a dormant chain at
time t.
Since a certificate can be revoked permanently or for a specified time period
only, we say that a revoked certificate is disabled.
Definition 6. A certificate c1 is disabled at time t if there is a revocation for
c1 and t is contained in the disabling interval of c1.
Definition 7. A certificate c is effective at time t if it is rooted at time t, t is
at or after the time of issuing of c, and c is not disabled at time t.
Definition 8. A privilege P holds at time t if there is a certificate c that cer-
tifies P , c is effective at time t, and t is contained in the validity interval of
c.
2.2 Privilege Calculus
Here we present a logic program which implements the framework given above,
encoding in an executable form the definitions given in the previous section. It
provides a means of evaluating queries of the form
holds(P, T)
to determine whether a privilege P holds at time-point T given a database of
time-stampled certificates and revocations. The program presented below can be
executed as a Prolog program as it stands, once the symbol ‘:’ is declared as an
infix functor. It can also be executed in other logic programming systems to give
the same results but with different computational behaviour. We use a term of
the form [T1, T2] to represent the closed-interval [T1, T2], and a term of the form
since(T1) to represent the open-ended interval of all time points later than or
equal to T1.
Rather than the holds(P, T) program, it is very straightforward to pro-
duce a generalisation, which is the version we present here. The 3-ary predicate
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holds(P, T, TD) represents that, according to the certificates and revocations is-
sued up to and including time TD, privilege P holds at time T . This generalized
form allows one to query not only the current state of the certificates and revo-
cations database, but all past states as well. This can very useful for auditing
purposes, for example, or for determining the effects of retroactive certificates
and revocations. (The simpler, less general version of the program, may be ob-
tained by deleting all occurrences of the parameter TD, and all conditions in
which it appears.)
[PC 0.] T during interval [Ts, Te] ← Ts ≤ T ≤ Te.
T during interval since(Ts)← Ts ≤ T .
[PC 1.] holds(P, T, TD)← C = certifies(S, P :I, T0, ID), T0 ≤ TD,
effective(C, T, TD),
T during interval I.
[PC 2.] effective(C, T, TD)← C = certifies(S,Priv, T0, ID), T0 ≤ TD,
T0 ≤ T,
rooted(C, TD),
not disabled(C, T, TD).
[PC 3.] rooted(C, TD)← chain(C1, C, TD),
C1 = certifies(S,Priv, T0, ID), T0 ≤ TD,
sourceOfAuthority(S, P ).
[PC 4.] chain(C,C, TD).
[PC 5.] chain(C1, C2, TD)← supports(C1, C2, TD).
[PC 6.] chain(C1, C2, TD)← supports(C1, C3, TD), chain(C3, C2, TD).
[PC 7.] validates(auth(S, P ):I, C, TD)← C = certifies(S, P, T, ID), T ≤ TD,
T during interval I.
[PC 8.] supports(C1, C2, TD)← C1 = certifies(S1,Priv, T1, ID1), T1 ≤ TD,
C2 = certifies(S2,Priv′, T2, ID2), T2 ≤ TD,
validates(Priv, C2, TD),
not disabled(C1, T2, TD).
[PC 9.] disabled(C, T, TD)← C = certifies(S,Priv, ID, T0),
revokes(S, ID, I, T1),
T0 < T1 ≤ TD,
T during interval I.
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3 Revocation schemes in the privilege calculus
In this framework we are concerned with the revocation of certificates, and for
reasons already explained, the resiliance dimension of [HJPW01] does not apply.
We now consider how the propagation and dominance dimensions apply to the
revocation schemes of ourframework.
c
¼
c1
¼
j
c2
j
c3
Fig. 1. c, c1, c2, and c3 are certificates. An arrow between two certificates represents the
support relation between the two in the direction of the arrow. For example, the arrow
between c and c1 represents that c supports c1. A deliberate feature of the framework
is that the issuer of a certificate does not have to identify the certificate that grants
him the necessary authority to issue a new certificate. It is possible therefore that the
same certificate can be supported by more than one certificate, as shown here. Both c1
and c2 could have created a privilege that made the issuing of certificate c3 effective.
3.1 Simple Revocation
The simplest revocation scheme is the one in which an agent revokes one of his
own issued certificates simply in order to withdraw the privilege given in that
certificate from the time of revocation onwards. In the case where the privilege
in the revoked certificate is an access-level permission, the effect of the revoca-
tion is that this particular instance of the permission does not hold at any time
after the issuance of the revocation. In the case where the privilege in the re-
voked certificate is a management level authority the effect is that the certificate
can no longer support any new certificate issued after the issuance time of the
revocation. However, revocation of this certificate will not affect any other exist-
ing certificates—any certificates created by a delegation chain from the revoked
certificate will continue to be effective (unless revoked directly).
This simple scheme is easily specified in the privilege calculus by a revocation
with a disabling interval that starts at the revocation time and extends (open-
ended) into the future: the revocation has the form revokes(issuer , id, since(ts), ts).
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This implies that from the time of the revocation and for any time after that,
the particular instance of the privilege given in the revoked certificate is deleted.
In the diagram above, if the issuer of c revokes c at any time t after the
issuance of c1, c2, and c3, the revocation will not affect certificates c1, c2, c3, but
c cannot be used to support any new certificate issued after time t.
3.2 Propagation of revocations
Sometimes one needs to revoke a certificate in such a way that it affects the
validity of some other certificates. The typical scenario is when one discovers
that an agent has abused his authority. If this (perhaps fraudulent) agent is in
a management role in which he has delegated privileges to others, then often
one wants to delete not only his authority but also all those privileges that were
delegated by him, and by his delegatees in turn.
This kind of propagation of revocations can be specified in the privilege cal-
culus by disabling the certificate that made the fraudulent agent an authority.
The certificate has to be disabled in such a way that its support for other cer-
tificates vanishes. This can be done by a revocation that has a disabling interval
containing all the time points, in the past and in the future, at which that cer-
tificate supports other certificates. This is similar to: I say now that what I said
in the past was not true, hence every other statement based on what I said then
does not hold either. The framework we are presenting is explicitly designed to
support such retrospective effects. Note that we are reasoning in two different
time lines: one is the time of the certificate database, and the other is the time
at which a privilege in a certificate holds.
Example: In the above picture, certificate c, issued by agent a, directly supports
certificates c1, issued by a1 at time t1, and c2, issued by a2 at time t2. Further
assume that a1 and a2 are different agents both included in the group of agents
who receive the privilege given in c and that t1 6= t2.
If at a certain time tx, a finds out that a1 is a fraudulent agent, the authority
given to a1 has to be deleted, immediately. But not only does the authority
given to a1 have to be deleted, the authorities delegated by a1 also have to be
deleted. Beside revoking c from time tx, a must disable c such that its support
for c1 disappears. a can do this by first revoking c at tx such that c cannot be
used by a1 at any time after tx. This is a simple revocation of c at time tx by
its issuer. In order for a to delete privileges delegated by a1, he has to revoke c
again, but this time in such a way that the support relation between c and c1
disappears. Of course, one could consider a revocation format that allows several
disabling intervals to be specified in one revocation statement. One can similarly
devise other kinds of ‘macros’ for commonly occurring patterns of revocation
statements.
Note that, if c does not support c1 any longer then automatically c1’s support
for c3 also disappears. Further, the support of c for c2 remains the same if
the disabling interval does not include t2. Hence, the authority management
structure created by a2 remains untouched. However, for a2 to be able to exercise,
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at any time after tx, the same authority he once received in c, a has to issue a
new certificate c′, at time tx, that gives a2, but not a1, the same privilege that
was given to him in c.
3.3 Dominance
In the framework presented so far, it is only the issuer of a certificate that has the
possibility to revoke it. Relaxing this constraint will complicate the framework as
well as the privilege calculus, but it is necessary if we want to support revocation
schemes based on the dominance dimension. But why do we need this?
It is a deliberate feature of our framework that agent x who issues a certificate
does not have to identify the certificate which grants him the necessary authority:
the certificate C does not have any record of which other certificate is being
invoked when certificate C is issued. This is by design. It is not realistic in our
view to require that agents say “I am issuing this certificate by the authority
given to me by certificate X”. Agent x may not know the identifier of X, and in
the case of a dormant chain, there is no such X (yet).
But now consider. Bjorn goes on holiday for the weekend and we are unable
to revoke any of the certificates he issued until he gets back. The only way is
to try to discover who has issued certificates to Bjorn, and then to ask each of
them to revoke their certificates so Bjorn’s privileges are revoked. That is clearly
ridiculous. Some of the problem can be mitigated by introducing some kind of
representation mechanism, allowing Bjorn to specify who can act for him in his
absence. But that does not solve all the problems. It does not deal with the case
where Bjorn has forgotten to appoint a representative, or done so deliberately.
The most general approach would be to decouple entirely the authority to
grant privileges from the authority to revoke certificates, i.e., by introducing
separate predicates auth+(s, p), which says “s has the authority to bring about
p”, and predicate auth−(s, p), which says “s has the authority to delete p”. This
would enable us to delegate each of these authorities separately. We would be
able to give the authority to create a privilege to one agent and the authority to
delete that privilege to a different agent.
Although this general approach would cover many interesting scenarios, and
has great flexibility, we believe that it would also make the framework too pow-
erful and too difficult to manage. Therefore we consider a less general approach,
similar to that discussed under the heading of ‘dominance’ by [HJPW01]. Here,
an agent is given the authority to revoke any certificate issued by him, and any
certificate that is issued on the basis of a delegation chain stemming from one
of the certificates issued by him.
The rationale is this. When an agent delegates some authority to another
agent, he retains some responsibility for the actions of the delegatee. And then
it seems only natural to say that the delegator should therefore retain some
measure of control over how the delegated authority is used. In a certificate-based
framework, this suggests the delegator should be allowed to revoke certificates
issued on the basis of his original delegation acts. This also seems to be the
reasoning behind the dominance mechanism discussed in [HJPW01].
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The framework and the associated calculus of privileges can be modified
straightforwardly. One simply replaces [PC 9.] in the privilege calculus with a
more elaborate version. An example is given presently.
There are a number of outstanding points of detail to be examined, however.
In particular, in a framework such as ours which supports the issuing of cer-
tificates with retrospective effects, it is easy to produce undesirable effects. For
example, if a wishes to revoke a certificate C issued by b, a could simply issue a
certificate granting himself the authority to create the privilege certified by C.
a’s certificate is not effective, but it is the start of a dormant chain supporting
the certificate C. If we are not careful in specifying the dominance relation, a
may be allowed the authority to revoke C in these circumstances.
One solution is to restrict attention to rooted chains, on the grounds that
their validity rests ultimately on a source of authority whose actions need not
be questioned. A second check is to compare the times of issuance of certifi-
cates in a chain, blocking the retrospective revocation of certificates through the
dominance mechanism.
Such questions remain to be explored more systematically. Here we illustrate
how the calculus of privileges can be modified to support the form of dominance
just discussed. Investigation of other forms of dominance and their properties is
a topic of current research for us.
[PC 9x.] disabled(C, T, TD)← C = certifies(S1,Priv1, ID1, T1), T1 ≤ TD,
revokes(Sr, ID1, I, T2), T2 ≤ TD,
T during interval I,
T1 < T2,
dominant(Sr, C, TD).
[PC 10.] dominant(S2, C, TD)← C = certifies(S1,Priv1, ID1, T1),
certifies(S2,Priv2, ID2, T2),
C ′ = certifies(S2,Priv2, ID2, T2),
chain(C ′, C, TD),
rooted(C ′, TD).
It is possible to derive equivalent but computationally more efficient formula-
tions. However, there are other implementation issues and options to be consid-
ered. We leave detailed discussion for another paper dealing with the practical
aspects of the framework.
Example: In the above picture, the issuer of c wants to delete the privilege given
in c3 which is supported by both c1 and c2 without deleting the privilege given
in c1 nor the privilege given in c2. Now, what the issuer of c can do is to revoke
c3 directly without touching the validity of c1 or c2.
3.4 Related work
In this paper we only focus on the issue of privilege revocations in terms of cer-
tificate revocations. Hence, we will only consider the related work that deals with
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the privilege revocation issues. This means that, currently, we do not consider
the issues of secure and reliable revocation mechanism for distributed certificates
as it is the case in PKI and PMI systems.
Most of the earlier work in revocation of privileges has focused on the con-
sequences of revocations in terms of propagation issue. The revocation schemes
discussed above are similar to those addressed in the databases literature. The
grant option presented in [GW76] is similar to the delegations in our privilege
calculus with the main distinction that in the privilege calculus one can delegate
an authority to create a privilege to someone without creating the privilege for
that person and/or without delegating the authority to that person to create the
privilege for himself. In the framework given in [GW76] or its extension given in
[Fag78], the grant capability can only be given together with the privilege itself.
In the original authorisation mechanism given in [GW76] if the same privilege
is granted by the same grantor to the same subject but at different time-points
then only the first one is recorded in a table and the second one is ignored. In
[Fag78], the author shows that, because of how the authorisations are recorded
in the authorisation mechanism given in [GW76], its revocation mechanism does
not perform as it should. Hence the authorisation mechanism is extended such
that similar authorisations with different time-stamps are recorded. For more
details we refer the reader to [Fag78]. Note that in these authorisation mecha-
nisms one does not revoke a particular exercise of a grant option, but the actual
granted privilege, as grants themselves have no identifiers. This is different from
our approach in which each delegation has its own identifier in terms of the i.d
of its certificate.
A very similar approach to ours is given in [BSJ97], in which a framework
for authorisations with a grant option is developed. The framework uses the
grant option given in [GW76,Fag78] for further delegation of authorisations to
support a decentralised management of authorisations. In this framework, nega-
tive authorisations are used for blocking positive authorisations for limited time
periods. This is different from the framework given in this paper in which we use
revocations with blocking time. The authors also give definitions for cascaded
and non-cascaded revocations that are similar to our simple and propagation
schemes for revocations.
In [BBFS97] the authors develop a framework for temporal authorisations
using time intervals and temporal operators for specifying the time interval dur-
ing which an authorisation is valid. In the same way a revocation may also have
a time-interval that specifies the interval that the revoked authorisation becomes
invalid which is similar to the disabling interval in revocations in our framework.
However, this framework is also based on the same grant model as the autho-
risation mechanism in [GW76,Fag78], and it does not support the retrospective
authorisations as in the Privilege Calculus.
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4 Conclusion
We have presented an extension of our framework for updating privileges by
means of authority certificates in order to provide a richer variety of revoca-
tion schemes than was originally supported. As in the original, we provide an
associated calculus, encoded as a logic program, for reasoning about what priv-
ileges hold at which times given a database (or access to such a database) of
time-stamped attribute certificates and revocations.
We find the classification scheme for revocation mechanisms introduced in
[HJPW01], and the dimensions of resilience, propagation, and dominance iden-
tified there, extremely illuminating and helpful in structuring our own investi-
gations. However, by focussing as we do on mechanisms for the creation and
revocation of privileges, and on time-dependent effects, we find that there are a
number of further distinctions that can be drawn. The concept of dominance, in
particular, seems deserving of further examination, in that we have encountered
a number of further points of detail that need to be resolved. We are currently
undertaking a more systematic exploration of these possibilities.
A distributed privilege management system requires an architecture for se-
cure and reliable revocation of digital certificates.
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Information Integrity Policies
Peng Li Yun Mao Steve Zdancewic?
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract. Information integrity policies are traditionally enforced by
access control mechanisms that prevent unauthorized users from modify-
ing data. However, access control does not provide end-to-end assurance
of integrity. For that reason, integrity guarantees in the form of nonin-
terference assertions have been proposed. Despite the appeals of such
information-flow based approaches to integrity, that solution is also un-
satisfactory because it leads to a weaker notion of integrity than needed
in practice.
This paper attempts to clarify integrity policies by comparing and con-
trasting access control vs. information flow, integrity vs. confidentiality
policies, and integrity vs. availability policies. The paper also examines
data invariants as a way to strengthen integrity. The result is a better
classification of information-integrity policies.
1 Introduction
Information integrity is a critical issue in computer security, and integrity policies
that seek to prevent accidental or malicious destruction of information have long
been recognized as important. However, the concept of integrity is difficult to
capture and context dependent. Pfleeger’s textbook, Security in Computing, [26]
defines integrity to mean that data is:
– precise
– accurate
– unmodified
– consistent
– modified only in acceptable ways
– modified only by authorized people
– modified only by authorized processes
– meaningful and correct
Traditionally, information integrity has been supported by security models
based on discretionary access control via access control lists or capabilities. These
models mainly provide the authorization component of integrity requirements.
However, such enforcement mechanisms are not adequate to deal with situations
in which important data in the system may be affected by untrusted sources of
information.
For example, the programmer may use a format string provided by the user to
print some information, possibly creating a vulnerability to the well-known buffer
overflow attack. Other examples include using a value received from the network
as an array index, or executing a piece of code downloaded from untrusted Web
? Email: {lipeng, maoy, stevez}@cis.upenn.edu
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sites. Prior to using dangerous data, the programmer must carefully verify it
against possible attacks to assure safety.
Because these potential integrity violations stem from how untrustworthy
data propagates through the system, it is tempting to generalize access-control
models of integrity to information-flow models, which have been widely applied
to the problem of protecting confidential information [28]. In fact, it has been
observed that information-flow based integrity can be treated as the formal dual
to confidentiality [2]. Yet it is also known that doing so yields a somewhat un-
satisfactory (and potentially inadequate) definition of security [6, 22].
The goal of this paper is to investigate integrity policies and their relationship
to other existing information security policies. The paper is intended to serve
as map of the technical landscape surrounding integrity policies; it suggests
that integrity be classified into program correctness, noninterference, and data
invariant policies. The main contributions of the paper include:
– A critical comparison between confidentiality and integrity when treated as
formal duals. This comparison is carried out in the context of Myers and
Liskov’s decentralized label model (DLM) [22].
– A comparison of information-flow style integrity policies as enforced by static
program analysis to data invariants (in the style of Clark and Wilson [6]).
This comparison is motivated because treating integrity as purely dual to
confidentiality leads to weak guarantees.
– A comparison of integrity policies to availability policies.
– Some suggestions for possible future research directions.
2 An aside on program correctness
Ideally, integrity, like any other program property, would be described by a spec-
ification and enforced by proving that the implementation satisfies the specifica-
tion. Such an approach captures the “meaningful and correct” data requirement
of Pfleeger’s definition. These specifications are especially difficult to pin down
and can perhaps best be formalized by requiring program correctness, which can
be defined as the following [3]: Let pi denote (a specification of) a computational
decision or search problem. For x an input to pi, let pi(x) denote the output of
pi. For a deterministic program f , we say that
– The program f is correct, if and only if ∀x, f(x) = pi(x).
– The output f(x) is correct, if and only if f(x) = pi(x).
Program verification [15, 4] aims at proving the correctness of programs with
respect to their specifications. Program correctness checkers [3] are programs
that verify the correctness of the program output.
Due to their expense, program verification and correctness checkers have not
been widely applied in practice. This paper instead focuses on formal definitions
of integrity policies based on noninterference and data invariants. These defi-
nitions can cover almost all of the meanings of integrity given by Pfleeger and
have more tractable enforcement strategies.
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3 Information flow
3.1 Access control vs. information flow
In computer security, access control has been widely used to manage the permis-
sions of users to access the objects. Capabilities [8, 36] and access control lists [17]
are often used to implement such policies. In discretionary access control (DAC)
[17, 13], the owner of an object controls the access to the object by granting and
revoking access to other users. Stack inspection [35, 11] is a more recently devel-
oped dynamic mechanism for enforcing access control checks to sensitive system
calls from untrusted code. Both DAC and stack inspection are insufficient in the
context of a running system—they do not control how the data is used after
granting access to the user.
Information-flow policies [12, 20, 28] are end-to-end security policies that pro-
vide more precise control of information propagation than access control models.
With access control, a file is accessible to some principal only if the appropriate
read permission is specified in the access control list. However, once the file is
read, the data can be used in any arbitrary way. Information-flow policies aim
to solve this problem by granting file access to only those processes that will
not leak confidential data. The policy enforcement is thus extended to the end
systems, providing more security than access control alone.
Information flow can be defined as a set of noninterference assertions [12,
20]. Intuitively, noninterference requires that high-security information does not
affect the low-security observable behavior of the system. Such policies are es-
pecially useful to protect data confidentiality, where the goal is to ensure that
secret data does not influence public data.
Formally, noninterference for confidentiality can be defined as the following1:
– Suppose there are two security levels of data: secret and public. Let the pro-
gram f take as input (isecret, ipublic) and produce the output (osecret, opublic).
– Define noninterference as a property of the program: f is noninterfering iff
∀a, a′ : f(a, b) = (c, d) ⇒ f(a′, b) = (c′, d)
That is, nothing about isecret can be learned by only observing opublic.
Recent studies have shown that language-based techniques are a promising ap-
proach to enforcing noninterference. In particular, static program analysis [7, 33,
14, 21, 27] has demonstrated advantages of little run-time overhead, the capabil-
ity of managing implicit information flows, and provable guarantees.
3.2 Decentralized label model
As a concrete point of comparison between information-flow definitions of con-
fidentiality and integrity policies, we use Myers and Liskov’s decentralized label
1 This simple definition of noninterference is suitable for our discussion—many other
more refined variants of noninterference exist in the literature. See the survey by
Sabelfeld and Myers [28] for a summary.
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model (DLM) [22]. The DLM addresses weaknesses of previous information-flow
control models in a distributed setting containing untrusted code or users. It
allows users to precisely control information flows, and it also accommodates
mutual distrust and selective declassification.
Principals and Labels To address privacy2 for mutually distrusted users
and groups, the DLM uses principals as a central concept. Principals are the
authority entities such that information is owned, read and written by them. For
example, each user or group account in a Windows/Unix machine is a principal.3
Labels are the confidentiality requirements that the principals state about
their data. A label consists of several policies, each of which is enforced by the
decentralized label model. A policy is written as {o : r1, r2, · · · , rn}, where o
represents the owner principal who owns the policy; r1, · · · , rn are the readers,
meaning that the owner o gives r1, · · · , rn permissions to read the data.
A composite label consists of zero, one or several policies, e.g. {o1 : r1, r2; o2 :
r1, r3}. This label says the data is owned by both o1 and o2. Owner o1 permits
r1 and r2 to read it, and owner o2 permits r1 and r3 to read it. To satisfy both
requirements, the only effective reader is r1.
Labels represent different security levels. It is easy to see that label L1 =
{o1 :} represents a stricter policy than label L2 = {o1 : r1} because o1 does
allow r1 to access the data in L2, but does not in L1. Such a label relationship
is written as L2 v L1, and is read as L1 is more restrictive than L2. It is shown
by Myers and Liskov that all the labels form a distributive lattice, and have a
partial order relation in the lattice [22].
When a program tries to compute a result from two values labeled with L1
and L2, the result should have the least restrictive label L that enforces all the
privacy concerns specified by L1 and L2. Namely, L1 v L,L2 v L and ∀L′ such
that L1 v L′ and L2 v L′ we have L v L′. This least restrictive label is the least
upper bound or join of L1 and L2, written as L1 unionsq L2. The greatest lower bound
or meet of L1 and L2, written as L1 u L2 is defined to be the largest label less
than both L1 and L2.
Declassification During computation, the labels on program results become
increasingly restrictive, making the data unreadable. Consequently, the owners
of the data sometimes need to relax their policies so that other parties can read
it. This kind of label relaxation is called declassification [39, 38].
To make declassification reasonable, the decentralized label model permits it
only when the current process is authorized to act on behalf of the principals
whose policies are weakened. Because a principal can weaken only his own pol-
icy, the other owners in the label are safe—their policies are still enforced. No
centralized declassification process is needed, making the DLM well suited to
distributed, heterogeneously trusted systems.
2 In this paper, the terms privacy and confidentiality are considered synonyms.
3 For the purposes of this paper, we ignore the DLM actsfor relationship, which allows
one principal to delegate rights to another.
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4 Integrity and noninterference
We have seen noninterference policies for protecting data confidentiality. Such
policies constrain: (1) Who can read the secret data. (2) Where the secret data
will flow to (in the future).
Dually, integrity policies constrain: (1) Who can write to the data. (2) Where
the data is derived from (in the past, the history of the data).
The analog of “public” is “untainted” and the analog of “private” is “tainted”.
This style of integrity policy can be defined formally using the same definition
of noninterference used for confidentiality:
– Suppose there are two security levels of data: tainted and untainted. Let
the program f take the input (itainted, iuntainted) and produce the output
(otainted, ountainted).
– Define noninterference as a property of the program: f is noninterfering iff
∀a, a′ : f(a, b) = (c, d) ⇒ f(a′, b) = (c′, d)
That is, the value of itainted does not affect the value of ountainted.
Integrity policies based on noninterference are useful when we want to control the
source of important data. For example, in an encryption algorithm, we may want
to generate randomized numbers from trusted sources and to make sure that the
adversary cannot affect the value of these numbers. Information-flow control and
program analysis can be used to enforce such policies based on noninterference.
Biba [2] first observed that integrity and confidentiality are duals in this way.
Consequently, both can be enforced by controlling information flows.
A related concept for integrity policies is the notion of separation of duties
(see for example Clark and Wilson’s paper [6]). The idea of separation of duties
is to increase data integrity by requiring that multiple principals collaborate to
produce the data—forging a data item is thus more difficult. Such separation
is only useful if the two parties are noninterfering in some sense. Shockley [31]
and Lee [19] showed how the enforcement parts of the Clark-Wilson paper could
be implemented using Bell and LaPadula [1] noninterference mechanisms. They
used the Bell and LaPadula model with “partially trusted subjects” to represent
the trusted program components.
More recent work by Foley gives a framework [9] for describing label-based
policies that supports separation of duties. Foley [10] has also shown how to
define integrity in terms of a refinement-based notion of dependability, which is
closely related to standard definitions of noninterference.
5 Extending the DLM for integrity
This section discusses an integrity variant of the DLM and compares it to other
integrity label models.
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5.1 Integrity label models
Before introducing the full decentralized label model for integrity, we first give
several simpler integrity label models for comparison and to help readers have a
gradual introduction to the label models.
1. Binary Model In this model, there are only two possible labels: {tainted}
and {untainted}. The meanings of these two labels are clear, and the order
relation is {untainted} v {tainted}. Although the binary model is very sim-
ple, it has been used to detect format string exploits [30].
2. Writer Model In this model, labels are sets of principals: {p1, p2, · · · , pn}.
This label means that every principal pi in the label may have modified the
data, and principals not in the set have not affected the data. Therefore, the
partial order relation can be defined as: L1 v L2 if and only if L1 ⊆ L2.
For example, L1={Alice} and L2={Alice, Bob}, we have L1 v L2 because
data with label L2 could be tainted by Bob, who is not a writer in L1.
3. Trust Model Here, labels are again sets of principals: {p1, p2, · · · , pn}, but
the meaning differs from the writer model. The interpretation is that a princi-
pal trusts the data with the label if and only if it is in the label set. Therefore,
the partial order relation can be defined as: L1 v L2 if and only if L2 ⊆ L1.
The trust model is used in secure program partitioning [40, 41] to ensure
data quality and to meet the robust declassification [39] requirement.
4. Distrust Model The distrust model is very similar to the trust model. In
the distrust model, a label, being a set of principals, means that principals
in the set do not trust the data. Consequently, the partial order relation is
the opposite to the trust model: L1 v L2 if and only if L1 ⊆ L2
Some of these models can be reduced to others. For example, to represent
the binary model in the in the trust model, the label {} can represent {tainted},
and {root} can represent {untainted}. Because root should be trusted by every
principal, everyone trusts that the data is untainted. It is not hard to see that
trust model and distrust model can be reduced to each other.
5.2 The DLM for integrity
Label Definition Myers and Liskov [22] show how the DLM extends to
support integrity in addition to confidentiality. Like a privacy label, an in-
tegrity label also consists of several policies. Each policy label is written as {o :
w1, w2, · · · , wn}. Here o represents the owner principal, meaning that he owns
the data; w1, · · · , wn are the writers, meaning that the owner o believe that only
w1, · · · , wn could have modified the data. The owners and writers are principals
drawn from the same set as in privacy labels.
A composite label consists of zero or more policies, e.g., {o1 : w1, w2; o2 : w1}.
This label says that the data is owned by both o1 and o2. Owner o1 believes that
w1 and w2 have written to it, and owner o2 believes that w1 have written to it.
To satisfy both integrity constraints, the only effective writer is w1.
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We intentionally choose this integrity label definition to use the same rep-
resentation syntax as that of privacy labels to make the duality between them
explicit. To avoid confusion, unless the readers can easily tell from the context,
we use the convention that L denotes representations, LP denotes privacy labels
and LI denotes integrity labels. We define L as the set of all possible label repre-
sentations. For convenience, we also define a functionR(L) to convert an integrity
label or a privacy label to its representation, namely, ∀L ∈ L, R(LP ) = R(LI).
Integrity Label Ordering Integrity labels have a partial order relation that
expresses their relative security. For privacy labels, L1 v L2 if and only if L2 is
as restrictive as L1 or more restrictive than L1. For integrity labels, we define
L1 v L2 if and only if L2 is as tainted as L1 or more tainted than L1. For
example, L1 = {o : w1, w2} is dirtier than L2 = {o : w1} because w2 may have
tainted the data in L1, but not in L2. Therefore, L2 v L1. If we treat L1 and L2
as privacy labels, and w1, w2 as reader principals, then L1 v L2. To summarize:
∀L1, L2 ∈ L, LP1 v LP2 iff LI2 v LI1 [22].
By this order definition, integrity labels also form a distributive lattice that
is exactly the dual of the privacy lattice. That is, if we turn integrity lattice up
side down, the two lattices will perfectly match. This property can help us to
derive the integrity relabeling rules and computation rules.
Label Computation To keep track of the integrity information-flow property
in the program, it is necessary to define the least upper bound operation unionsq
and greatest lower bound operation u in terms of integrity labels. Because of
the dual relation of integrity labels and privacy labels, R(LI1 unionsq LI2) = R(LP1 u
LP2 ) and R(L
I
1uLI2) = R(LP1 unionsqLP2 ). For composite label L = {P1;P2; · · · ;Pn},
where L1 = {P1}, L2 = {P2}, · · · , Ln = {Pn}, we have LP = LP1 unionsq LP2 unionsq · · · unionsq
LPn , and L
I = LI1 u LI2 u · · · u LIn
Representation Power of the DLM The DLM for integrity is able to
represent all the other models we have given. For example, {root: Alice, Bob}
in the DLM represents {Alice, Bob} in the writer model. {Alice: ; Bob:} in the
DLM represents {Alice, Bob} in the trust model. Because the distrust model is
representable by the trust model, it is also representable by the DLM.
Endorsement An analog to declassification also exists for integrity labels.
We call this integrity security relaxation endorsement. The motivation is that
along with the information flow in the program, more and more data may be
tainted, and the final results may be useless. It is desirable to cast tainted data to
untainted data, perhaps after performing some check on that data. For example,
the program may read data from the Internet, a very tainted data source. Enforc-
ing pure noninterference would prevent such data from affecting any untainted
data in the program, which is usually too restrictive in practice. Endorsement
is intended for such situations. If the program can verify that the data from the
network is safe and not tainted, e.g. the digital signature is correct, the program
may endorse the data and allow it to flow to untainted places.
In the extended DLM, the endorsement operation is a set of relabeling rules
to change the integrity labels. Because we can express mutual distrust integrity
constraints, it is important that the endorsement can only weaken the integrity
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constraints of the current authority. In particular, if the policy of a principal
does not exist in the label, he has the right to add to it.
The endorsement rule for integrity labels can be formalized as follows: If
L2 u {a :} v L1 and a is a current authority then L1 can be endorsed to L2.
Examples We have described how to modify the DLM to support integrity
constraints. Now we present several examples in Jif [23], which is a variant of
Java language that implements the DLM, to help readers understand how the
model works. To distinguish integrity labels from privacy labels, we put “!” in
front of labels to represent integrity labels.
Example 1 Example 2
1: boolean !{Alice: Bob} x=true; 1: public int !{Alice:} foo(int !{} in)
2: boolean !{Alice:} y = false; 2: where authority(Alice)
3: x = y; 3: {
4: y = x; //this is wrong! 4: int result = (in>0) ? in:0;
5: if (x) { 5: return(endorse(result, !{Alice:}));
6: y = true; //wrong, too! 6: }
7: }
In Example 1, variables x and y are given two different labels. By our in-
tegrity label definition, !{Alice: } v !{Alice: Bob}. Therefore, x is consid-
ered tainted data while y is untainted. Thus, assigning y to x is legal (line 3) but
assigning x to y is illegal (line 4). Line 6 illustrate the implicit information flow
case. Although y is not directly modified by any tainted data, y’s value depends
on the condition value of the control statement in line 5. In fact, if y is false
before line 5, then line 5 and 6 is equivalent to y=x. The compiler rejects such
programs by adding another constraint that y must be dirtier than the current
program-counter (pc) label, and in line 5 the pc label is augmented to x’s label
so that the compiler can detect the fault.
In Example 2, the function foo takes an argument, tests whether the value is
larger than 0, and returns a non-negative result. The interesting part is that the
input data could be written by anyone. The program will be rejected without
endorsement. With the endorsement statement, the return value of the function
is fully trusted by Alice. Note that the endorsement requires Alice to be a current
authority. If the current authority is Bob or someone else, the endorsement will
not be granted.
6 Comparison of label models
The DLM can be symmetrically defined for both confidentiality labels and in-
tegrity labels, but they are not completely symmetric in applications. The prob-
lem lies in the motivation to use the DLM: to enforce security policies in presence
of mutual distrust. Figure 1 is a comparison of the label models for both confi-
dentiality and integrity; the details are explained in the following subsections.
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Confidentiality Labels Integrity Labels
Trusted Code Untrusted Code Trusted Code
RM DLM RM DLM WM TM/DM DLM
Mode 1
√ √ √ √ × × ×
Mode 2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Mode 3(a) × √ × ×
Mode 3(b)
× √ × √ × √ √
RM = Reader Model TM/DM = Trust/Distrust Model
WM = Writer Model DLM = Decentralized Label Model
Fig. 1. Comparison of confidentiality and integrity label models under various failure
modes (see Sections 6.1 and 6.3).
6.1 Revisiting confidentiality
To better understand the motivation of using the DLM to protect confidentiality,
we compare the DLM with the reader model. The reader model is the dual
of the writer model: each label is simply a list of principals allowed to access
the information. We consider both trusted (self-written) code, and untrusted
(downloaded) code, assuming all the code is typechecked before execution.
We compare the two models in the following failure modes (see the summary
for confidentiality labels in the left half of Figure 1):
1. Wrong Computation: This is the case where the code performs some wrong
computation. For the trusted, self-written code, it may be a bug in the
program. For the untrusted code, it may be some malicious statements trying
to leak secret information. As long as the code is annotated and typechecked,
both the DLM and the reader model are safe, because the typechecking
guaranteed that no information will be leaked. In fact, performing the wrong
computation on the secret data only make it safer. The secret data only
becomes more useless after the wrong computation.
2. Violating Flow Constraints: This is the case where the flow of information
violates the annotated constraints. Both models are safe in this aspect, be-
cause the typechecker will detect such problems.
3. Wrong Declassification: This is the case where the code declassifies some
secret information that should not be leaked. The reader model is not safe
in this case, because there is no relationship between the authority of the
code and the principals in the label. If we allow declassification here, there
is no way to restrict the declassification in the code that we do not trust.
For example, anyone can declassify root’s password to the public.
The DLM works better here, because the authority of the code is associated
with the owners in the policies, and each principal may only weaken his/her
own policy. There are two cases:
(a) Wrong Declassification with sufficient authority: If a principal has the
authority to weaken a policy, such a wrong declassification is not safe.
For example, if root wants to declassify his own password to the public,
this is a serious mistake and the typechecker will not detect it.
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(b) Wrong Declassification without sufficient authority: If a principal does
not have the authority to weaken a policy, it is safe because such a
mistake can be detected by the typechecker. For example, if an applet
wants to declassify root’s password, such a program will be rejected
because the applet does not have root’s authority.
This comparison gives a clear view of the motivation to use the DLM. In
the reader model, it is not safe to allow declassification when the code is not
trusted. In the DLM, declassification is safe as long as each principal does not
compromise his own confidentiality.
6.2 Code must be trusted to assure integrity
We know that the decentralized label model and information-flow control can be
used to assure data confidentiality, even when part of the code is not trusted. As
long as the program is typechecked, it is guaranteed that no secret information
can be leaked.
However, when untrusted code exists, the information-flow control approach
is not immediately sufficient to assure integrity. Consider the following examples:
Example 1 Example 2
1: int !{untainted} add( 1: class Evil {
2: int !{untainted} a, 2: int !{untainted} fileHandle;
3: int !{untainted} b ) 3: void setFileHandle(int !{untainted} fh){
4: { 4: fileHandle = fh - fh; // Evil here
5: return a+b; 5: }
6: } 6: int !{untainted} getFileHandle() {
7: return fileHandle;
8: }}
In the first example, the method add does not violate any information-flow
control constraints. It takes two untainted arguments and calculate the sum of
them, so that the result can also be annotated as untainted. But if the code
is downloaded from untrusted sources, the integrity of the result still cannot be
guaranteed, because it is easy to compromise data integrity without violating
information-flow constraints. For example, the a+b can be modified to a-b, or
even a-a, so that the result can always be garbage. More generally, we can infer
that, if the code is not trusted, then we have no integrity guarantee on any
information returned from it, because the adversary can manipulate the data in
many ways without violating information-flow control constraints. In the second
example. The Evil class was written by the adversary. It was supposed to store
the value of a file handle and later return it. Apparently, we want to assure the
integrity of that file handle, but the direct information-flow control approach
cannot provide such a guarantee. The Evil class can be typechecked, but the
value returned from the getFileHandle() method is completely garbage.
Therefore, the information-flow control approach must be augmented to as-
sure the integrity of information returned from untrusted code. If such untrusted
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code exists, it may taint any data flowing out of it. One solution is to annotate
these data as tainted by the authority of the code, which is equivalent to treating
the untrusted code as tainted input channels.
6.3 Comparison of integrity label models
Now we compare the three integrity label models described earlier in this paper:
the writer model, the trust/distrust model, and the decentralized label model. We
exclude the untrusted code cases from our comparison, because none of these
models can guarantee the integrity of data coming from untrusted code. We
assume that all the code is written by a trusted person.
We compare the two models in the following failure modes (see the summary
for integrity labels in the right half of Figure 1):
1. Wrong Computation: This is the case where the code performs some wrong
computation. Clearly, such a mistake will break the integrity of the results,
and it is not safe for any model.
2. Violating Flow Constraints: Just as for confidentiality, all models are safe.
3. Wrong Endorsement: This is the case where the code endorses some data
that is actually tainted.
The writer model is not safe in this case, because there is no relationship
between the authority of the code and the principals in the label. If the pro-
grammer misuses a endorsement, the typechecker cannot find this mistake.
In both the trust/distrust model and the DLM, the authority of the code is
associated with the principals in the policies, and each principal may only
weaken his/her own policy. There are two cases:
(a) Wrong Endorsement with sufficient authority: If a principal has the au-
thority to weaken a policy, such a wrong endorsement is still not safe.
For example, if root wants to endorse an arbitrary integer and use it as
the index to access an array, the typechecker will not detect it.
(b) Wrong Endorsement without required authority: If a principal does not
have the authority to weaken a policy, both the DLM and the trust/distrust
models are safe. Such mistakes can be detected by typechecking.
This comparison shows that the writer model is not as powerful as the DLM,
because the authority of the code is not associated with the principals in the
label. However, the comparison does not show any difference between the trust
model and the DLM. In fact, it seems that the trust model is sufficient to use in
practical applications.
We have shown that although the DLM can be defined, manipulated and
implemented in symmetric ways for integrity as well as for confidentiality, it
does not provide more benefits than simpler models as the trust model or distrust
model. The motivation and the power of DLM is significantly weakened by the
assumption that the code is trusted.
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7 Integrity and data invariants
This section considers data invariants as a means of strengthening information-
flow based definitions of integrity.
7.1 Limitations of noninterference
Noninterference is not strong enough to represent the integrity policies needed
in practice. In our case study of the integrity extension to the Jif language,
we simply ruled out the information-flow analysis for untrusted code. We have
seen such examples: An untrusted applet may have a method f that takes an
untainted argument a and returns an untainted value f(a). This method can
be noninterfering, i.e. the output f(a) only depends on a, the untainted input
value. But in fact, even if f is noninterfering, f(a) can be anything. It can be
a+ a or any arbitrary constant. This will lead to serious problems that hurt the
integrity of the system. What will happen if we use f(a) as the index to access
an array or use it as the format string for printf()?
The problem is that noninterference can be used only to control how the
data flows in the system, but it cannot be used to control how the data is
manipulated. For confidentiality, this suffices, because destroying the data only
make the secrets safer, just like shredding a piece of paper with secrets on it only
makes it harder to reveal these secrets. For integrity, we must consider both the
data flow and its contents.
Consider the Unix file system as an example. Besides noninterference policies,
which state that only authorized users can write to the file, we also want to make
sure that the file system is manipulated in correct ways. The data structure of
the file system should be kept consistent, i.e. the user cannot create cross-linked
files or directories, the date and time of each directory item are valid (not June
32nd). Such requirements are far beyond the scope of noninterference policies,
yet they are usually considered as integrity requirements.
7.2 Integrity as invariants
For a better understanding of integrity policies beyond noninterference, we need
to study the concept of integrity of the contents of data. In practice, there are
many examples: array access (indexes not exceeding the boundaries), message
authenticity (digital signature or MAC is valid), and file systems (the data struc-
tures are consistent).
Depending on the context of the application, the integrity of data may have
very different meanings. Nevertheless, they all require some property of the data,
which is either “good”, i.e. it satisfies the constraint or meets the specification, or
“bad”, i.e. the data is invalid or inconsistent. To be enforceable, such properties
must be computable, so that given a specific value, we can decide whether it is
good or bad. Generally, for a piece of data a, we can define the quality of a as a
computable predicate ϕ on it:
ϕ(a) ≡ a has good quality
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An integrity policy on the value of data can be defined as: an invariant ϕ on the
quality of data under program execution. We use the function f to represent a
fragment of program such as a method or an instruction. For an integrity policy
with invariant ϕ, we can define the quality of the program as a predicate ψϕ on
f , by checking whether it always maintains the invariant:
ψϕ(f) ⇐⇒ ∀a, ϕ(a)→ ϕ(f(a))
We would expect that such integrity policies be enforced by checking ψϕ(f).
For example, if the quality of data ϕ is easy to compute, a simple approach to
enforcing the invariant policies would be to rewrite the program f in the form
g(a) =
{
f(a) when ϕ(f(a))
b when ¬ϕ(f(a)) ∧ ϕ(b)
where b is a value with good quality that satisfies ϕ. Suppose the invariant is a
range [1..10] on variable x, then, after the execution of f , x may be 11, which
is out of the range. In such a case, g could either return a default value 1 that
falls within the range, or raise an exception, indicating the failure. This is ex-
actly the approach people have used in software-based fault isolation [34], where
mandatory runtime monitors and assertions are inserted into the programs. In
particular, if ϕ(a) holds and we choose b = a, the function g has the atomic
effect of a transaction—the data a will either persist unchanged or become f(a)
if and only if f(a) has good quality.
If we treat the data during program execution as traces, a security policy
based on the invariant ϕ is a safety property [29], specifying that bad things
never happen during any execution. Therefore, various enforcement mechanisms
for safety properties can be used to assure integrity, such as execution monitor-
ing with security automata [29], software-based fault isolation [34], and proof
carrying code [24].
7.3 Enforcing the invariants
Clark and Wilson’s model [6] used an access-control style enforcement mecha-
nism for preserving data invariants. The model introduced the concepts of CDI
(Constrained Data Item), referring to data with good quality, and TP (Transfor-
mation Procedure), referring to programs preserving the invariants on CDI. The
invariants are enforced with two kinds of rules: certification rules, which state
that all the TPs are certified so that they always preserve the invariants on the
CDIs, and enforcement rules, saying the CDI can only be accessed via the TP
and the accesses are controlled according to a certified relation (User, TP, CDI).
The certification of TP is exactly the problem of checking whether a pro-
gram preserves a data invariant. In Clark and Wilson’s model, the certification
is usually a manual operation performed by the security officer or the system
custodian. For large systems, solely relying on the manual proofs would be ineffi-
cient and error-prone. Moreover, the emerging application of mobile code brings
more challenges on the integrity model: it is impractical to manually check the
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safety of a downloaded applet before executing it. Therefore, we need automated
mechanisms to enforce the data invariants for programs.
There are two kinds of enforcement mechanisms—static and dynamic mech-
anisms. One tradeoff between them is that they have different information to
work with—dynamic mechanisms have access to the run-time state, but static
mechanisms typically have access to the full program text. Another tradeoff is
that dynamic mechanisms potentially introduce more runtime overhead. The
typical dynamic runtime mechanisms include software-based fault isolations [34,
32] and reference monitors [29, 18].
Static mechanisms, such as type systems and program analyses are also a
promising way to specify integrity invariants. The difficulty is in verifying rich
integrity invariants—properties involving arithmetic, for instance, quickly be-
come intractable.
An important research direction is to apply these technologies to integrity in-
variants, potentially by combining static and dynamic approaches: type systems
that ensure dynamic checks have been inserted into the system appropriately.
8 Availability vs. integrity
Recently, the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, emerging as one of the most seri-
ous security problems, has brought availability issues to the security community.
Because the idea behind DoS attack is to make the computing resources unavail-
able to break down the system, not confidentiality, integrity or anonymity, but
availability policies are violated. However, there are some similarities between
integrity and availability policies.
The well-known availability definition is: Availability = MTTFMTTF+MTTR.
MTTF stands for Mean Time to Failure and MTTR stands for Mean Time
To Repair. One problem of this definition is that it tries to measure the failure
of the whole system. In a large, distributed system, even when some hardware
or software fails, parts of the system are still functioning. Thus, we need a finer
grained definition. We propose that the system may have multiple inputs and
outputs, each of which has a different availability concern. This requirement is
almost inevitable for the large-scaled distributed system. Now, it is natural to
make the analogy of the noninterference notion from integrity to availability.
That is, just as we need that untainted data is not affected by tainted data for
integrity, we need that highly available data (dependable data) does not depend
on the low-available data (undependable data) during the computation.
The formal definition of noninterference for availability is as follows:
– Suppose there are two security levels of data: undependable and dependable.
Let the program f take the input (iundependable, idependable), and produce the
output (oundependable, odependable).
– Define noninterference as a property of the program: f is noninterfering iff
∀a, a′ : f(a, b) = (c, d) ⇒ f(a′, b) = (c′, d)
That is, the value of iundependable will not affect the value of odependable.
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Given this formal definition, we also need to formalize the model of the mul-
tiple inputs/outputs system, and precisely answer what we mean by availability
for an output. First, we simplify the system as a real-time function f : f takes a
vector 〈i1, i2, . . . , in〉 as input, and outputs another vector 〈o1, o2, . . . , om〉. As-
sume that for all 〈i1, i2, . . . , in〉 ∈ In, RunningTime(f(〈i1, . . . , in〉)) ≤ t0. That
is, the running time of f , no matter what its inputs are, is bounded by time t0.
All the data the system depends on should be specified by the input parameters
or have universal availability. If the input channel for ij is available, the data
can be read by the system in time tj , which should be negligible compared to
t0, i.e. tj = o(t0).
Secondly, in this model, we define the availability as a property on each
output element of the system. The availability for an output is the a vector of
probabilities, each element of which is the probability for the system to get the
corresponding output element successfully in time O(t0). By this definition, in
a system one can have different levels of availability for different output ele-
ments. Recent research shows that such multi-level tunable availability is useful
in system design [37].
The noninterference of this model is useful at least in following two scenarios:
1. There is a well-known trade-off that making data highly available sacri-
fices performance. For example, in storage systems, making more replicas
increases availability, but maintaining consistency degrades the performance.
Therefore, noninterference is useful to guarantee that all critical data is de-
pendable while other data may not be, permitting improved performance.
2. One possible way to fight against DoS attack is to allocate some privileged
users separate, highly available resources from ordinary users [5]. When some
DoS attack happens, the behavior of privileged users is not affected.
There are limitations to this noninterference definition of availability.
1. The system model above is significantly simplified from reality. System run-
ning time is typically not bounded and varies according to many factors,
such as logic inside the program, input, network conditions, etc. It is unpre-
dictable in general. Strong noninterference, which takes timing channels into
account, may have application to availability research, i.e., the undependable
data cannot interfere with the timing effects of dependable data.
2. The computing infrastructure, including OS, CPUs, chips, storage devices,
power supplies, is heavily influential in availability issues. For confidentiality
and integrity, it is natural to put the infrastructure into the trust computing
base. For availability, however, how dependable the infrastructure is becomes
much more important [25, 16]. One interesting question is how to practically
specify the availability of underlying infrastructure.
3. A probabilistic model of availability brings difficulties to both the program
analyzer and end-users who specify policies. For program analyzer, it is
harder to calculate least upper bounds of security levels because they may
or may not correspond to independent events. For end users, it is harder to
specify availability of resources in terms of percentages than it is to specify
who can see/modify the data in confidentiality/integrity.
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Therefore, enforcing noninterference for availability is sometimes necessary
for some applications, but definitely not sufficient.
These observations suggest a number of possible future research directions:
– Specifying availability concerns inside programs to enable static program
analysis, perhaps using type systems to provide the specifications. We call for
concrete specification models to address this problem. In particular, how to
specify the underlying hardware availability is an important open question.
– Developing a better metric model for availability than the model defined
above. We need to incorporate timing effects, the probability that the service
is available, the corresponding distribution, and correlated events.
– Exploring ways to better enforce timing sensitive strong noninterference.
9 Conclusion
We examined similarities and differences between access-control and information-
flow based definitions of confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies, focus-
ing mainly on integrity.
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be defined as noninterference
policies in information-flow control with varying degrees of success. The decen-
tralized label model exhibits the duality between confidentiality and integrity.
However, treating integrity as the formal dual of confidentiality leads to a weak
notion of security, because integrity demands additional assurance on the quality
of the data. This paper suggests invariants on quality of the data under program
execution as a way to strengthen noninterference based integrity policies.
These observations lead us to propose a definition of integrity as program
correctness, noninterference, and data invariant conditions, which yields the fol-
lowing categorization:
– Program correctness: program output is precise, accurate, meaningful and
correct with respect to a specification.
– Noninterference: data is modified only by authorized people or processes
either directly, or indirectly by means of information flow.
– Data invariants: data is precise or accurate, consistent, unmodified, or mod-
ified only in acceptable ways under program execution.
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Abstract. In which we demonstrate that, under eminently reasonable
assumptions, Ben-Or, Goldreich, Micali and Rivest’s contract-signing
protocol has a curious weakness: rational agents—that is, agents who
are unwilling to concede any advantage if there is no chance at all of re-
couping the loss in the long run—will never be willing to run the protocol
at all.
1 Introduction
Often it is desirable to have a procedure to allow two parties to sign a contract
simultaneously. The obvious danger of having one party sign before the other is
that the second party may refuse to sign until it becomes to his advantage to do
so. For instance, suppose the contract is for Alice to buy 1,000 shares in Fudge
Labs, Inc., from Bob, at £1 per share, in a year’s time. If Alice signs first, Bob
may then delay signing until the end of the year. If the price has fallen, he will
sign, the contract will be binding on both parties, and he will make a profit; if
the price has risen, he will not sign. A similar problem will arise if Bob signs
first. Because the market changes over time, anything that allows one party the
option of delaying the decision on whether to commit will cause problems.
Simultaneity in message transmission is, in most practical situations, im-
possible to achieve, making cryptographic contract-signing protocols difficult to
realize. A trusted third party can be employed to receive the two signatures and
then distribute them, but it is clearly advantageous to construct a protocol that
does not require action on the part of a third party unless there is suspicion of
foul play by one of the parties involved in the contract.
In this paper, we examine a cryptographic contract-signing protocol that
aims to solve these problems by making the probability that one party can
abuse the protocol arbitrarily small. We demonstrate that the protocol has a
curious weakness: two rational agents whose rationality is common knowledge
will refuse to run the protocol at all.
Most protocol properties that have been studied and analysed in the litera-
ture to date—secrecy and authentication in particular—are ones for which the
two protocol participants are considered to have the same goal: secrecy of some
value from other agents, or authentication of the initiator to the responder, for
instance. In such cases, the agents are either both satisfied or both disappointed.
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A contract-signing protocol, however, does not fit this mould: the very existence
of such a protocol is predicated on the fact that Alice would be better off if Bob
were to commit while she did not.
These considerations suggest that the protocol should be analysed within
the general framework of game theory, which provides, among other things, am-
munition for reasoning about interaction between two parties who may assign
different levels of satisfaction (different pay-offs) to the same outcome. It is this
framework that we use here.
This paper is not the first to apply such techniques to security protocols.
Kremer and Raskin used game theory to conduct formal analysis of a contract-
signing protocol in [1], though their method is rather different from that em-
ployed here.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the protocol in question;
in Sect. 3 we set out and demonstrate the problem; we then in Sect. 4 consider
whether our argument is related to two famous game-theoretic problems; and
finally we sum up in Sect. 5.
2 The Protocol
Ben-Or, Goldreich, Micali and Rivest in [2] propose a protocol for approximat-
ing simultaneous contract signing on a network in which simultaneous message
transmission is impossible. Interest in this protocol has been recently revived by
Norman and Shmatikov’s analysis in [3].
The protocol operates by means of allowing agents A and B to commit
to the contract with a certain probability. As the messages go back and forth
between the agents, the probability of each being committed to the contract
increases gradually from 0 to 1. The protocol takes two parameters: a measure
of fairness  > 0, and a measure of negligibility v > 0.
If either agent should abort the protocol, the probability that A will not
be committed given than B is committed will be less than , provided that the
probability that B is committed is at most v ; and similarly for A committed and
B not. These parameters  and v can be made as close to zero as one wishes;
however, the smaller the values, the more messages will need to be exchanged
to complete the protocol and have both parties committed to the contract.
The protocol makes use of a judge—but only if the protocol run does not
reach completion. If everything goes according to plan, the protocol run termi-
nates with each party having committed to the contract with probability 1.
If either party fails to send the next message of the run, the other party can
send the last message received to the judge. The judge, on receiving a message
with the meaning
A commits to contract C between A and B with probability p
will choose a value for a random variable x with a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
If x  p then the judge will declare C binding on A; otherwise, the judge will
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declare it not binding. If another message is later received by the judge for the
same contract C , he uses the same value of x as before.
The purpose of the judge in this protocol is rather unlike that of the trusted
third party in most other protocols. The judge here is not performing any cryp-
tographic service, but simply making a ruling on whether the contract is binding
or not.
2.1 Protocol Messages
A general protocol message k will be of the form
Message k . a → b : {a, b, c, p}SK (a)
meaning that a commits to contract c between a and b with probability p.
The precise mechanism used for signing the messages is not important for the
purposes of this paper.
The agents decide, by some undisclosed mechanism, who is to ‘go first’; we
shall take it that a goes first. They also decide on a factor α > 1 by which to
increase the probability of commitment at each turn3, such that the probability
of an agent not being committed given that the other agent is committed will
never exceed  (except when the probability of commitment is at most v). The
first message sent is
Message 1. a → b : {a, b, c, v}SK (a)
Thereafter, message sending alternates between a and b. When b is to send a
message, he takes the probability p committed to by a in the previous message m,
and sends out
Message (m + 1). b → a : {a, b, c,min(α · p, 1)}SK (b)
Agent a, on receiving a commitment by b with probability p′ in message m ′,
sends out
Message (m ′ + 1). a → b : {a, b, c,min(α · p′, 1)}SK (a)
The protocol continues, with the probability of commitment by the agent sending
the message increasing by a factor of α at each stage (except at the very end).
The protocol terminates when each agent has committed to the protocol with
probability 1.
3 The original paper allows for the agents to choose different factors—or, in fact, for
either agent or both agents to get away with never increasing the probability at all!
This introduces the possibility of infinite ‘ping-pong’ between the two agents, with
no progress ever made.
Provided that, as in any real-world implementation, the probability space is dis-
crete, so that there is an upper bound on the length of an eventually terminating
protocol run, these considerations do not affect the results presented here.
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3 Problems
We now set out the problem with the protocol. Section 3.1 gives the assumptions
required for our analysis; then in Sect. 3.2 we consider what will happen when
two agents look to sign a contract using the protocol.
3.1 Assumptions
In what follows, we make two important assumptions about the two agents A
and B who wish to sign the contract.
Assumption 1. The agents are rational ; that is, they always follow strategies
that are optimal based on the knowledge that they have at the time. This results
in a certain type of selfishness: an agent will never give anything away for nothing.
If it is certain that he will not gain (in the long run) from sending a message,
he will not send it.
Assumption 2. There is common knowledge of rationality between the agents;
that is,
(i). A knows that B is rational.
(ii). B knows that A is rational.
(iii). A knows that B knows that A is rational.
(iv). B knows that A knows that B is rational.
(v). A knows that B knows that A knows that B is rational.
(vi). B knows that A knows that B knows that A is rational.
etc.
These assumptions are not in any way unusual: they are standard fare in game
theory (see, for example, [4, 5]).
3.2 Stalemate
Consider what happens when Alice and Bob attempt to run the protocol to sign
contract C , using a negligibility of v and a factor of α. Let us assume, without
loss of generality, that Bob is to send the last message of the run, and that this
will be Message n. We shall further assume that v · αd = 1 for some natural
number d . This last assumption is not necessary, but it makes the notation
easier, and does not otherwise affect the argument.
The last few messages of the run will, therefore, if all goes according to plan,
be
Message (n − 3). Alice → Bob : {Alice,Bob,C , α−2}SK (Alice)
Message (n − 2). Bob → Alice : {Alice,Bob,C , α−1}SK (Bob)
Message (n − 1). Alice → Bob : {Alice,Bob,C , 1}SK (Alice)
Message n. Bob → Alice : {Alice,Bob,C , 1}SK (Bob)
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Suppose that Bob has just received Message (n− 1), and that he is therefore
due to send out Message n. What is his motivation for doing so? It is immediately
clear that he has none whatsoever: Alice has already committed with probability
1, and Bob knows that his final message cannot elicit any further commitment
from Alice. To send out Message n would lose him his small probability of 1−α−1
of getting out of the contract at a later date, and for no gain. If Bob is rational
(in the sense of Assumption 1) then he will certainly not send out Message n.
Now consider Alice’s position when she has received Message (n − 2) and is
preparing to send Message (n − 1). She knows, by Assumption 2, that Bob is
rational, and so she knows that if she sends Message (n−1) then she will not get
a response. This puts her in a position similar to Bob’s discussed above: she is
being asked to give something for nothing. She knows that, whatever she does,
she will not get any further commitment from Bob; so she has nothing to gain
by continuing with the protocol. By sending Message (n−1), she would increase
the probability of her being bound to the contract from α−2 to 1, for no profit.
She will not comply.
But then, of course, Bob has no reason to send out Message (n − 2). Why
should he? To do so would commit himself further—with probability α−1, rather
than the α−3 of Message (n − 4)—with no hope of a response. His rationality,
his knowledge of Alice’s rationality, and his knowledge of Alice’s knowledge of
his rationality, forbid it.
The rather startling conclusion now becomes clear: Alice will not start the
protocol at all! The argument above can be tracked right back to the beginning
of the protocol. If Message (k + 1) will not be sent, then Message k will not
be sent either. And since Message n will not be sent, we see by induction that
Message 1 will not be sent.
In summary: if the agents are rational, and have common knowledge of ra-
tionality, then they will be unwilling to run the contract-signing protocol.
4 The Validity of the Argument
We now turn to consideration of whether the problems that we have identified
in the protocol are similar to those exemplified in a couple of well-known puzzles
that are much discussed in the literature: the ‘paradox’ of the unexpected hang-
ing, and the problem of the prisoner’s dilemma. We argue in Sect. 4.1, drawing
on Quine’s work in [6, 7], that the ‘paradox’ of the unexpected hanging is no
paradox at all, but in any case is related to the weakness in the protocol only
in virtue of being another instance of weak backwards mathematical induction.
We then turn in Sect. 4.2 to the prisoner’s dilemma, where we accept the sur-
prising result that two rational agents may each be worse off than two irrational
agents. We argue that this is replicated in the protocol: two rational agents, in
not running the protocol, and, consequently, not signing the contract, can each
be worse off than two irrational agents that run it and, consequently, sign the
contract.
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4.1 The ‘Paradox’ of the Unexpected Hanging
At first sight, it looks as if the contract-signing protocol suffers from a weakness
related to that suffered by the well-known ‘paradox’ of the unexpected hanging.
The story runs as follows. A judge tells a prisoner that he will be hanged one
afternoon in the next week. Further, he tells him that, to make his punishment
worse, he will not know on the morning of the day of the hanging that that
is indeed the day of the hanging. The prisoner is not subdued by this dread
announcement, but, on the contrary, is jubilant. He reasons thus:
Suppose I am to be hanged on Friday. Then I shall know on Friday
morning that I am to be hanged on Friday, since I shall obviously know
that I have not been hanged on preceding days. So clearly I cannot be
hanged on Friday as that would violate the judge’s decree. But since I
now know that I cannot be hanged on Friday, I cannot be hanged on
Thursday either. Suppose I were to be hanged on Thursday; then I’d
know on Thursday morning that I was to be hanged on Thursday, since
I should know first that I have not been hanged on previous days, and,
secondly, by my previous argument, that I cannot be hanged on Friday.
Hence I cannot be hanged on Thursday.
By a similar argument the prisoner rules out every day of the week and concludes
that he cannot be hanged.
The story comes in many different versions, the surprise examination being
the most common. It was first discussed in print in [8], though, Gardner tells
us, it apparently circulated by word of mouth in the early 1940s (see, inter
alia, Chapter 1 of [9]). Gardner thinks that the origin of the ‘paradox’ lies in
a Swedish Broadcasting Company announcement in 1943 or 1944 that a civil-
defence exercise would be held in the following week and that no one would know
before the actual day on which day of the week it would take place. For further
references we advise the reader to consult [10].
What is wrong with the prisoner’s reasoning? We are convinced by the simple
argument of Quine in [6, 7]. The prisoner errs right at the start—when consid-
ering whether he could be hanged on Friday he considers only two possibilities:
(i). that he would be hanged on Friday afternoon and would know it then;
(ii). that he would have been hanged before Friday afternoon.
The prisoner rejected (i) because of its non-fulfilment of the judge’s decree,
leaving (ii) as the remaining possibility, and then reasoned inductively to the
absurd conclusion that he would have had to be hanged before the start of the
week. He did not consider at the start of his reasoning the further possibilities:
(iii). that he would not be hanged at all;
(iv). that he would be hanged on Friday afternoon but would not know it then.
It is clear that (iii) contravenes the decree, but it is neither more nor less than the
prisoner’s own conclusion at the end of all of his reasoning, and (iv) is another
76
live option. Indeed, it is perfectly possible that (iv) will actually be realized, and
that the unfortunate prisoner, still confidently believing (iii), will be surprised
by the arrival of the hangman on Friday afternoon. Since the prisoner is first
surprised and then hanged, the decree is fulfilled.
The question arises as to whether the weakness of the protocol is related to
the weakness, as outlined above, of the unexpected hanging ‘paradox’. At first
sight, the prisoner’s reasoning is very similar to our reasoning about the protocol
in Sect. 3.2. In each case, the last possibility (hanging on the last day, or sending
of the final message) is ruled out; the penultimate is consequently discarded too;
and the argument proceeds inductively to rule out every possible day on which
to be hanged or every possible message to be sent. If the prisoner’s reasoning is
fallacious, one must ask whether our argument concerning the protocol is beset
with similar problems.
A little thought convinces one that it is not, however. The essence of the
prisoner’s fallacy, as Quine makes clear, is to confuse two fundamentally differ-
ent thoughts: the assumption that the judge’s decree will be fulfilled, and the
assumption that he knows that the judge’s decree will be fulfilled. It is as a result
of this that the prisoner fails to distinguish between (i) and (iv) in his reason-
ing. This fallacy does not make an appearance, however, in our treatment of the
protocol. The key to this is the assumption of common knowledge of rationality
(Assumption 2). If we were to drop this, but keep Assumption 1, the reasoning
would no longer be sound: we could still infer that Bob would not send the last
message of the protocol, but we could go no further. Alice would no longer have
a clear reason to hold back with the penultimate message, because she would
not know that Bob was rational, and hence not know that Bob would not send
the final message.
Without the common knowledge assumption, we would be making an invalid
leap from Bob’s rationality to Alice’s knowledge of Bob’s rationality; this is, in
essence, the mistake that the prisoner makes in his reasoning. With the assump-
tion in place, however, the argument is sound. Assumption 2 plugs the gap that
the prisoner needs somehow to fill to get his argument to work.
4.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
We have argued above that no rational player will participate in the protocol
under discussion, and that, consequently, it will never get off the ground with ra-
tional players. We then have the surprising conclusion that two irrational players
may be jointly better off than two rational players. This is because if they are
both irrational then they may run the protocol to conclusion and thus get the
contract signed, whereas if they are rational then they will not run the protocol
and they will not sign the contract. Under the reasonable assumption that each
is better off if both sign than if neither signs—for otherwise, they would not be
looking to sign the contract at all—it follows that each may be better off if both
are irrational than if both are rational. This surprising result is reminiscent of
the well-known problem of the prisoner’s dilemma.
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The basic form of the prisoner’s dilemma, according to Kuhn [11], originated
with Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in the 1950s, though the title ‘Prisoner’s
Dilemma’ and the precise format we use below are originally due to Albert
Tucker. For further information, we refer the interested reader to the exhaustive
and annotated bibliography of Robert Axelrod [12].
In the prisoner’s dilemma we are asked to imagine that two prisoners have
been captured and are being held separately from each other, such that each has
no means of communication with the other. Each is offered a deal by the police:
if he confesses and implicates the other, he will get off scot-free, while the other
will get a heavy sentence (say, ten years in prison); but if he stays silent and the
other confesses, he will then get the ten-year stretch, while the other will get
off scot-free. If both confess then each will get five years, but if both stay silent
then they will get only one year apiece, since the courts will be able to convict
only on a lesser charge. For each prisoner the dominant or optimal strategy is
to confess: if the other confesses, he will do better to confess; and if the other
does not confess, he will do better to confess. The surprising thing is that if each
prisoner is rational then both will confess and the overall result will be worse for
each of them than if both were to remain silent. It is clear that the prisoner’s
dilemma is closely related to the weakness in the protocol: rational agents can
be worse off than irrational agents.
One may then ask: what if Alice and Bob had more than one contract to
sign? What if they had a pile of k contracts to work through, one by one, with
each signing each contract? One might wonder whether in this case it would be
worthwhile for Alice to sign the first few contracts, so as to encourage Bob to
sign some, and only refuse to sign near the bottom of the pile. She might be
better off with, say, ten signed contracts and a risk of Bob refusing to co-operate
on the eleventh, than no signed contracts at all.
This reasoning calls to mind the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Here there are k
rounds, for some fixed (large) k , in each of which each prisoner is given the option
to confess and the option to remain silent. In each round the prisoner knows what
he and what the other prisoner did in previous rounds. The suggestion is that
this ‘solves’ the problem, as a prisoner can be punished in later rounds for having
confessed in earlier rounds.
However, this line of reasoning is not sound (see Selten’s work in [13]). The
kth round would function exactly as would a non-iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
and since each prisoner would realize this, he would not take it into account
in his deliberations over how to play the (k − 1)th round, which would then in
turn be reduced to a standard non-iterated prisoner’s dilemma. By induction,
this would apply to every round, and so the whole problem would collapse into
a normal, non-iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which each prisoner’s dominant
strategy is to confess at every turn, thus ensuring that each is worse off (under
the assumption that both are rational) than had both stayed silent.
This, of course, applies directly to Alice and Bob’s pile of contracts. They
will not sign the kth contract, for the reasons outlined in Sect. 3.2; and, by
Assumption 2, each will know in advance that this will be the case. They will,
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therefore, have no motive to sign the (k−1)th contract, or the (k−2)th, and, by
induction, will not sign any of the contracts at all. The fact that they have a large,
fixed number of contracts to sign makes no difference at all to the practicality
of the protocol.
Note, however, that the number of contracts must be known to the agents
in advance in order for this argument to work. If there were an infinite number
of contracts to sign, or a finite but unknown number, the situation would be
less than clear. One might argue that issues of reputation and trust come into
play: an agent might not want to get a reputation for being a non-signer. Two
considerations make gaining a reputation less significant than one might think,
however: in the first place, many contracts are of such importance and value
(for instance, exchanging contracts for sale of a house) that concerns about
reputation are likely to be overshadowed by concerns about what is to be gained
from this particular contract; and in the second place, one would hope to be
able to use such a protocol over an anonymous channel (where the signature
is tied to an anonymous identifier for a particular electronic payment method,
for instance, rather than to a named individual), and reputation makes no sense
with anonymous signing. In any case, there is no indication from the designers of
the protocol under consideration that a desire for a good reputation is necessary
to get the protocol to function adequately.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Ben-Or, Goldreich, Micali and Rivest’s
contract-signing protocol suffers from a serious and surprising weakness: two
rational agents whose rationality is common knowledge will not be prepared to
use the protocol at all.
Four important points should be noted about what we have concluded here.
(i). The result does not in any way depend on the value the agents may place
on the contract itself. Even if each is desperate to have the other committed
to the contract, neither will get anywhere. Once Alice is fully committed,
Bob has everything he wants, and has no reason at all to send the last
message, regardless of how pleased he may be to have Alice’s commitment.
And however much Alice may want Bob to send the last message and commit
with probability 1, she knows that nothing will induce him to do so; and so,
regardless of the value she places on the contract, she will not send out the
penultimate message. . .
(ii). Nor does the result hinge on the agents’ risk profiles. The argument we have
given is not one that requires probabilistic analysis on the part of Alice and
Bob, but one based on certainties: for Alice to send the penultimate message
in the hope of a response from Bob would not be to take a risk but to
guarantee herself a loss. She may be as risk-averse or as risk-inclined as she
wishes; but she will still be unwilling to concede her advantage when she has
no chance whatsoever of a response from Bob.
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(iii). It should be noted that these results apply only in cases where each party’s
best result is to get the other party to commit to the contract while remaining
uncommitted himself. There may be cases where both parties need to commit
in order to make any subsequent progress; and, in this case, it will be to Bob’s
advantage to send the last message, and the argument will not hold. However,
simultaneous contract-signing protocols are not designed with such situations
in mind! It is precisely to deal with the possibility of one party signing and
the other not signing that contract-signing protocols were invented.
(iv). This is not the end of the story. It would be interesting to investigate the
effects of other more advanced game-theoretic models on this and other
contract-signing protocols. Selten’s ‘trembling hand’ model (see [13]), for
example, allows for consideration of game participants who, on each turn,
fail with some small probability to act on their rational decision. This would
allow us to specify agents who might at each point continue the protocol in
spite of their belief that they have nothing to gain. Incorporating this into
the analysis will be the topic of a further paper.
We suspect that this problem is fundamentally insoluble without involving a
more traditional form of trusted third party. However the protocol is organized,
someone will have to send the last message; and since it is never possible, without
the aid of a trusted third party, to prove that one has sent a message, it follows
that the agent sending the last message of the protocol has nothing to gain by
doing so. The same argument as that presented in Sect. 3 will then apply: the
last message will not be sent; therefore, by the same reasoning, the penultimate
message will not be sent; therefore the antepenultimate message will not be sent;
and so on.
There are protocols in existence that make use of a trusted third party, in
a way that is not vulnerable to the problem outlined above, to perform cryp-
tographic functions in cases where one party or the other fails to complete the
protocol. The work by Asokan, Shoup and Waidner [14], for example, makes use
of verifiable key escrow to ensure that the third party can force the agents to
play fair. The weight on the shoulders of the third party here is much less than
if he were involved in every run. However, it would clearly be advantageous to
have a protocol that does not ever involve a third party; our belief is that this is
impossible without running into the sort of problem laid out in this paper. Even
in the Ben-Or, Goldreich, Micali and Rivest protocol, in which the third party
is active but plays a purely judiciary role, rational agents are unable to make
any progress.
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Security and Trust in a
Voter-Verifiable Voting Scheme
Jeremy Bryans and Peter Ryan
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, UK
{Jeremy.Bryans|Peter.Ryan}@newcastle.ac.uk
Abstract
Digital voting systems provide an excellent context in which to investigate
issues of security and trust in socio-technical systems. We describe the integrity
and secrecy requirements of digital voting schemes, noting the tension between
these requirements. We give an overview of a variant of the Chaum digital
scheme [2] and use this as a vehicle to explore the nature and feasibility of
these requirements. Finally we discuss how public trust in such a system might
be engendered and maintained.1
1 Introduction
More technologically sophisticated alternatives to the traditional pen and paper
methods of casting and counting votes are currently being investigated. The UK
government has stated its enthusiasm for such schemes [6] and a number of trials
have been performed, e.g. [3].
Such systems provide an excellent context to investigate issues of security
and assurance in complex, socio-technical systems. Of particular interest to us
is a scheme proposed by Chaum. In this scheme, assurance arises from voter-
verification and independent auditing of the behaviour of the components: the
booths and trustees. We are using this scheme as a vehicle to investigate the
mechanisms for achieving assurance and for engendering public trust and confi-
dence.
2 Requirements of a Voting System
In this section we discuss the requirements of a voting scheme. The primary
requirements are accuracy and ballot secrecy. The system must also be robust
and resilient in the face of accidental and malicious threats. In particular, failures
with respect to the primary requirements should be detectable and recoverable.
Ideally a voting scheme should also be usable, available, efficient, unbiased
and scalable but we will not discuss these aspects here. These are being addressed
in the context of a broader, socio-technical study of digital voting schemes being
conducted by the DIRC project, [4].
1 The authors would like to thank David Chaum for many useful discussions. We
would also like to thank the members of the DIRC project for useful discussion and
input.
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It is also essential the such a system gain public trust: voters must be confi-
dent that their vote will be accurately included in the final count and that the
secrecy of their vote is guaranteed. One way to help engender confidence in the
accuracy is to provide voter verifiability: some way for the voter to assure them-
selves that their vote has been accurately included in the tally. This immediately
creates a tension between the requirement for ballot secrecy and that of verifia-
bility. A naive implementation of verifiability would immediately violate secrecy.
In [2], Chaum conjectures that it is impossible to achieve absolute assurances
of unconditional accuracy and privacy simultaneously. His scheme provides both
requirements up to certain probabilistic and computation bounds.
2.1 Accuracy
What precisely we mean by accuracy will depend on what level of abstraction
we are working at and where we are drawing the system boundaries. At the
most abstract level, we would like the outcome of a election, referendum etc. to
accurately reflect the “intentions” of the eligible electorate. At this level we will
need to consider social and psychological issues that might favour certain sectors
of society, might bias choices or encourage voter error and so on. These aspects
are being investigated in the DIRC project.
For the purposes of this paper we will restrict ourselves to the purely technical
question of ensuring that votes counted in the final tally accurately reflect votes
cast. We will assume that issues of authentication and prevention of double
voting have been addressed.
In practice, absolute assurance of complete accuracy is not feasible and, ar-
guably, too strong a requirement. The real requirement is that the outcome be
“correct”, e.g. that the candidate with the largest number of votes wins. The
Chaum scheme provides a good probabilistic assurance of accuracy: the chance
of p votes being corrupted undetected diminishes exponentially with p. As a re-
sult, tight statistical bounds can be placed on the probability of the outcome of
an election being swung by undetected corruption of votes.
2.2 Ballot Secrecy
It will typically be a requirement that the way any individual voter voted remain
secret. For some forms of vote this might not be required, for example voting in
the UK House of Commons. For this paper we will assume that ballot secrecy
is a requirement. Besides the natural desire for privacy, ballot secrecy serves to
prevent coercion or vote buying. The key point is that there should be no way
for a voter to prove to a third party which way they voted.
Note that absolute assurances of total secrecy may not be realistic here.
In certain exceptional circumstances secrecy will be violated in any case, for
example, if all the votes went one way. In any case, an observer will be able to
make probabilistic estimates of which way a vote was cast on the basis of the
final counts.
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Instead of ballot secrecy we might require voter anonymity. At first glance
one might suppose that these are equivalent. We adapt the approach of Schneider
et al. [7] in formalising the notion of anonymity using CSP. A system S satisfies
anonymity with respect to some set V of voters and viewpoint given by the
process abstraction A if:
∀pi : Perm(V ) • A(S) ≡ A(S[pi])
where [pi] denotes the CSP renaming operator.
Thus, if we transform the system by arbitrary permutation on the set of
voters, the resulting system is indistinguishable from the original, at least from
the viewpoint represented by the abstraction A. The abstraction serves to hide
internal details not visible to an outside observer. For the simplified scheme set
out in this paper, an observer would only be able to see the values on the outside
of each envelope.
Note that, using such a definition, the scenario of everyone voting for the same
candidate would still be deemed to satisfy anonymity but would fail the ballot
secrecy requirement. Given that such a scenario is perfectly admissible, this
would seem to suggest that voter anonymity is the more appropriate requirement.
2.3 Assurance and Verifiability
System malfunctions and compromises will inevitably occur. It is essential there-
fore that mechanisms be provided to detect, contain and recover from failures.
These mechanisms need to be robust in the face of malicious as well as accidental
threats.
The ways of achieving assurance can be thought of as lying along a spectrum
with verification at one end and run-time monitoring at the other, with testing
lying somewhere in between.
In order to verify a system we assume some model of its behaviour and
subject this to various forms of mathematical analysis to prove that it will satisfy
certain (formally stated) requirements. This is fine up to a point but suffers from
a number of deficiencies:
– Our analysis will only be as good as the models on which it is based. In
order to render them tractable, our models will typically be pretty drastic
abstractions of the real systems.
– It is difficult to ensure that the verified system will correspond exactly to
the fielded system.
– Even supposing that our models start off as being faithful representations of
the real system and its environment, systems and environments evolve. This
evolution, which could include degradation, patches etc, can invalidate the
original analysis.
On the other hand, run time monitoring also suffers various drawbacks:
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– Monitoring can be difficult: you need to know exactly what to monitor,
monitoring has to be accurate and, in a hostile environment, robust against
subversion.
– Detecting a violation at run time may be too late. For example, once a secret
it out, it is out.
– Some properties, by their very nature, are not amendable to run-time mon-
itoring. Information flow properties provides a classic example: it is not a
trace property and so failures of information properties typically will not be
manifest from monitoring the target system.
Given these deficiencies, one should use these techniques in combination to
achieve increased levels of assurance.
These issues are thrown into sharp focus in the context of digital and elec-
tronic voting systems. Many of the proposed and even deployed electronic voting
systems depend heavily on (claims for) carefully verified code and provide lit-
tle or nothing in the way of run-time monitoring. The Chaum scheme is at the
other extreme: virtually no reliance need be placed in the components and all
the assurance comes from close monitoring of the behaviour.
The Chaum scheme strives to provide the voter with good levels of assurance
that their vote will be accurately recorded and that the privacy of their vote
will be guaranteed. In particular, with respect to the accuracy requirement, the
scheme provides the user with a physical receipt and the means to check, in
principle, that their vote is accurately represented in the final count.
On the surface of it, it would appear to be impossible to devise a form of
receipt that would, on the one hand allow the voter to check that their vote
is accurately represented in the final tally whilst, on the other hand, not pro-
viding any evidence to a third party as to which way the vote was cast. Many
commentators on the subject seem to assume that this is indeed impossible. For
example, the assumption is implicit in Rebecca Mercuri’s question 14 of her set
of questions for evaluators of voting schemes, [5]:
“How is vote confirmation provided without ballot-face receipt?”
Most of the alternative, digital voting schemes require the voter to trust
the hardware and/or software that processes their vote and provide little or no
means for the voter (or indeed anyone) to detect a failure in the processing of
votes.
3 A simplified variant of the Chaum voting scheme
Due to lack of space we will not attempt to describe the Chaum scheme in detail
but rather we outline a simplified, analogous scheme that conveys the essence.
In this sense, the paper can be thought of as an exploration of the requirements
and their realisabilty. For full details of the original Chaum scheme we refer the
reader to [2, 1].
The scheme presented here preserves the spirit of the Chaum original but ab-
stracts from many of the cryptographic details, in particular the details of the use
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of visual cryptography of the original (by far the most difficult aspect to explain
and understand). Thus, for example, we use sealed envelopes as a metaphor for
cryptographic wrappers, and a bulletin board in place of web postings. We are
not proposing this as a serious, alternative scheme, the abstractions introduce
several vulnerabilies, but rather as a vehicle to explore requirements and discuss
trust and assurance in the context of voting schemes.
The key idea is to provide the voter with a form of receipt. Obviously, such a
receipt cannot show voter’s choice in the clear. The trick then is for the receipt
to record the voter’s choice in encrypted form. This provides a way for the voter
to check that their (encrypted) vote has been correctly included in the tallying
process. The problem that now remains is how to provide the voter with good
assurance that their encrypted receipt will be faithfully decrypted to their actual
choice.
Suppose that there are n voters and k trustees. Suppose further that the voter
is asked to choose from amongst s options. The voter’s choice can therefore be
encoded as a number in the set {0, · · · , s−1}.
The task of the voting machine, when the voter enters the booth, is to assign
a unique serial number q to the voter and prepare 2k random, independent
numbers drawn from the set {0, · · · , s−1}. Denote these by Bq,i and Gq.i, where
i is the trustee index. These numbers will serve to (super)-encipher the vote. The
booth now prepares two nested envelopes, one Blue and one Green. Consider the
Blue envelope (the Green one is similar): it comprises k nested envelopes. The
inner envelope contains a slip bearing the value Bq,k. The next envelope contains
the inner envelope along with another slip bearing the value Bq,k−1, and so on
until the outer envelope that contains all the other, nested envelopes and a final
slip bearing the value Bq,1. The outer envelope also shows the unique serial
number q.
The voter now provides their choice of candidate, via a touch screen for
example. Suppose that this is encoded as the numerical value V oteq. The booth
now computes two receipt values as follows:
Receiptq,Blue =
(
V oteq +
s−1∑
i=0
Bq,i
)
mod s
This value is printed a blue receipt slip. Similarly for the Green receipt.
The voter is now invited to choose between the blue and green receipts.
Suppose that she chooses to retain the blue. In this case the green envelopes are
opened, and she calculates the sum (mod s) of the values on the enclosed slips.
She then checks that when she subtracts this (mod s) from the value shown on
the green receipt she gets the numerical code for her choice of candidate. The
green receipt, envelopes and slips are now destroyed in front of her, she retains
the blue receipt and sees the blue envelope (with Receiptq,Blue printed on the
outside) dropped into a locked sealed ballot box.
Note that all these envelopes could be prepared in advance, possibly by some
other authority and printed on counterfeit-proof stationery.
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3.1 The Role of the Trustees
Once all the votes have been cast, the ballot box is passed on to the first trustee,
who gathers all the envelopes and shuffles them throughly. Then for each enve-
lope, he does the following:
– He breaks the seal and opens the envelope.
– He subtracts the value on the enclosed slip from the receipt value on the
printed on the outside of the envelope.
– He prints the resulting number on the enclosed envelope along with a new
counter number q1.
– He retains the enclosed code sheet and records on it the counter number of
the enclosing envelope (q, in the case of the outermost envelope) as well as
the new, scrambled number q1. This is for checking purposes later.
Having done all this he posts all the outer (now empty) envelopes back to
the first column of the bulletin board and the enclosed envelopes are passed on
to the second trustee.
The second trustee now repeats this process on the envelopes it receives from
the first trustee. This continues until we reach the last of the trustees. She will
open the inner envelopes to reveal the final encryption value which she duly
subtracts from the value of the inner envelope which, to reveal the numerical
code for the voter’s original choice. These are posted on the last column of the
bulletin board in scrambled order according to another new counter number.
The final column will now have the full set of correctly decrypted votes, but
in (multiply) scrambled order with respect to the order in which the original,
sealed envelopes were posted. Thus we should have accuracy: the set of votes
in the last column accurately reflect the votes cast, and anonymity: decrypted
votes cannot be linked back to the voters.
3.2 Checks on the Booths and Trustees
The fact that the voters can check that the outer envelopes with the correct serial
number and encrypted vote appear in the first column of the bulletin board serves
as a check on the booths. The seals on the envelopes make it difficult for the
booths to mess about with their contents. The voter’s free choice between the
two envelopes and ability to check the correct decryption of the receipt/envelope
pair that is then destroyed means that any attempt by the booth to cheat by
incorrectly encrypting the receipt stands a 50/50 chance of being caught.
To check on the behaviour of the trustees the following procedure is fol-
lowed: for the first trustee, an auditor randomly designates half of the ballots to
be checked. For these, the first trustee is required to reveal the corresponding
decryption slip. This indicates the number assigned to the enclosed envelope
posted to the second column of the bulletin board and the encryption value.
The auditor is thus able to check that the decrypted value the trustee printed
on the enclosed envelope bears the correct relationship to the value on the first
envelope.
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The auditor now requires the second trustee to reveal the “complementary”
links as created by the second trustee. Thus none of the links of the first trustee
should line up with links revealed by the second trustee.
The auditor now performs the corresponding checks on the links revealed by
the second trustee, and so on through all the trustees. Thus any attempt by a
trustee to perform the decryption incorrectly on any ballot will stand a 50/50
chance of being detected by the auditor.
The decrypted votes will all be available in the final column output of the
last trustee and so the overall count will be checkable by anyone.
4 The trust model
From the point of view of the accuracy requirement, the trust that we need to
place in the booths and trustees is minimal since the scheme has been designed
to detect any significant attempt at fraud.
Some degree of trust is required in the auditors who perform the partial ran-
dom checks on the trustee transformations. This can be minimised as necessary
by using a number of independent auditors. One place where a higher level of
trust is required is in the process for the selection of the links to be revealed.
This is one step in the process that cannot be replicated.
Assurances of anonymity are provided by the secret, random permutations
on the envelopes applied by the trustees. If there are k trustees then, in the
original scheme, we can tolerate the subversion of k−1 of these and still provide
anonymity.
We assume that the checks are performed sufficiently assiduously, i.e. a suffi-
cient proportion of the voters do choice to run checks on their receipts and check
that their receipt is correctly posted on the web site. We also assume, for this
paper at least, that the auditors perform their checks correctly and that there
is no collusion between trustees and auditors. Note that if a trustee knew in
advance which links would be selected for audit then they could corrupt votes
on the other links.
5 Public trust
The Chaum scheme has been carefully devised, and the checks carefully con-
structed, so that essentially no trust need be placed in the components of the
system. Thus, with respect to the accuracy requirement, it would be extremely
difficult for either a booth or a trustee to corrupt of falsify votes undetected.
The scheme thus offers a high degree of transparency: significant malfunctions
or compromises of booths or trustees will be detected, as long as the checking
procedures are applied reasonably assiduously.
On the other hand, careful verification of the design and validation of the
assumptions is required.
Being trustworthy, however, is not the same as being trusted. The voter’s
ability to check that their (encrypted) ballot is included in the tally should help
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foster used confidence. On the other hand, the subtlety and complexity of the
arguments demonstrating that ballot receipts will be correctly decrypted by the
trustees will be difficult for most voters to understand. This could prove problem-
atic from the point of view of public uptake. It is extremely difficult to provide a
simple explanation of the grounds for regarding the scheme as trustworthy that
the average voter would find both understandable and convincing.
The majority of the public therefore would have to take on trust the claims
for such a scheme. Presumably having the system reviewed by a number of
authorities and experts would help engender public confidence, but would this
suffice? Could confidence be undermined by spurious claims to be able to read
the receipts?
6 Conclusions
We have discussed the dependability requirements of digital voting systems and
have presented the elements of the Chaum scheme. We have argued that the
scheme appears to meet these requirements to a high level of assurance and
requires essentially no trust to be placed in the components. It offers a high
level of transparency and allows voter-verifiability and for all the steps to be
independently audited.
We have briefly discussed the obstacles to engendering and maintaining pub-
lic trust in such a system. In future work we will investigate further the socio-
technical aspects of this and similar digital voting schemes.
References
1. Jeremy Bryans and Peter Ryan. A Dependability Analysis of the Chaum Voting
Scheme. Technical Report CS-TR-809, Newcastle University School of Computing
Science, 2003.
2. David Chaum. Secret-Ballot Receipts and Transparent Integrity: Better and
less-costly electronic voting at polling places.
http://www.vreceipt.com/article.pdf.
3. The Electoral Commission. Modernising Elections: A Strategic Evaluation of the
2002 Pilot Schemes.
http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/about-us/modernisingelections.cfm, Oct
2002.
4. Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration in Dependability.
http://www.dirc.org.uk.
5. Rebecca Mercuri. Questions for voting systesm vendors.
http://www.notablesoftware.com/checklists.html.
6. Office of the E-envoy. http://www.edemocracy.gov.uk, July 2002.
7. Steve Schneider and Abraham Sidiropoulos. CSP and Anonymity. In ESORICS,
volume 1146 of LNCS, 1996.
120
Anonymity with Identity Escrow
Lindsay Marshall and Carlos Molina-Jiminez
School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Lindsay.Marshall@ncl.ac.uk, Carlos.Molina@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. The ability to have a conversation with some-
one whilst remaining anonymous is, in some circumstances,
an important, arguably essential, right that people expect and
ought to have. With electronic communication it becomes
harder to safeguard this right whilst paying heed to the le-
gitimate objections that raised to anonymous communica-
tion. This paper describes a system using identity escrow
where people can create anonymous identities which can  be
used for communication but where their true identity can be
recovered if there is a reason to do so.
Introduction
 In the present political climate, there is much talk of the dangers to society from the
use of encrypted and/or anonymous communication by criminal. Many of the argu-
ments put forward are without merit, nevertheless, there are arguments, particularly
with respect to anonymity, which need to be considered carefully: people should be
able to expect to be protected from anonymous harassment. However, this does not
mean there are no circumstances where preserving a someone’s anonymity is accept-
able. There are many situations where we expect and get anonymity (e.g. personal
help lines).
As electronic media are increasingly the way that people communicate it is neces-
sary that mechanisms for providing anonymous communication using them should be
investigated . In this paper we describe a method of establishing an anonymous elec-
tronic identity where in well-defined circumstances the true identity of the user can be
revealed.
Total Anonymity
[4] describes a protocol (MMP) that allows users of wireless computers to access
communication services without revealing their identity. Excluding attacks that would
require a “funded organisation” [1, 2], MMP allows a user to send messages where
the recipient cannot identify the sender unless this information is part of the message.1
MMP provides for one-way anonymous communication, and if the two parties es-
tablish, say, a TCP connection between them, they can exchange messages with the
                                                           
1 The details of this protocol are not relevant to the subsequent discussion in this paper.
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initiator remaining anonymous. However, this kind of communication leaves itself
open to “call tracing” attacks. The best way of overcoming this is to allow the ex-
change of messages between named but anonymous users. This was the service pro-
vided by penet.fi, but its weakness was that there was a centrally held mapping be-
tween real and anonymised identities, and it was the existence of this that lead to its
closure. This mapping let the penet.fi server be a conduit for anonymised messages,
which is efficient but weakened the reassurances of anonymity that it provided.
With MMP, it is possible to have totally anonymous bi-directional communication.
The simplest method would be for someone to offer a service which allows users to
register an identity which they can use on their MMP connection and which provides
a range of services. However  as total anonymity appears to be unacceptable to many
people, we propose a service that supports anonymous users but where the mapping
between real and anonymised identities can be reversed easily under controlled cir-
cumstances. This can be achieved by the use of an escrowed identity scheme. Previ-
ous uses of escrowed identity (e.g. [3]) have concentrated mainly on its use for group
signatures rather than for the provision of a general anonymising service.
Escrowed Identity
Users wishing to use the service anonymously must first sign up and create an identity
within the system. This relies on the availability of an MMP-style communication
channel as without this the act of creating an anonymous identifier is open to attacks
that can allow the identity to be linked to the creator.
Rôles, Assumptions and Notation
We assume the following players in what follows:
† 
A Alice, someone who wishes to send anonymous messages
† 
A Alice when using anonymous communication so that her identity is not
revealed.
† 
S A provider of an anonymous interactive service
† 
n,m Constants defined by S for use with Rabin’s algorithm [5] (or a similar
method) which allows the segmentation of a data block into n parts but
allows its recovery from m blocks, where n > m and n,m > 0
† 
T   
† 
{Ti : i Œ 1Kq}  is a set of identity token providers, q > 0
† 
E   
† 
{Ei : i Œ 1K p}  is a set of escrow holders, p > n
† 
H
† 
H Ã E, H = n  is a set of escrow holders chosen by A from E
† 
V   
† 
{Vi : i Œ 1Kn} is a set of votes. The exact nature of a vote is dis-
cussed below
Set T is defined by S and consists of well-known, independent organizations (for
example, banks) that have agreed to perform identity token generation for S.  Set E is
also defined by S and consists of people (or organizations) who have agreed to “hold”
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components of escrowed identities and to take part in votes concerning the uncover-
ing of specific identities.
Issues of trust are clearly important and we shall discuss these further below. For
the purposes of the protocol description we assume that everyone involved is trusted
not to attempt to comprise the anonymity of A. Some parts of the protocol as de-
scribed are not necessary in a system where everyone is trusted; we include them as
they serve as a guarantee that certain kinds of attacks are not possible
We use the following notations :
† 
X ÆY : M X sends Y the message M  over  normal untrusted
channels
† 
X anonæ Æ æ  Y : M X sends Y the message M over an anonymous
channel using MMP
† 
D1, D2,...{ }K Encrypt/Decrypt the data items 
† 
D1, D2 ,... using
the key K
† 
signX D( ) Sign D as being from X
† 
validX D( ) Validate that X signed D, returns True or False
† 
R n,m, D( ) Segment D using Rabin’s algorithm into n seg-
ments, recoverable using m segments
† 
storeX D1, D2 ,...( ) X stores the data 
† 
D1, D2 ,...
† 
miÂ The concatenation of series of messages mi
† 
FA Alice’s token signed by  Identity Token Providers
(ITKP)
† 
L A unique, anonymous identifier
In what follows we show encryptions, but usually omit the symmetric decryptions.
Signup protocol
Alice first sends a signed request for an identity token (ITKRequest) to her chosen
provider. Assuming that the request is correctly signed and that the token provider is
prepared to validate it, then she receives a signed token readable only by the provider.
For simplicity, step 1 indicates that the identity string encrypted is Alice’s public key,
see below for discussion of the possible contents of this string.
In a real system it would be necessary to prevent the reuse of identity tokens, and
this can be achieved by the use of timestamp, etc, however we have omitted this step
from the protocol description
1. 
† 
A Æ Ti : signA ITK Request( ){ }K pubTi
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2. 
† 
Ti Æ A : signTi K pub
A{ }K pubTi
Ê 
Ë 
Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ 
Ï 
Ì 
Ó 
¸ 
˝ 
˛ K pubA
At this point, Alice can stop and proceed with 
† 
F1 ≡ FA , however she may suspect
that her chosen provider is in collusion with the ITKP and might be able to find her
identity.  Steps 3 and 4 (which can be repeated as often as wished)  ask another token
provider to sign the token after encrypting it (ITKSignatureRequest). This process is
carried out over an anonymous connection as Alice’s real identity is not required as
this is implied by the validity of the token.
3. 
† 
A anonæ Æ æ  Tj : ITKSignatureRequest,F1{ }K pubT j
4. 
† 
validTi (F1),then Tj
anonæ Æ æ  A : signTj F1{ }K pubT j( ){ }K pubA
† 
F1 = signTi K pub
A{ }K pubTi
Ê 
Ë 
Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ 
† 
FA = Fm = signTx Fm-1{ }K pubTx( )
Alice now generates a new key pair, establishes an MMP connection to S, and asks
for provision of anonymous service (ServiceRequest), sending her temporary public
key, her identity token and a password to be used with the new identity.
5. 
† 
A anonæ Æ æ  S : ServiceRequest,K pub
A ,FA, password{ }K pubS
S validates the token and returns a list of escrow holders and the number n of hold-
ers she must pick.
6. 
† 
validTi (F),then S
anonæ Æ æ  A : n,E{ }K pubA
Alice decides which n escrow holders to trust and returns this set to S.
7. 
† 
A anonæ Æ æ  S : H{ }K pubS
S then encrypts Alice’s token and partitions the result into n segments using
Rabin’s algorithm (step 8). The encryption is necessary to show that there is no possi-
bility of collusion between escrow holders during complaint resolution.
8. 
† 
C = Ci : i Œ 1:n, R n,m, FA{ }K pubS( ){ }
Each of these segments is encrypted with the public key of the corresponding es-
crow holder selected by Alice (step 10). S generates L, stores L, H and the encrypted
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segments (step 11) and then returns L to Alice who can now use this as her identity
when using the services S provides.
9. 
† 
D = Di : i Œ 1:n, Ci{ }K pubHi{ }
10. 
† 
stores L, H , D( )
11. 
† 
S anonæ Æ æ  A : L{ }K pubA
Note that the escrow holders are not involved in the process of setting up an
anonymous identity, nor are they actually required to hold any data
Complaint Resolution
If S receives a complaint Y about anonymous user L, then it retrieves the triple (L, H,
D) stored in step 10. S sends a copy of the complaint (Adjudicate Request) to each of
the escrow holders nominated by L (step 1), that is, the members of H.
1. 
† 
"Hi Œ H ,S Æ Hi : AdjudicateRequest,Y{ }K pubHi
Each replies with a signed vote. These consist of packets signed by the escrow
holders containing a ballot and the complaint Y. A ballot can be a simple yes or no
vote, or it could be a numerical indicator of support, say a number in the range  -1…1.
The inclusion of the complaint in the vote prevents attacks based on reusing votes.
2. 
† 
Hi Æ S : signHi Vi( ){ }K pubS
S sends the set of all the votes to each of the escrow holders along with m, the list
of voters, and the segment of F that was encrypted using their key.
3. 
† 
"Hi Œ H ,S Æ Hi : V ,m, H , Di{ }K pubHi
The escrow holders can read all the votes and verify that m or more holders have
voted “yes” (or that the sum of their ballots > m) and if so, decrypts the identity seg-
ment and returns this value to S
4. 
† 
Hi Æ S : Di{ }K privHi{ }K pubS
S concatenates these segments and uses Rabin’s algorithm to retrieve the encrypted
identity token.
5. 
† 
I = R-1 n,m, Dii=1
m
ÂÊ Ë Á 
ˆ 
¯ 
˜ Ï Ì 
Ó 
¸ 
˝ 
˛ K privS
S then decrypts the token, derives the identity provider from it and asks (Reveal)
for the real identity associated with the token. S sends the details of the complaint, the
results of the voting and the identities of the escrow holders. Since the token may
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have been blinded, this step may pass through several token providers until it reaches
the original creator.
6. 
† 
S Æ Ti : Reveal, I,Y, H ,V{ }K pubTi
The original token provider replies “Alice”, that is, the real identity of the user with
login L.
7. 
† 
Ti Æ S : "Alice"{ }K pubS
Simpler versions of the voting protocol are possible, but these do not exclude cer-
tain attacks. For instance, an escrow holder could vote “yes” by returning their de-
crypted segment and “no” by doing nothing, however this would let S save decrypted
segments from a series of failed complaints until it has m different blocks and then re-
generate the token. With a simple yes/no ballot system, escrow holders who vote “no”
do not need to decrypt their segment, however with weighted ballot systems a more
complex system of agreement may need to be used.
Identity Tokens
A trusted identity supplier generates an identity token for someone based on unique
data, for example, passport number. The contents of the token are not important so
long as they can be uniquely tied to the entity and are not easily forgeable or stealable.
We assume that the ITKP has knowledge of the person and that it takes all possible
steps to prevent fraud. Typically these suppliers would be banks, credit card compa-
nies or government departments. The identity data is encrypted and signed by the
supplier. This lets anyone check a token claimed to have been generated by an ITKP.
Escrow Holders
An escrow holder is trusted by both the ASP and customer to provide a fair and bal-
anced adjudication for complaints. Escrow holders whose public keys are known to
the ASP need only be actively involved when a complaint arises. They vote on
whether a complaint warrants the identity of the user being revealed, and then decrypt
a string if the vote yields m “yes” votes out of n. Escrow holders are sent full details
of the voting so that they can verify that the target of m “yes” votes was reached. The
use of Rabin’s algorithm ensures that escrow holders who vote “no” do not need to
reveal their segment of the token.
Difficulties and Attacks
Because trust is involved, there is no guarantee that the identity of a user cannot be
retrieved without going through the escrow process. The aim has to be to reduce the
trust requirements to a minimum and to identify the parts of the process where trust
126
could be compromised. Let us look at the trust requirements for each of the partici-
pants in the system.
Escrow Holders Escrow holders never see plaintext data so there is no data
manipulation that they can do individually to find the identity of an anonymous user.
A group could collude to complain about a user and agree to vote to reveal the
identity. However, as the they are chosen for being independent and unbiased this
ought to be an unlikely.
Users We assume that users of the system have not been the victims of identity theft.
That is, when they present their identity token, they really are who the token
represents. This is always going to be a difficult area in anonymous systems and
cannot be avoided. The best we can do is to ensure that tokens have a limited life span
and that users must re-authenticate themselves at regular intervals.
The Anonymous Server Provider (ASP) If the ASP colludes with other parties then
an identity is not safe. This unavoidable, but suspicion of collusion would damage the
reputation of the ASP and so is unlikely. However, employees could collude to steal
data in order to retrieve an identity. There is only one point in the protocol where this
is a danger as once the token has been split it is encrypted using escrow holder’s keys.
This happens when users applying for an anonymous id send their token to the ASP.
To check that the token is valid it must be in a verifiable form, and since it is also the
identifier that is presented to an ITKP when asking for an identity to be revealed,  the
ASP’s system must ensure that the open token is not stored. A stolen token allows the
theft of an anonymous identity, and there needs to be a way to warn of this, similar to
key revocation systems.
Identity Providers We trust that ITKPs generate tokens backed up by proper identity
checks and that they secure their data. ITKPs must be seen to be trustworthy or else
their business will suffer. If an ITKP, for whatever  reason, ceases to operate then all
tokens that they signed must be revoked as they can no longer be used to reveal a
valid identity. Users whose tokens become invalid must reauthorise by presenting a
new token and their old token.
Attacks
In addition to the attacks based on collusion there are other possibilities, for instance:
Bogus complaints We have not addressed the issue of how compliants are made and
deemed to warrant being voted on. A complaint that seemed to be valid would
encourage escrow holders to vote to uncover an identity, but generating the cause for
such a complaint may be hard, unless this is based on material alleged to be
defamatory that is in fact true. Using the law to force revelation is difficult as the
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service provider does not have a reversible identity mapping, so lawyers would have
to apply pressure to everyone involved in the process which may be impractical.
Overloading the third party By generating enough complaints you might be able to
overload the escrow holders so that they vote “yes” all the time. Equally they might
vote “no”, so this may not be a useful attack! Overloaded escrow holders may decide
not to take part in the process in which case all identities that they escrow must be
held until they have been re-established. A user could take advantage of delays in the
resignation process to cause complaints that cannot then be resolved.
Identity theft The system is always vulnerable to people who have managed to obtain
valid credentials for another person. If the ITKPs are properly managed then this risk
can be reduced, though coercion can always be used to make someone give up their
identity. Identity theft is used as a way of avoiding being discovered or of causing
trouble to another person so is different from the attacks that could be used to try to
reveal an identity.  The theft of an existing anonymous identity is also a possibility
and has exactly the same problems as the theft of an ordinary login identifier.
Conclusions
The aim of our protocol is to make anonymity practical by making it reliable for the
anonymous user and safe for the public: the protocol guarantees that the identities of
anonymous users remains concealed unless they abuse a service. The protocol is ap-
plicable in circumstances that often arise and provides a workable solution for them.
Our next step is to build a variety of systems that embody the protocol and which
provide such services as surveys or anonymous business collaboration. A more de-
tailed version of this paper is available from the authors.
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Abstract. In this paper we define a general trace model for security
protocols which allows to reason about various formal definitions of au-
thentication. In the model, we define a strong form of authentication
which we call synchronization. We present both an injective and a non-
injective version. We relate synchronization to a formulation of agree-
ment in our trace model and contribute to the discussion on intensional
vs. extensional specifications.
1 Introduction
Security protocols have become an established application area of formal meth-
ods today. Over the past years various modelling languages, logics and process
algebras have been proposed for the systematic and tool supported analysis of se-
curity protocols. Exploitation of formal methods in this setting leads to a better
understanding of implicit assumptions and gives feedback on what the protocol
does or, in many cases, what it unexpectedly does not achieve.
In this paper we focus on the notion of authentication as a so-called in-
tensional security property. We formulate a variant of authentication, called
synchronization. In [10] Roscoe introduces the notion of canonical intensional
specification, stating that all parties involved in a protocol, after completion
of their role, are convinced that for their part the protocol has been executed
according to its rules. Intensional properties are those induced by the form or
structure of the protocol; extensional properties are related to the effect the pro-
tocol achieves. The notion of synchronization proposed here captures Roscoe’s
notion of canonical intensional specification as a general trace property. By cast-
ing intensionality in the same framework as extensional security properties, in-
tensionality can be compared with and, as we shall see, related to so-called full
injective agreement.
Important to this point of view is the observed behavior from the perspective
of an individual agent. It will make no difference to an agent engaged in the
protocol if a sequence of communications was the result of its interaction with
an honest principal, with a malicious intruder controlling the network, or a mix of
these. If the agent is entitled to believe at a point in time that the interaction thus
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far is consistent with the agents role in the protocol, the agent simply proceeds
under the assumption that all parties involved have obeyed the protocol rules.
In [8] Lowe studies, building on earlier work of [1] and [4], four different forms
of authentication, viz. aliveness, weak agreement, full non-injective agreement
and full injective agreement. On top of this, agreement on subsets of data items
and recentness is considered (two topics we do not address here). By casting
the notions in the setting of CSP Lowe shows that the notions constitute an
ascending chain of authentication principles. Additionally, the relationship with
Roscoe’s definition of intensional specification is discussed at the conceptual
level. The notion of injective synchronization that is proposed in this paper as
intensional authentication can be shown to be strictly stronger than full injective
agreement and thus, can be added at the top of Lowe’s authentication hierarchy.
This extension constitutes the body of the present paper.
Authentication and agreement is also studied in [3] by Focardi and Mar-
tinelli in the context of the so-called GNDC scheme. In a process algebra ex-
tended with inference systems reflecting cryptographic actions, one can reduce
reasoning about security properties with respect to any arbitrary environment
to the analysis of the behavior of the security protocol in the most general en-
vironment. It is argued that the GNDC scheme is valid for establishing various
security properties, in particular agreement (as well as its weaker variants).
In Section 2 below we gather the machinery required for our description of
security protocols. The notions of non-injective and injective synchronization are
the main topic of Section 3. The thread of reasoning is continued for the case of
agreement. In Section 4 agreement is reformulated in our setting and compared
with its definition in [8]. We further present a taxonomy result for the intro-
duced notions of injective and non-injective synchronization and agreement, and
provide examples to show the strictness of the implied relationships. Section 5
then closes off with concluding remarks.
Acknowledgment We are grateful to Jerry den Hartog for his useful sugges-
tions at various points.
2 Trace model
In this section we will define the notions which are essential for the definition
of synchronisation as elaborated in Section 3. Synchronisation is based on the
property that every successful execution of a protocol by an agent implies that its
communication partners exactly follow their roles in the protocol and exchange
the intended message in the intended order. Therefore, we first provide a formal
definition of a security protocol and the partial order implied on its events.
The second step is the introduction of the trace model for asynchronously
communicating agents. Synchronisation is verified as a property on the set of
execution traces. It can be defined independently of the way in which the trace
model is constructed for a given security protocol, a given set of agents and a
given intruder model. Therefore, we will not find a need to introduce a formal
semantics precisely defining the trace model. Rather, we expect that many of
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the existing formal approaches towards security protocols can be molded in such
a way as to produce the required trace model.
2.1 Security protocols
A security protocol defines the interacting behaviour of a number of agents.
Agents can take part in one or more runs of a protocol by performing a role
defined in the protocol.
In most approaches, a protocol description consists of a list of messages ex-
changed by some principals. In contrast to this approach we take as a starting
point the projection of this behaviour onto the different roles. Thus, we split a
communication into two separate events, viz. a send event and the corresponding
read event. These two corresponding events are described in two (different) role
definitions. We elaborate on the implications of this choice later.
We assume a finite set of role names, called Role . The behaviour of a role is
defined by a role definition (RoleDef ). A role definition is simply a list of role
events (taken from the set RoleEvent). In the following, we will define send, read,
and claim events.
Roles exchange message from the set RoleMess of role messages, by executing
the events send(r, r′, m) and read(r, r′, m). The send event is executed by role r,
which intends to send message m to role r′. The read event is executed by role
r′ and indicates the reception of message m, apparently sent by role r.
Because it is allowed that the same message occurs more than once in a
role definition (having the same sender and the same recipient), we will need to
disambiguate these events by extending them with labels from the finite label set
Label . Therefore, we have role events send `(r, r
′, m) and read `(r, r
′, m) for a label
` ∈ Label . We require that all events in a security protocol have distinct labels,
except for corresponding send and read events (from different roles), which share
a common label.
These labels also serve a second purpose. Due to our decision to split commu-
nications into separate send and read events, we lost the intended correspondence
between these events. We use the event labels to keep this correspondence infor-
mation available. If a send event from one role definition shares a label with a
read event from another role definition this expresses that these are correspond-
ing events. We define the (partial) functions sendrole and readrole to determine
for a given label the sending role and the receiving role, respectively.
Our treatment of security claims is somewhat different from other approaches.
Rather than considering correctness of a security protocol as a property of the
protocol as a whole, we consider a more refined approach where claims are local
to each role. For this purpose, we introduce claim events.
A claim event has the form claim(r, c), where r is the claiming role and c
is the claim, taken from a set of claims Claim . An example of such an event is
claim(r, alive(r′)). This means that if an agent executing role r has executed
his part of the protocol up to the claim event, he can be sure that the agent
executing role r′ was alive. In Sections 3 and 4 we will give the definitions of
four claims: ni-synch , i-synch , ni-agree and i-agree .
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The fact that security claims are local to a role is a consequence of our
approach to split communication events into separate send and read events and
to consider role definitions as a basic concept.
Finally, we define a security protocol p ∈ SecProt as a collection of role
definitions, or rather as a function from Role to RoleDef . In summary, we have
the following definitions.
SecProt = Role → RoleDef
RoleDef = RoleEvent∗
RoleEvent ⊇ {send `(r, r
′, m), read `(r, r
′, m), claim`(r, c) |
` ∈ Label , r, r′ ∈ Role , m ∈ RoleMess , c ∈ Claim}
sendrole(`) = r if send `(r, r
′, m) ∈ p(r) or read `(r, r
′, m) ∈ p(r′)
readrole(`) = r′ if send `(r, r
′, m) ∈ p(r) or read `(r, r
′, m) ∈ p(r′)
Please notice that we did not provide an exhaustive definition of RoleEvent .
We only require inclusion of the given events. The reason is that these events
suffice for our definition of authentication. Nevertheless, a formal semantics could
consider more role events, such as assignments to local variables.
The authentication property which will be defined in Section 3 expresses that
the message exchanges between the agents take place exactly in the order as
implied by the security protocol. In order to express this, we define the causality
relation on the events in a security protocol as a partial order. Since security
protocols are often visualised as Message Sequence Charts (MSCs, see [5]), it
comes as no surprise that the partial order semantics for MSCs can be used
to express the order of events in a security protocol. This partial order simply
expresses that the events in a role definition are sequentially ordered, and that
every read event is preceded by its corresponding send event. Adopting notation
from [2], we start with defining the role order ≺r for r ∈ Role as the total
order on its events. Event e causally precedes event e′ (notation e ≺r e
′) if e
occurs before e′ in the role definition of r. Next, we define the send-before-read
order ≺sr which expresses that a send causally precedes the corresponding read
(i.e. send ` ≺
sr read `). Finally, we define the causality preorder ≺p of protocol p
as the transitive closure (denoted by +) of the union of all role orders and the
send-before-read order, i.e.
≺p= (
⋃
r∈Role
≺r ∪ ≺
sr)+
Example The well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol (NSL) (cf. [9, 6])
can be depicted by the MSC in Figure 1. The added i-synch claims at the end
of the roles will be defined in Section 3.
The NSL protocol has two roles, viz. one of the initiator I and one for the
responder R. The role definitions for the initiator and responder are
send1(I, R, {I, nI}pkR) · read2(R, I, {R, nI , nR}pkI ) · send3(I, R, {nR}pkR) · claim4(I, i-synch)
read1(I, R, {I, nI}pkR) · send2(R, I, {R, nI , nR}pkI ) · read 3(I, R, {nR}pkR) · claim5(R, i-synch)
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Fig. 1. The NSL protocol and the partial ordering on its events.
The indices of sends, reads and claims refer to the labels listed aside of the roles.
On top of the roles, the initial knowledge of the agents is listed. It is assumed
that both agents know the public key of the other and the private key of their
own. The generation of nonces nI and nR is visualized in the action boxes. The
hexagons contain the claims made by the agents. In fact, these are the security
goals the protocol is supposed to achieve. The causality preorder ≺p for NSL is
given by the lattice on the right in Figure 1.
2.2 Traces
Now that we have introduced security protocols, we can discuss the execution
of a security protocol (or rather a role in a security protocol) by an agent.
We start by defining the set of agents Agent . A role executed by an agent is
called a run. Whereas we can consider a run as an instantiated role, we can
consider run events (RunEvent) as instantiated role events. This instantiation
simply amounts to replacing abstract role names by concrete agent names. Since
the concrete messages sent in a run may be different from the abstract messages
specified in a role (e.g. because of the instantiation of role names by agent names),
we introduce the set of run messages RunMess. An agent can execute several
roles (possibly the same) in an interleaved way. Although it is not necessary for
the definitions below, a proper semantics will require that every (honest) agent
executes the events exactly as prescribed by its role definition.
Because we need to be able to distinguish the events from different runs (pos-
sibly stemming from the same role), we need to add information to disambiguate
run events. This is done by assigning a unique run identifier from the set RunId
to every run and extending the events of every run with their run identifier. An
event e extended with run identifier rid is denoted by e]rid. Thus, we have the
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following run events.
RunEvent ⊇ {send `(a, a
′, m)]rid, read `(a, a
′, m)]rid, claim `(a, c)]rid |
rid ∈ RunId , ` ∈ Label , a, a′ ∈ Agent , m ∈ RunMess, c ∈ Claim}
Each of these events is executed by some agent, performing some role in the
protocol. The role of the actor of event e is denoted by role(e). It can be derived
easily from the label of the event (which is unique in the protocol specification)
taking into account if it is a send or read event, or a non-communication event.
The final step is to introduce the traces of a security protocol, induced by
some semantic definition (e.g. assuming operational behaviour of agents and an
intruder model). The semantics of security protocol p is denoted by T (p). We
assume that it is defined as a collection of sequences of run events.
T (p) ∈ P(RunEvent≤ω)
We denote the i-th event of trace α ∈ T (p) by αi (for i ≥ 0). If we require
a property of a security protocol p, we will, in our set-up, have to check this
property for all of the traces in T (p).
Thus, the semantics of a security protocol is expressed as a set of traces and
each such trace is an interleaving of a number of runs. An agent can execute
many such runs in an interleaved way and every run may be an instantiation
of each of the roles in the protocol definition. We assume T (p) to contain, for
example, traces corresponding to the double instantiation of p where agent a
is running both role r and r′, and agents b and c are running roles r′ and r,
respectively. But T (p) will also contain traces for the situation where role r is
taken up by agents a and c and role r′ by agents b and d with a talking to b and
c to d. More concretely, in the case of NSL described above, T (NSL) contains all
the shuffles of the following four traces induced by the instantiation just given
(and many more).
send1(a, b, {a, n
1
a}pkb)]1 · read2(b, a, {b, n
1
a, n
2
b}pka)]1 · send3(a, b, {n
2
b}pkb)]1 · claim4(a, i-synch)]1
read1(a, b, {a, n
1
a}pkb)]2 · send2(b, a, {b, n
1
a, n
2
b}pka)]2 · read3(a, b, {n
2
b}pkb)]2 · claim5(b, i-synch)]2
send1(c, a, {c, n
3
c}pka)]3 · read2(a, c, {a, n
3
c, n
4
a}pkc)]3 · send3(c, a, {n
4
a}pka)]3 · claim4(c, i-synch)]3
read1(c, a, {c, n
3
c}pka)]4 · send2(a, c, {a, n
3
c , n
4
a}pkc)]4 · read3(c, a, {n
4
a}pka)]4 · claim5(a, i-synch)]4
Please note that the send and read events that make up these traces are really
executed by the running agents. So, the occurrence of an event read `(r, r
′, m) in
trace α denotes that in this scenario α agent r′ really receives message m, which
might or might not have been sent by agent r. This means that the read and
send events are not intruder events. Nevertheless, the order and contents of these
events may be under control of an intruder, as specified in a formal semantic
definition. Due to the fact that the read and send events are executed by the
agents (performing some role in the protocol) it is clear that the extension of
these events with labels and run identifiers is by no means under control of the
intruder. The label (like a program counter) simply indicates the state of the
agent when executing his part of the protocol. The run identifier expresses in
which run of the agent activity takes place.
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Although it is not common to include labels and run identifiers in the seman-
tics of a security protocol, they are often left implicit or occur when developing
tool support for a particular semantics. For an example of such use of labels
and run identifiers see [7]. Error traces of a protocol are displayed as follows:
“Msg α.1. IA → B : A, B; Msg α.2. B → IA : B, Nb; Msg β.1. IA → B : A, Nb”.
Clearly, α and β represent run identifiers and the numbers 1, 2, etc. (the program
counters in the role) represent labels. Making this information explicit allows us
to formally reason about these notions.
3 Synchronisation
In this section we formally define the notion of synchronization based on the
trace model introduced in Section 2. As is the case with other forms of authen-
tication, we will make a distinction between non-injective synchronisation, and
the somewhat stronger notion of injective synchronisation, which rules out a
class of replay attacks.
3.1 Non-injective Synchronisation
For the purpose of a modular presentation, we present the definition of non-
injective synchronisation in three steps. The first step is the definition of au-
thentication for a single message, or rather, for a single label shared by two cor-
responding send and read events. For this we define the predicate 1L-SYNCH
(for 1 label synchronisation). It has five arguments: the trace α being validated
up to index k, the label ` for which we check the authentication property, and
the two runs rid1 and rid2 containing the read and send events that must be val-
idated. This basic authentication property simply amounts to checking whether
the send labeled with ` from the first run is followed by the corresponding read
from the second run. These corresponding send and read events should exactly
agree upon the the sender, the recipient, and the contents of the message.
Definition 3.1 For all traces α, k ∈ N , labels ` and run identifiers rid1, rid2,
the single-label synchronization predicate 1L-SYNCH is given by
1L-SYNCH (α, k, `, rid1, rid2) ⇐⇒
∃i,j∈N ,a,b∈Agent ,m∈RunMess
i < j < k ∧ αi = send `(a, b, m)]rid1 ∧ αj = read `(a, b, m)]rid2
If 1L-SYNCH (α, k, `, rid1, rid2) holds, we say that the communication labeled
with `, sent by run rid1 and read by run rid2 has occurred correctly in a trace α
before position k.
The second step towards the definition of synchronisation is to extend the
1L-SYNCH predicate to range over multiple communications, given by a set of
labels. This predicate is denoted by ML-SYNCH (for multi-label synchronisa-
tion).
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When dealing with multiple communications, we require consistency over
roles. For example, if an initiator receives two messages from a responder during
a run, we require that they are sent from the same responder in the same run.
The requirement that roles from a protocol are consistently mapped to runs
leads to the introduction of an instantiation function inst : Role → RunId . This
explains the four parameters of the ML-SYNCH predicate: α and k give the part
of the trace that is to be checked, L is the set of labels for each of which we check
the 1L-SYNCH property, and inst is the instantiation function which determines
a run for each role definition from the protocol. The definition of ML-SYNCH
consists of the requirement that for every label from L the predicate 1L-SYNCH
holds. In order to determine for a given label the sending role and the receiving
role, we use the auxiliary functions sendrole and readrole , respectively, which
have been introduced in Section 2.
Definition 3.2 For all traces α, k ∈ N , label set L and instantiation inst , the
multi-label synchronization predicate ML-SYNCH is given by
ML-SYNCH (α, k, L, inst) ⇐⇒
∀`∈L 1L-SYNCH (α, k, `, inst(sendrole(`)), inst(readrole(`)) )
If ML-SYNCH (α, k, L, inst) holds, we say that the set of labels L has correctly
occurred in a trace α before position k with respect to the instantiation inst .
For the third and final step towards the definition of synchronisation we need to
fix the set of labels that should be checked and we must quantify over the α, k
and inst parameters of ML-SYNCH .
It is tempting to take for L the set of all labels occurring in the protocol.
However, as a consequence of our choice to have security claims attached to
individual roles, rather than to a protocol as a whole, this would result in too
strong a predicate.
For any (local) synchronisation claim, we can at most require that all com-
munications that causally precede the claim, have occurred correctly. This is
because the claiming role may only expect these events to have been executed.
Since a communication consists of two events, we must make it more precise
when a communication precedes a claim. Clearly, it must be the case that if a
read event precedes the claim, the corresponding send event precedes as well.
However, in general we cannot expect the opposite. It may be the case that a
send (causally) occurs before a claim, while the corresponding read does not.
This observation leads to the definition of the set of labels that causally precede
a synchronisation claim.
Definition 3.3 The set prec(p, cl) of causally preceding communications of a
claim role event labeled with cl, for a security protocol p is given by
prec(p, cl) = {` | read `( , , ) ≺p claimcl( , )}
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Section 2, and Figure 1. Note that for the NSL protocol, in agreement with the
discussion in Section 2, we have that prec(NSL, 4) 6= prec(NSL, 5). In particu-
lar, read3(I, R, {nR}pkR) ≺p claim5(R,ni-synch), but read 3(I, R, {nR}pkR) 6≺p
claim4(R,ni-synch), as can be seen in Figure 1.
Finally, we define the synchronisation predicate NI -SYNCH . It states that if
we encounter a synchronisation claim claim `(a,ni-synch)]rid as an event in any
of the traces α of a security protocol, the communications causally preceding
this claim must be well behaved. With respect to the instantiation function inst ,
we can simply require the existence of any such function, mapping roles to run
identifiers, with the restriction that it maps the role of the claiming agent to
the run containing this claim (i.e. inst(role(αk)) = rid, where αk is the claim
event).
Definition 3.4 For all security protocols p, the synchronisation predicate
NI -SYNCH for claims labeled with `, is given by
NI -SYNCH (p, `) ⇐⇒
∀α∈T(p),k∈N ,a∈Agent,rid∈RunId αk = claim`(a,ni-synch)]rid ⇒
∃inst :Role→RunId inst(role(αk)) = rid ∧ML-SYNCH (α, k, prec(p, `), inst)
It expresses that for all instantiated claims in any trace of a given security
protocol, there exist runs for the other roles in the protocol, such that all com-
munications preceding the claim must have occurred correctly within these runs.
3.2 Injective synchronisation
Synchronisation guarantees that a single protocol role run has executed as ex-
pected. For each other role in the protocol, there exists a run that has sent and
read messages according to the protocol. However, this property does not rule
out a particular type of replay attacks. If we consider, for instance, a simple two-
party protocol, it can be the case that every run of the initiator neatly matches
the same run of the responder. Such a protocol could be abused by an intruder
replaying an old responder run for every new session. (See Figure 3 in Section 4.2
for a more detailed discussion.) This weakness of the protocol could easily be
detected by requiring that there is an injective relation between the claiming
run and the other runs. This notion of injectivity has been defined for several
authentication properties (see e.g. [8]). Here we will define it for synchronisation.
The definition of injective synchronisation proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to bring the definition of non-injective synchronisation into a form that
allows us to easily add the injectivity criterion. Note that in Definition 3.4
the relation between the claiming run (with run identifier rid) and the runs
playing the other roles (as expressed by the instantiation function inst) is not
made explicit. If we want to require that this relation is injective, we must first
formulate an explicit version of this definition. The functional dependence of
the instantiations inst on the claiming run rid will be expressed by a function
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Inst : RunId ×Role → RunId . We can easily extract the instantiation functions
from Inst by taking inst = λr.Inst(rid, r), i.e. the bindings that are relevant for
the run identifier rid. These observations yield the following rewrite of Defini-
tion 3.4.
NI -SYNCH (p, `) ⇐⇒
∀α∈T(p)∃Inst :RunId×Role→RunId∀k∈N ,a∈Agent ,rid∈RunId
αk = claim`(a,ni-synch)]rid ⇒ Inst(rid, role(αk)) = rid
∧ML-SYNCH (α, k, prec(p, `), λr.Inst(rid, r))
We can now define injective synchronisation in almost the same way as the
second formulation of NI -SYNCH , by requiring that the function Inst in the
definition is injective.
Definition 3.5 For all security protocols p, the injective synchronisation pred-
icate
I -SYNCH for claims labeled with `, is given by
I -SYNCH (p, `) ⇐⇒
∀α∈T(p)∃Inst :RunId×Role→RunId injective∀k∈N ,a∈Agent ,rid∈RunId
αk = claim`(a, i-synch)]rid ⇒ Inst(rid, role(αk)) = rid
∧ML-SYNCH (α, k, prec(p, `), λr.Inst(rid, r))
It expresses that for all instantiated claims, there exist runs for the other roles
in the protocol. All communications preceding the claim must have occurred
correctly within these runs. Furthermore, for each such claim there are unique
runs executing the roles in the protocol.
4 Agreement
In this section we formalize a form of authentication called agreement. This con-
cept is weaker than synchronisation, as it places less restrictions on the ordering
of the occurring events. We first give formal definitions. We will argue that these
definitions correspond to a form of agreement as described by Lowe in [8]. Next,
we present an extension of the authentication hierarchy and provide examples
showing the strictness of the various relationships.
4.1 Non-injective and injective agreement
We construct the definition of agreement analogously to synchronisation. Syn-
chronisation required that all sends occur before their corresponding reads. The
definition of 1L-AGREE does not require that the send occurs before the corre-
sponding read.
Definition 4.1 For all traces α, k ∈ N , labels ` and run identifiers rid1, rid2,
the single-label agreement predicate 1L-AGREE is given by
1L-AGREE (α, k, `, rid1, rid2) ⇐⇒
∃i,j∈N ,a,b∈Agent,m∈RunMess
i < k ∧ j < k ∧ αi=send `(a, b, m)]rid1 ∧ αj=read `(a, b, m)]rid2
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If 1L-AGREE (α, k, `, rid1, rid2) holds we say that the communication labeled
with `, sent by run rid1 and read by run rid2, is agreed upon in trace α before
position k.
There are no requirements on the order of the read and send. We observe that
if 1L-AGREE holds for some communication, all variables sent as part of the
message m are received exactly as expected. Therefore, both parties will agree
over the values of the variables that are sent. Further definitions are constructed
as with synchronisation. First we define a notion of multi-label agreement similar
to ML-SYNCH .
Definition 4.2 For all traces α, k ∈ N , set of labels L and run identifiers
rid1, rid2, the multi-label agreement predicate ML-AGREE is given by
ML-AGREE (α, k, L, inst) ⇐⇒
∀`∈L 1L-AGREE (α, k, `, inst(sendrole(`)), inst(readrole(`)))
If ML-AGREE (α, k, L, inst) holds we say that the set of labels L is agreed upon
in trace α before position k, for instantiation function inst .
Next we define non-injective agreement.
Definition 4.3 For all security protocols p, the agreement predicate NI -AGREE
for claims labeled with `, is given by
NI -AGREE (p, `) ⇐⇒
∀α∈T(p),k∈N ,a∈Agent,rid∈RunId
αk = claim`(a,ni-agree)]rid ⇒ ∃inst :Role→RunId inst(role(αk)) = rid
∧ML-AGREE (α, k, prec(p, `), inst)
The agreement predicate expresses that for all instantiated claims in any trace of
a given security protocol, there exist runs for the other roles in the protocol, such
that all communication events causally preceding the claim must have occurred
before the claim.
Injective agreement is defined in the same way as injective synchronisation.
Definition 4.4 [I -AGREE ] For all security protocols p, the injective agreement
predicate I -AGREE for claims labeled with `, is given by
I -AGREE (p, `) ⇐⇒
∀α∈T(p) ∃Inst :RunId×Role→RunId injective ∀k∈N ,a∈Agent ,rid∈RunId
αk = claim`(a, i-agree)]rid ⇒ Inst(rid, role(αk)) = rid
∧ML-AGREE (α, k, prec(p, `), λr.Inst(rid, r))
It expresses that for any trace and for any run of any role in the protocol there
exist unique runs for the other roles of the protocol such that for all claims oc-
curring in the trace all communications preceding the claim must have occurred
correctly within these runs.
In [8], Lowe defines several forms of authentication. The strongest form of au-
thentication, not involving time, is called full (injective) agreement:
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Initiator I is in agreement with responder R, whenever I as initiator
completes a run of the protocol with R, then R as responder has been
running the protocol with I . Moreover, I and R agree on all data vari-
ables, and each run of I corresponds to a unique run of R.
We will argue that for any protocol for which an I -AGREE claim at the end
of a role holds, full (injective) agreement holds with respect to all other roles
and data items, and vice versa. Note that we will only consider the case where
agreement is claimed over all roles involved in the protocol.
The main difference between our approach and that of Lowe, is that we
consider abstract messages only. The definition of full injective agreement does
not depend on the actual messages that are passed through. Instead, Lowe refers
to the data items contained in messages. The relation between the messages and
the data items does imply however, that when a message is read exactly as it is
sent, both agents will agree over the variables sent in the message, and the other
way around. Thus, if all messages in a protocol are read as they were sent, there
must be agreement over all variables in the protocol.
The definition of I -AGREE does not involve all communications, but only
the set prec(p, `) of communications that precede a claim. However, it turns
out that the way in which full agreement is made precise in terms of CSP, as
can be checked by compiling Casper-code into CSP, it also takes only preceding
communications into account. For this, running-commit signals (see [11]) are
introduced in the protocol. For each role, a running signal is added to the last
communication preceding the agreement claim. In the role of the claim, a commit
signal is added to the last communication. Full injective agreement over all roles
requires that the running signals of each role precede the commit signal. This
corresponds to the order requirements of I -AGREE .
It follows that the notions of I -AGREE and full injective agreement over all
roles coincide.
4.2 Hierarchy
The formulations of the four security prop-
 
 	
@
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@
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 
 	
I -SYNCH
NI -SYNCH I -AGREE
NI -AGREE
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of security proper-
ties.
erties in the previous sections clearly re-
veal their relative strengths in preventing
attacks. Every injective protocol is also
non-injective and if a protocol satisfies
agreement then it satisfies synchronisa-
tion too. Figure 2 shows this hierarchy.
An arrow from property X to property
Y means that every protocol satisfying X
also satisfies Y . Phrased differently, the
class of protocols satisfying X is included
in the class satisfying Y .
The proof of the following theorem simply follows from the definitions above.
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Theorem 1. The security properties I -SYNCH , NI -SYNCH , I -AGREE, and
NI -AGREE satisfy the inclusion relation as depicted in Figure 2.
The question whether the inclusions in Figure 2 are strict is harder to an-
swer. This is due to the abstractness of our trace model. Since our approach
is parameterised over the actual semantics, and thus over the intruder model,
we cannot determine for a given protocol to which class it belongs. Therefore,
strictness of the inclusions can only be answered relative to a given semantics.
Consequently, the following reasoning will be at a conceptual level only.
If we take e.g. a model where all agents simply follow their roles and the
intruder has no capabilities at all, then the diamond in Figure 2 collapses into a
single class. The same holds if the intruder can only eavesdrop on the communi-
cations. However, in the Dolev-Yao model, all inclusions are strict. The case of
injectivity vs. non-injectivity has been studied extensively before. The MSC on
the left in Figure 3 shows a protocol that satisfies NI -SYNCH and NI -AGREE ,
but neither I -SYNCH , nor I -AGREE .
pk−1I
I
pkI
R
{I, R}
pk
−1
I
ni-synch
msc Injectivity vs. non-injectivity
pk−1I , pkR
I
pk−1R , pkI
R
I, R
nonce nR
{R, nR}pkI
{nR, I}pkR
i-agree
msc Synchronisation vs. agreement
Fig. 3. Distinguishing Protocols
The intruder will only be able to construct message {I, R}
pk
−1
I
after hav-
ing eavesdropped this message from a previous run. Therefore every read event
of this message is preceded by a corresponding send event, so the protocol is
both NI -SYNCH and NI -AGREE . However, once the intruder has learnt this
message, he can replay it as often as desired, so the protocol is not injective.
A distinguishing example between synchronisation and agreement is depicted
on the right in Figure 3. As confirmed by the Casper/FDR tool set, this proto-
col satisfies unilateral authentication in the sense of agreement (both injective
and non-injective). However, the protocol does not satisfy synchronisation (both
variants): the intruder can send message I, R long before I actually initiates the
protocol, making R to believe that I has requested the start of a session before
he actually did.
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The two examples show that the diamond in Figure 2 is strict if the intruder
has the capabilities to eavesdrop, deflect and inject messages. Both examples
also imply that there are no arrows between NI -SYNCH and I -AGREE .
In Figure 4 we show how the difference between NI -SYNCH and NI -AGREE
might be exploited. Here, R is an Internet Service Provider, used by I . I pays R
for the time he is connected. When I wants to connect, R retrieves the certificate
of I from the trusted server S and uses this to authenticate I . After a successful
session, I is billed from the moment the first message was received by R.
This protocol is a slightly modified version of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol. It can be exploited as follows. An intruder can send the first message
preemptively, causing R to initiate a session with what it believes is I . If at some
later time I decides to initiate a session with R and finishes it successfully, I will
receive a bill that is too high. In fact, although, this protocol satisfies agreement
for R, the first message is not authenticated at all.
This protocol does not satisfy synchronisation. The protocol can be easily
modified to satisfy NI -SYNCH and thus to be resilient against the sketched
type of timing attacks.
pk−1I , pkR, pkR
I
pk−1R , pkR
R
pk−1R , pkI
S
I,R
I,R
{I, pkI}pk−1
R
nonce nR
{R, nR}pkI
{nR, I}pkR
ni-agree
msc Synchronisation vs. agreement
Fig. 4. A protocol that satisfies NI -AGREE but not NI -SYNCH .
5 Conclusions
In this section we summarize the main contributions of our research and discuss
some directions for future work.
First of all, we have defined a general trace model for security protocols which
allows for the definition of security properties in an intensional style. This trace
model is not tied to a particular semantics, making it independent of e.g. the
execution model of an agent and the intruder model. The starting point of the
trace model is a role-based protocol description, where security claims are local to
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the protocol roles. Such a subjective security claim expresses what an agent may
safely assume after having executed his part of the protocol. The events in our
model are extended with event labels and run identifiers to unambiguously define
the origin of an event. These attributes are not under control of an intruder, but
serve to identify the events when reasoning about protocols. The main motivation
for developing the trace model was to study intensionality of specifications (which
we call synchronisation) and agreement in an abstract framework, allowing us
to pinpoint what the exact differences are. Due to the uniform phrasing, the
two notions of authentication can be distinguished easily: agreement allows that
an intruder injects a (correct and expected) message before it is sent by the
originator of the message. As for agreement, we provide both an injective and a
non-injective variant of synchronisation.
Since we only assumed an abstract trace model, the theory presented in this
paper does not suffice to prove protocols (in)correct. For this purpose we are
currently defining a canonical operational semantics of security protocols which
satisfies the requirements for the trace model put forward here. Experiments
with this operational definition of synchronisation indicate that formal proofs
that security protocols satisfy synchronisation are feasible.
Finally, we think that it would be interesting to study extensions of our
model, such as timing and recentness as has been done in [8].
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Abstract. The rapid development of collaborative environments over the internet
has highlighted new concerns over security and trust in such global computing
systems. The global computing infrastructure poses an issue of uncertainty about
the potential collaborators. Reaching a trusting decision in such environments
encompasses both risk and trust assessments. While much work has been done
in terms of modelling trust, the investigation of the management of trust lifecycle
issues with consideration of both trust and risk is less examined. Our previous
work addressed the dynamic aspects of trust lifecycle with a consideration of
trust formation, exploitation, and evolution. In this paper we provide an approach
for formalizing these aspects. As part of the formalization of the trust lifecycle,
we introduce a notion of attraction to model the effect of new pieces of evidence
on our opinion. The formalization described in this paper constitutes the basis of
ongoing work to investigate the properties of the model.
1 Introduction
Increasing interest in collaborative applications for accomplishing difficult distributed
tasks in the global computing context (Internet and other large networks) has led to an
increased awareness of the security issues in such a dynamic and open environment
[5], [4]. It is becoming widely acknowledged that traditional security measures fail to
provide the necessary flexibility for interactions between mobile autonomous entities,
due to statically defined security policies and capabilities. The global computing setting
precludes reliance on some central control authority, which in traditional systems would
have full knowledge of all the entities within the system. One approach that has been
suggested to help alleviate these problems is the concept of trust [7], which in analogous
situations in human society has proved to be effective in allowing unknown entities
to learn to determine how each other are likely to behave based on evidence that is
available for evaluation. In the SECURE project[9], we are providing an approach that
considers risk and trust to secure collaborations between entities. At the heart of the
SECURE approach lies the formal trust model [2] and risk model [1].
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In a global collaboration environment, mobile entities form ad-hoc collaborations
in order to achieve their goals. These entities might represent persons, devices, or their
software agents. Every entity that needs to make trusting decisions is defined in our
model as a principal in a set P. A collaboration involves a number of actions belonging
to the set A, the set of all possible actions. Although a collaboration in the general
case might involve multiple actions and principals, in this paper we restrict ourselves to
single action collaborations between two principals. We call such collaborations simple.
Thus, a simple collaboration is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Simple Collaboration). Given a set P of principals and a set of actions
A, a simple collaboration C between pi and pe elements of P is defined as a triple
(act, pi, pe) , where
. pe is the executor of the action,
. pi is the initiator of the action,
. act denotes the action (actions could be parameterized) that pi wants to perform
and is an element of A, the set of actions.
The starting supposition is that one of the two collaborators (pi) sends a request to pe
asking for permission to perform the action act. Since the environment of collaboration
is characterized by a high level of uncertainty about the identity and trustworthiness of
the collaborators, a trusting decision needs to be made. In such a situation both trust
and risk assessment play a crucial role in establishing collaboration, in the sense that no
trusting decision is required if there is no risk involved in executing the action. This is
the reason for having trust and risk models underpinning the SECURE project.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the formal model of
the trust-based decision maker with its components. Section 3 discusses the trust policy
languages. We conclude and state the future work in section 4.
2 Trust-based decision maker
The approach we are taking in the SECURE project is to develop a dynamic model
of trust to provide entities with the ability to collaborate and make security related
decisions autonomously. A trusting decision will be reached by weighing the trust in-
formation of the principal and the risk assessment for the requested interaction. The
cyclic relationship between trust and risk implies that on one hand, trust is a parameter
in the risk assessment, while on the other hand risk is a parameter in the trust evolution
process.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the decision maker that incorporates four com-
ponents: a trust engine, a risk evaluator, a trust lifecycle manager, and an evidence
repository. For a trust-based decision to be made, the trust engine supplies the risk eval-
uator with the trust information that would help in reasoning about the risk involved in
the collaboration. For example, a trustworthy principal behaves in a way that increases
the probability of high benefits and reduces the probability of high costs. The decision
is based on the risk aversion of the deciding principal and the expected costs/benefits of
the interaction as they are dictated by risk analysis. The trust information , in the form
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of evidence from interactions, collected and processed by the trust lifecycle manager
will be fed into the risk evaluator and the trust engine to be used in future interactions.
Trust information or values may be stored in memory to represent historical information
on the behavioural patterns of specific entities. The functionalities of these components
are further discussed in the following subsections.
Risk Evalautor
Evidence Store
Trust Engine
Trust L.cycle M.
Fig. 1. The trust-based decision maker
2.1 Trust Engine
The aims of the trust engine are to update trust information based on the accumulation
of evidence and to supply the risk evaluator with the required trust information for
handling requests and reaching decisions.
In the global computing setting, the set of active principals is very large. Therefore,
every principal has its own trust values on a finite set of other principals and associates
unknown to the rest (unknown is interpreted as having no evidence for trust or distrust).
In the trust engine [2], the global trust of the system is expressed as a function (m)
mapping principals (P ) to a function from principals to trust information (T ). Formally
we have:
m : P → P → T
meaning that m applied to a principal a and then to a principal b would return the trust
value m(a)(b) ∈ T expressing a’s trust in b. The set T is a set of trust values, whose
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elements represent degrees of trust. The set T has two orderings ¹ and v such that
(T,≤) is a complete lattice and (T,v) is a complete partial order (c.p.o.) with a bottom
element. The two orderings (¹ and v) that defined on the set T are:
The first ordering (¹) is the trust ordering, that allows the qualitative comparison
of trust values. For example, in a complete lattice (T,≤) that expresses a set of trust
labels (low,medium, high) the value high reflects ”more trust” in comparison to the
value medium.
The second ordering (v), the trust information ordering, represents the quantity of
available trust information for a principal. In essence this enables the comparison of the
precision of trust information.
Following these two orderings, we can construct the triple (T,≤,v) starting with
a complete lattice, (D,≤), and considering the set of intervals of type [d0,d1] over D.
The ¹ ordering on this set of intervals allows the construction of a complete lattice
of intervals which can be allocated as trust values. For example, the interval [medium,
high] represents higher trust than the interval [low, medium].
The v ordering considers the intervals’ width, which can be thought of as repre-
senting the amount of uncertainty. For example, the interval [low,medium] represents
less uncertainty in comparison to the interval [low, high]. In fact, the interval expresses
that the exact trust label could be either low or high.
Each principal has a trust policy that expresses how the principal plans to compute
its own trust information (for examples of policies see section 3 of this paper). The
global trust function m will be computed from the collection of all the policies (one for
each principal).
There are two operations defined in the trust engine: update and trust. The update
method modifies the state of the engine with new observation, and the trust method
returns a trust value for a principal. Local policies compute the trustworthiness of the
principal.
2.2 Risk Evaluator
The function of the risk evaluator is to reason about the risk involved in the interactions
between principals. The risk evaluator helps in reaching decision under the circum-
stances of uncertainty. For this reason the whole process of the risk evaluation is based
on investigating the likelihood of potential costs or benefits of the possible outcomes.
Each action is associated to a set of possible outcomes. Each outcome has an associ-
ated subjective family of cost-probability density functions (cost-pdfs)[1]. The cost-pdfs
represent the range of possible costs and benefits that may be incurred by the user for
each outcome, reflecting variations in principal behaviour. Actions might have parame-
ters associated with them. In this case, the action parameter may affect the values of the
costs/benefits.
The trust information that is provided by the trust engine selects one cost-pdf from
the family of cost-pdfs for each outcome. The selected cost-pdf for each of the indepen-
dent outcomes are combined and analyzed according to a security policy, to facilitate
a decision on the requested action. The decisions need not be binary, in the sense of
“accept or reject”, but may also encode some other decisions, i.e. asking for more in-
formation.
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The approach we are taking in the SECURE project is to incorporate trust and risk
for trust-based decision making for collaboration between entities. Reasoning about risk
and trust indicates the mapping relationship between users’ trustworthiness and users’
profile of expected behaviour (cost-pdfs).
2.3 Trust Lifecycle Manager
The dynamic aspects of the model such as how trust is formed, how trust evolves over
time due to available information and how trust can be exploited are collectively re-
ferred to as the trust lifecycle. Therefore, the trust lifecycle manager evaluates trust
information and reflects that on the level of principals’ trustworthiness. The processes
of trust formation and trust evolution are slightly different. Formation differs from evo-
lution in that additional evidence might be actively sought for formation, while evolu-
tion refers to the process of changing one’s estimation of trust based on gathered trust
information from interactions.
There are two main sources of trust information (evidence): observations and rec-
ommendations. Personal observations are gathered after each collaboration is complete.
Personal observations of the entity’s behaviour are essential for the subjective evalua-
tion of trustworthiness; therefore the outcome of collaborations is recorded and stored
as evidence for future collaborations. Recommendations from trusted third parties pro-
vide the possibility for trust regarding unknown entities to be propagated.
It is important to state that we would expect personal observations to influence trust
to a greater degree than recommendation, therefore it is important to weight the evi-
dence dependent on the source of the information. Since trust is a subjective notion, our
own trust information has more merit in the sense that we have first hand knowledge of
the whole circumstances of the interaction. Recommendations, however, are passed on
as a trust value, which conceals much of the supporting information. The process of rec-
ommendation becomes more important in cases where we have no personal interactions
with the entity in question.
In [6], we introduced the notion of attraction. The attraction represents the effect
of a new piece of evidence on the current trust value. The new evidence (either from
observations or recommendations) has some influence on our opinion, in the sense that
it “attracts” our opinion towards it.
Definition 2 (Attraction). An attraction att is a pair (τ, ι) where τ is the direction of
the attraction and ι is the power (strength) of the attraction.
The attraction operates by using the two orderings: trust ordering (¹) and informa-
tion ordering (v). Accordingly, we have that:
. The direction of the attraction, τ, is determined by the trust ordering. Relative po-
sitioning of the two trust values according to the trust ordering, i.e. trust positive,
trust neutral and trust negative. For example, if Tcurr = [low, medium] and Tevd =
[medium, high] then the trust value from evidence is trust positive.
. The power (strength) of the attraction, ι, is determined by the information or-
dering. Relative strength of the two trust values is determined by their position-
ing on the information ordering c.p.o. For example, if Tcurr=[low,medium] and
Tevd=[medium,high] then the trust value from evidence is conflicting.
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The power (strength) has the following properties:
. The stronger the new piece of evidence, the stronger the attraction (τ and ι) is.
. The stronger our opinion the weaker the attraction.
. A supporting evidence reinforces our opinion.
. A contradicting evidence undermines our opinion.
Before describing the application of the notion of attraction and its two functions to
observations and recommendations, we will discuss the evaluation of observations and
recommendations.
Observation. Observation is defined as the observed cost-benefit for each outcome
upon completion of an interaction (ocb-outcome). The evaluation function takes place
after completing an interaction and obtaining some observation. Formally the evaluation
of observation is achieved by the function eval(). This function takes as arguments the
current trust value (Tcurr) and the observed costs-benefits of the outcomes and returns a
trust value.
As described above in the risk evaluator, the outcomes are associated with their
potential cost and likelihood. Incorporating the trust model and the risk model allows us
to choose the best cost-pdf for the outcomes. By reaching a decision, a prediction of the
expected cost/benefit of the outcomes will be made. The evaluation function determines
the level of trust in the principal based on the one piece of evidence, by comparing the
current trust value used to initiate the collaboration with the observed cost/benefit (ocb-
outcome). The evaluation function must therefore be able to determine the correct trust
value which corresponds to the ocb-outcome, to enable the determination of the relevant
trust value. This is achieved through the use of a reversible mapping from cost/benefit
to trust values.
The evaluation function evalactp : T ×Outcomes → T , where Outcomes is the set
of possible outcomes and T is the set of trust values. The function takes a pair (ocb-
outcome, Tcurr), where ocb-outcome represents the observed cost/benefit and the Tcurr
represent the current trust value that was in use before establishing the interaction. The
evaluation function provides an insight into which cost-pdfs would have been the more
accurate predictors of the outcome of the interaction (i.e. which set of cost-pdfs would
have provided the highest likelihood for the observed costs-benefits). This evaluation
function produces a trust value (i.e. the trust value that would have picked this set of
cost-pdfs). The evaluation function eval() could be defined as,
evalactp = eval(Tcurr, ocb-outcome,C) = eval(Tcurr, ocb-outcome,act, pe, pi)
where act is the action and pe and pi are the principals. Following this approach ev-
idence might be stored with two indexes identifying the action and the principal who
performed the action. This allows us to look up the history of evidence by either the
principal or the associated action.
Recommendation. Recommendations are defined as,
rec : P → P → T
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For example if a,b ∈ P (P is the set of principals) we can say that rec(a)(b) is a’s
trust value for b. We seek recommendation for further information when the amount
of observations is insufficient. Accordingly, we request recommendations, with respect
to the principal in question, from trusted third parties. Trusted third parties pass on
their opinion on the principal in question as a trust value. This trust value summarizes
their own observations. Having recommendations based on third parties’ observations
prevent us from receiving second hand recommendations.
Assumption 1 (Uniform Behaviour).
We only consider recommendations from principals that observe uniform behaviour
to us, In the sense that we observe similar profile of cost/benefit probability mass.
The driving force behind this assumption is that we only consider recommendations
provide information useful to us. Unless we observe similar behaviour then a recom-
mendation is misleading.
There is an issue of discounting recommendations. The current state of our formal-
ization does not incorporate a notion of discounting recommendations. We are consider-
ing this issue in our agenda of future work. The discounting will change the trust value
before its evaluation otherwise the approach is the same.
The way we deal with recommendations is similar to observations by calculating
their respective trust values’ attraction. Each piece of evidence (either from recom-
mendations observations) has its own attraction on our trust value.The core step of the
evolution of trust values is the application of the following two attraction-functions to
the new piece of evidence.
As said above, the attraction-functions correspond to the notion of the two orderings
of the trust engine (trust ordering and information ordering). Therefore, we have two
attraction-functions: trust function (τ-function) and information function (ι-function).
These two functions take as arguments the current trust value Tcurr and the trust value
from the piece of evidence (for simplicity called Tevd), be that from an observation
(after the application of the eval() function) or from a recommendation (note that the
recommender is just providing a trust value).
τ-function. This function takes the current trust value (Tcurr) and the trust value from
evidence (Tevd) and produces a trust-attraction value (τ-value). Formally we can de-
scribe the function as:
τ(Tcurr,Tevd)= τ-value
These trust-attraction values belong to a domain that is divided into trust increas-
ing, trust decreasing and trust neutral values. A trust increasing value cannot lower,
according to the trust ordering, our current trust value. For example, if Tcurr is [medium,
medium] and Tevd is [medium,high] that means the new trust values cannot be lower
than [medium, medium]. Similarly a trust decreasing value cannot increase our current
trust value. While a trust neutral value can neither increase nor decrease our current
trust value. If the trust-attraction value is positive, negative or neutral depends on the
relative position on the trust ordering lattice of the two trust values, arguments of the
τ-function.
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ι-function. This function also takes the current trust value Tcurr and the trust value
from evidence (Tevd) and produces an information-attraction value (ι-value). Formally
we can describe the function as:
ι(Tcurr,Tevd)= ι-value
These information-attraction values belong to a domain that is divided into conflict-
ing, reinforcing and neutral values. To determine which value of the domain the ι-value
belongs to, we follow these conditions:
. The maximum reinforcing value is returned when the greatest lower bound (g.l.b.)
according to the information ordering of the two arguments is equal to the current
trust value(Tcurr).
. The maximum conflicting value is returned when the g.l.b. of the two arguments is
equal to the least element of the information ordering.
. A neutral value is returned when the g.l.b. of the two arguments is equal to the trust
value from the evidence.
The exact measure of the ι-attraction value has the following relationship to the
strength (number of labels included in interval) of the arguments and the overlap(number
of common labels):
(Strength (evidence trust)/Strength (current trust))*(Overlap)
The maximum strength for a trust value is assigned to values that have no other trust
value greater than them according to the information order, while the minimum strength
is assigned to the least element of the information ordering c.p.o. The rest of the strength
values reflect the number of trust values that are greater than the value in question
according to the information ordering. The overlap reflects the level of contradiction or
reinforcement of the two trust values and as was described above depends on the relative
position of our current trust value to the g.l.b. of two arguments of the ι-function.
Applying the two attraction functions (ι-function and τ-function) to the new piece
of evidence produces a pair (τ,ι)that will be used to update the current trust value (Tcurr).
The update function. The update function, update(), takes as input the pair (τ, ι)
and the current trust value (Tcurr), producing a new trust value (Tnew).Formally, we can
describe the update() function as:
update((τ, ι),Tcurr)=Tnew
The two attraction values are in fact excluding certain trust values as a possibility for
the new trust value. The τ-attraction excludes values based on their position on the
trust ordering lattice, while the ι-attraction excludes values based on their position on
the information ordering c.p.o. For example, a trust increasing value τ-value would
exclude all trust values for which the current trust value is greater than according to
the trust ordering. Similarly, a contradicting value ι-value will exclude all trust values
that are greater than the current trust value according to the information ordering. These
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functions will result in two subsets (τ-set and ι-set ⊆ T ) of trust values each consistent
to the evaluation of the new piece of evidence according to the each ordering. The new
trust value Tnew ∈ τ-set ⋂ ι-set. The exact functions for the determination of the new
trust value depends on the application.
2.4 Evidence Store
In our model the position is taken that the trust information is stored in order to allow
us to reason about principals’ trustworthiness in future interactions. Therefore, we in-
troduce a structure called the evidence store. The use of a layered structure (Figure 2) to
store trust information provides a greater depth of information upon which to base any
decision than merely storing the individual trust values relating to the entity in question.
The following points discuss these layers of the evidence store and the operation
functions between the layers:
1. The base layer contains lists of all observations or recommendations. The output of
the evaluation function eval()will be stored in these lists. There is a fixed size for
each one of these lists. When adding a new experience, the size of the list (L) will
be checked. If L has some space, then the new piece of evidence will be added to
the previous ones. When L is full, the attraction of old observations or recommen-
dations will be calculated and then cleared so as to add the new one. In this way, all
evidence in the history of the principal’s interactions is reflected in the trust value
even though the observations themselves are discarded. The trust update function
update() produces a trust value (Tobs)that will be stored on the second layer. The
update of the evidence will take place separably, for recommendations and obser-
vations, to allow us to determine a trust value that purely based on observations
(Tobs). This facilitates the process of giving recommendations upon receiving rec-
ommendation requests.
2. The second layer in the structure contains a trust value (Tobs) specific to observation
and a trust value (Trec) reflects the attraction of all the received recommendations.
The new final Tcurr to be used for decision making can be calculated using the
attraction notion in two ways. The first approach is to apply the attraction of Trec on
Tobs to produce a new trust value that will be stored as (Tcurr)in the top layer. In the
second approach we apply the attraction of both Trec and Tobs on the current trust
value (Tcurr)that is stored in the top layer and produce a new trust value. The result
of these two operations produce a trust value that will be stored in the top layer.
3. The value in the top layer influences the trust engine, which invokes the trust
method. In this way, the local trust policy will be updated in the light of this new
trust value.
3 Trust Policy languages
In this section we show how to express what was said in the previous sections using a
language for describing policies.
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Tcurr
(Stored or combined from layer below)
Tobs Trec
Evidence layer (list of all observations and received recommendations)
Fig. 2. The Trust Information Structure
3.1 The Policy Language
In [2] we defined a general setting, where policies are specified via a language. For-
mally, policies are functions of type P → T such that for each principal a they return
a trust value. The language permits the specification of these functions. A policy lan-
guage has the form λx : P .τ where τ specifies the returned value of the policy, done
by using certain operators. One of these operators is the operator p·q, called delegation.
For instance the policy λx : P .paq(x) specifies the function that, for any principal b∈ P ,
returns a’s trust in b. Delegation makes policies dependent on the global trust m. The
function m is defined as the least fixed point of all policies (see the reference for more
details and formal semantics).
The operator of delegation can also be combined with other operators provided from
the language. For instance we could write a policy which says that our trust in b is a’s
trust in b but for any other principal c it will be the least upper bound between a’s trust
in c and a threshold value [d0,d1]:
λx : P .(x = b) 7→ paq(x);([d0,d1]upaq(x))
where the operator · 7→ ·; · is semantically equivalent to an if-then-else and u is the l.u.b.
in lattices.
3.2 Encoding in the policy language
The encoding in the policy language is done by exploiting two features: the syntax of the
policy and the structure of the set T . When we give a policy pi written in the language
we give an algorithm for computing a function. Hence, when writing the policy, we
“store” some information in the syntax of the language which means that it is possible
to record the current trust value.
Representing the various layers of the evidence repository could be handled by giv-
ing more structure to the set T . Suppose that the initial set of trust values (as the one
of the previous sections) is Tval , provided with an information ordering v and a trust
ordering ¹ as required. Then we can define a new set T as
T = [EV D]×Tobs×Trec
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where [EV D] is the list of observations, e.g. [evd1, . . . ,evdn] ∈ [EV D] for evd1, . . . ,evdn
evidences. This means that our policy contains a list of evidences (as shown in the base
layer of the evidence repository), and two trust values (as shown in the second layer):
the first one which refers to the current trust value based on observation (which is then
a constant in the syntax), and the second one which refers to the value updated with
recommendations.To describe these trust values as a policy, we will initially start from
the situation where there is no observations or recommendations. Therefore, the policy
could be defined as:
pia = λx : P .([],⊥,⊥)
where [] is the empty list and ⊥ is the bottom of the information ordering (no infor-
mation).
When we have an observation, say o1, we just need to update the list of observations
and so get the the new policy
pia = λx : P .([evd1],⊥,⊥)
In a situation when the returned trust value that we asked the trust engine for is not
enough, we might ask principal b for recommendation about c. Then our policy would
be updated to
pia = λx : P .([], [d0,d1],(x = c) 7→ update((τ1, ι1), [d0,d1])
where τ1 = τ((pbq(x).2),paq(c).2)) and ι1 = ι((pbq(x).2),paq(c).2)) determines the
attraction. The operator .2 (in general .n for any natural number) stands for the projec-
tion of the 2-nd element (in general n-th) over the tuple (over set T ). Hence every time
we update we keep the old value and add new references to other principals.
Notice that when getting an observation we just store it in the list but we do not
update the trust value. That is going to be done with a further update which basically
cleans the list and updates (with the function eval) the trust value in the middle of the
triple.
4 Conclusions and Further Work
The primary contribution of this paper is in formalizing a model for a trust-based de-
cision maker that incorporates four components: trust engine, risk evaluator, trust life-
cycle, and evidence repository. The model reflects on how important is to take the two
factors of trust in risk on board in establishing collaboration between principals. The
model showed that reaching decision is a prolonged process to remove some shade of
uncertainty issues concerning risk and principals’ trustworthiness.
A similar approach for trust management formalization is described in [3]. This
model also accommodates and correlates trust and risk in establishing interactions in
the context of e-services. In their proposed model, there is no formal definition of trust.
Alternatively, they described a classification of trust relationships in the environment
of e-commerce. It is also important to mention that subjective logic theory [8] , has
influenced our addressing of issues of uncertainty in our model.
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There are a number of promising directions for further investigation. One of these
issues is how to introduce complexity in the model by considering more complex col-
laborations (i.e. a collaboration that takes place between more than two collaborators
to perform dependent actions). An interesting area of research is how to make a deci-
sion based on the relative context and time. This implies encoding these two notions
in the model. For the trust engine, one particular area of interest is to complement the
denotation model presented here with an operational model where, for instance, we will
need to address the question of computing trust information efficiently over the global
network.
Our future research will be focused on examining this model by developing a sim-
ulation framework. In this framework, we will study the properties of the proposed
model. The results of the simulation and the study of the current model properties will
guide us to more complex collaboration model. We hope to report on this work shortly.
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